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And when the worrying starts to hurt 
 and the world feels like graves of dirt  
Just close your eyes until  
you can imagine this place, yeah, our secret space at will 
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The perseverative cognition hypothesis 
In daily life, many people ponder about things that have happened in the past or about things that 
might occur in the future. In contrast with animals, human beings are capable of thinking minutes, 
hours, months and years back and ahead. This ability comes in handy when planning one’s holiday or 
when deciding what jobs one wants to pursue. Also, it can be a pretty enjoyable experience to 
remember pleasant events or to look forward to such events. Yet, this ability to think back and ahead 
also has a downside: it gives humans endless opportunities to keep thinking about stressful events 
that lie either in the past or in the future. For a majority of people worries about upcoming stressful 
events are indeed a common experience in daily life, also when these events never actually happen. 
Frequent worries about the future do not come without costs. Since the early ‘80s, it has 
been increasingly recognized that severe, pathological worry is crucial in the onset and maintenance 
of anxiety and mood disorders (Watkins, 2008). More recently, pathological as well as non-
pathological worry has become a growing area of interest in stress research (Brosschot, Gerin, & 
Thayer, 2006), the major aim of which is to explain why stressful events can make us sick. Stress 
research in the past fifty years had been dominated by the reactivity model of stress, stating that 
frequent exaggerated stress-related physiological activity during the experience of a stressful event is 
detrimental for one’s health (Linden, Earle, Gerin, & Christenfeld, 1997). For example, people who 
show a strongly enhanced heart rate during stressful events such as an exam would be vulnerable to 
develop cardiovascular problems in the long term. Yet, in the last ten years a shift in paradigm could 
be observed towards prolonged activation models (Linden et al., 1997; Schwartz et al., 2003; Pieper 
& Brosschot, 2005), stating that stress-related physiological activity that is enhanced in anticipation 
of or after stressful events is crucial in the causal chain from stressful events to disease. This focus on 
the temporal aspects of the stress response was already advocated by early stress researchers (Selye, 
1951), but has remained understudied for years. From a prolonged activation model point of view, 
the total duration of the physiological stress response, and not so much its initial strength, is the 
most important factor in determining whether stress affects one’s health. A central venture for stress 
researchers is therefore to disentangle why and under what circumstances stress-related 
physiological activity is prolonged beyond the presence of actual stressful events. Working from 
within the framework of the prolonged activation model, Brosschot, Gerin and Thayer (2006) 
proposed that worry is a likely candidate to produce sustained stress-related physiological activity in 
daily life. Worry can be regarded as a recurrent or persistent cognitive representation of a stressor, 
termed ‘perseverative cognition’, and this perseverative cognition could serve as a mechanism that 
prolongs physiological activation due to stressor. According to the ‘perseverative cognition 




which in turn leads to health problems. In other words, stressful events cannot affect one’s health, 





Figure 1. The perseverative cognition model. Only physiological stress responses that are prolonged by worry can lead to a 
pathogenic state in which people are vulnerable for the development of somatic health problems. Adapted from: 
Brosschot, Gerin & Thayer (2006).  
 
Evidence for the perseverative cognition hypothesis is accumulating. Recent research shows that 
worry in daily life is associated with enhanced cardiac activity (in combination with stressful events 
having similar adverse effects as smoking; Pieper, Brosschot, van der Leeden, & Thayer, 2007; 
Brosschot, van Dijk, & Thayer, 2007). Furthermore, worry has been found to be predict somatic 
health complaints like fatigue, neck pain and headache, and this effect could be reduced by a simple 
worry postponement intervention (Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006; Jellesma, Verkuil, & Brosschot, 
2009; see chapter 2 for a more thorough review). Yet, the existing studies suffer from limitations that 
restrict conclusions regarding several crucial aspects of the perseverative cognition model. This thesis 
addresses several of these aspects.  
Firstly, the larger part of studies investigating the effects of worry on somatic health 
outcomes have relied on self-report trait-worry questionnaires; 15 out of 24 studies reviewed by 
Brosschot, Gerin and Thayer (2006) solely relied on trait questionnaires. Yet, the extent to which 
such trait questionnaires are related to the frequency and duration of worry episodes as measured 


















as reported in chapter 3). Thus the significance (exact meaning) of the larger part of the current 
evidence therefore remains unknown. If trait worry questionnaires do not correspond with worry in 
daily life, the validity and reliability of most current evidence could be questioned. Therefore we 
used real life, momentary measures of worry to study its prospective relationship with somatic 
health complaints (chapter 4).  
Secondly, only little is known about the relation between daily worry and health outcomes in 
populations vulnerable to develop stress-related health complaints, such as teachers or nurses 
(chapter 4), or in people already suffering from severe stress (chapter 5). It is also not known 
whether the potentially adverse effects of worry can be reduced in these groups. Brosschot and Van 
der Doef (2006) already showed that a simple worry postponement intervention could reduce the 
adverse effects of worry on health complaints. Worry plays a pivotal role in the development and 
maintenance of not only anxious and depressed mood, but likely also in somatic complaints. In a 
time where a significant amount of employees is suffering from work-related stress and worries 
(Monsterboard, 2008), and where as yet few evidence-based short and easy to administer stress 
management interventions are available (Jorm & Griffiths, 2006), it seems of particular interest to 
test whether such an intervention would also be effective in a clinical population suffering from 
severe work stress (chapter 5). Showing that a simple worry intervention is effective in reducing 
somatic complaints, as well as anxious and depressed mood, could potentially provide clinicians, like 
occupational physicians and general practitioners, with such an evidence-based intervention. 
Furthermore, it would provide evidence that the perseverative cognition hypothesis holds true in a 
clinical population too.  
Thirdly, whereas ambulatory studies have consistently found associations between state 
(daily) worry and cardiac activity (e.g., Pieper et al., 2007; Brosschot et al., 2007), laboratory studies 
have yielded inconsistent results (see chapters 6 and 9). Although most studies have shown that trait 
perseverative cognition predicts slowed cardiovascular recovery after stressful events (Glynn, 
Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002; Gerin, Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal, & Schwartz, 2006; Key, Campbell, 
Bacon, & Gerin, 2008), several of these studies did not find an association between state worry and 
slowed cardiovascular recovery (Key et al., 2008; Gerin et al., 2006). One possible explanation is that 
in high trait worriers worrying occurs very automatically and without conscious awareness. If this is 
true, such implicit worry cannot be assessed via self report methods that rely on information that 
one can consciously reflect upon and report. According to the definition of perseverative cognition, 
its pathogenic ingredient is the ‘cognitive representation of a stressor’, which can theoretically be 
conscious as well as unconscious (Brosschot et al., 2006). Whereas all studies concerning the 
perseverative cognition hypothesis have focused on its explicit, conscious forms, no studies have 





cardiac recovery (see also chapters 2 and 6). If perseverative cognition like worry indeed occurs 
unconsciously and slows cardiac recovery, this would open up a new and promising venture for stress 
research, because a large part of cognitive processing in daily life occurs without conscious 
awareness. This could potentially mean that by focusing on consciously perceived stress, researchers 
have been focusing on the ‘tip of the stress-iceberg’. 
Fourthly and finally, as a consequence of worry research only being started recently and the 
heavy focus on trait-approaches, only very few attempts have been made to study the mechanisms 
via which worry exerts its detrimental influence on both mental and somatic health. In this thesis, 
three studies are reported that have been conducted to address these possible mechanisms 
(chapters 7 – 9).  
 
Thesis outline 
The main aim of this thesis was twofold. First, realized in part 1, to further test the perseverative 
cognition hypothesis, three studies were conducted to test whether worry predicts adverse health-
related outcomes, while addressing the above mentioned limitations. In these studies, health-related 
outcomes were operationalized as either somatic health complaints (chapters 4 and 5) or slowed 
cardiac recovery (chapter 6). Health complaints and slowed cardiovascular recovery are both 
associated with morbidity and mortality (Sha et al., 2005; Kivimaki et al., 2006; Jae et al., 2008). The 
second aim of this thesis, realized in part 2, was to examine possible pathways or mechanisms that 
could explain or add to the findings from the first part of this thesis (chapters 7 – 9; see below for 
more details).  
The thesis starts with a theoretical review summarizing recent evidence regarding the 
perseverative cognition hypothesis and providing an integrative theoretical framework on 
perseverative cognition (chapter 2). In chapter 3, the predictive validity of three widely used trait 
worry questionnaires is investigated in a large sample of university students. In chapter 4, the effects 
of momentary assessed stressful events and worry episodes on somatic health complaints is 
examined in a sample of primary and secondary school teachers. The specific prediction was tested 
that worry mediates the adverse health effects of stressful events. In chapter 5, the effectiveness of a 
simple worry postponement and disengagement intervention was tested in a sample of clinical 
outpatients suffering from severe work stress. In this randomized clinical trial, patients that were 
awaiting stress management therapy were randomly allocated to either receive the worry 
postponement and disengagement intervention before the onset of the stress-management therapy 
or one out of two control conditions, that is the registering of worry episodes or a waitlist control. By 
experimentally trying to reduce worry, it could be tested whether worry was causally related to 





the additive effects of this worry intervention on the stress management therapy were investigated. 
In chapter 6 the effects of explicit and implicit worry on cardiac recovery after a stressful event were 
investigated. We hypothesized that trait worry would predict slowed cardiac recovery after stress, 
and that this effect would be mediated by explicit and implicit state worry experienced during the 
recovery period following the stressful event. 
Whereas the first part of this thesis is aimed at examining whether worry is related to health 
outcomes, the second part of this thesis is aimed at clarifying the mechanisms behind the relation 
between worry and health (chapters 7 and 9) and also the mechanisms behind the worry process 
itself (chapter 8). Each of these three studies described in this part corresponds to a study reported 
earlier in this thesis and targets a specific mechanism that adds to a fuller understanding of how 
worry affects our health, thereby extending and specifying the perseverative cognition model. Below, 
the aims or these studies are explained and how they correspond with the part 1 studies. First, 
although the perseverative cognition hypothesis states that worry can lead to somatic health 
complaints via prolonged physiological activity, as assumed in the study of chapter 3, an alternative 
pathway that bypasses the physiological route was suggested there and tested in a study reported in 
chapter 7. Somatic health complaints could be due to specific worries about one’s health. It is 
possible that in people who frequently experience somatic health complaints bodily sensations 
trigger cognitive networks related to health, which promote selective cognitive processing and 
misinterpretations of these bodily sensations. In turn, highly accessible cognitive networks increase 
the likelihood of reporting somatic health complaints by causing worries about these complaints 
(Brown, 2004; Brosschot, 2002). To address this issue, we conducted a study in which we examined 
the extent to which common health complaints were associated with health worry, and with 
selective cognitive processing of health related information. Second, an implicit assumption in the 
studies using the worry postponement intervention (Brosschot and Van der Doef, 2006; chapter 5) or 
mindfulness based intervention aimed to reduce worry, is that worry episodes are prolonged due to 
difficulties in disengaging attention from threatening information. Indeed, recent work suggests that 
people who suffer from anxiety and dysphoria especially have trouble with disengaging attention 
from threatening information (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; 
Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 
2006). In chapter 8, it was examined whether this was specifically due to heightened levels of worry. 
This would provide us with more clues on how to treat worry and provide evidence that 
interventions indeed do well by focusing especially on the engagement-disengagement dimension in 
the worry process. Third, concerning the cardiovascular effects of worry (chapter 6), it is not clear 
which elements of worry actually cause these cardiovascular effects. It might be that this is due to 




during cognitive problem solving. We therefore conducted a study in which heart rate (HR) and heart 
rate variability (HRV) were compared within subjects during induced worrying, problem solving 
concerning issues that were not personally relevant and relaxation (chapter 8). If mere mental load is 
responsible for - at least a part of - the physiological effects of worry, this might suggest that long 
term health effects of worry might be due to the prolonged mental load aspects of worry rather than 
to its emotional aspects, even though the latter is the most commonly held belief. 
 
Figure 2 represents a more detailed model of how perseverative cognition is hypothesized to 
influence physiological and subjective health. Stressful events can lead to perseverative cognition, 
(operationalized as worry in the current thesis), as well as to negative affective responses and 
changes in information processing (‘enhanced processing of threat’), of which the latter could be 
considered as an unconscious form of perseverative cognition. These three processes interact and 
enhance each other (chapters 2 and 8). Concerning the content of worry, worry is hypothesized to 
lead to somatic health complaints via both prolonged stress responses and via specific health worry 
(chapter 7). Furthermore, worry consists of mental effort and increases negative affect (anxiety), 
both of which are assumed to be associated with increased stress-related physiological activity 















Enhanced processing of threat:















Summarizing, the studies in this thesis are aimed at showing the effects of worry on several health 
outcomes, and attempt to address the mechanisms by which these effects are accomplished. These 
latter studies should be viewed as ‘first attempts’ and were meant to be hypothesis generating and 
inspiring future research rather than giving definite answers. Expanding knowledge on whether and 
how worry affects health might bring us a step further in disentangling how ‘stress’ can ultimately 
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An adaptation of this chapter will be published in Emotion Regulation and Well-Being. Vingerhoets, 





General introduction: the perseverative cognition hypothesis 
The idea that stress can make us sick is not new. A long tradition of research into the effects of 
stressful events has made clear that stressful events can lead to mental (Hammen, 2005) as well as 
somatic health problems (Cohen & Williamson, 1991; Rozanski, Blumenthal, & Kaplan, 1999). This is 
especially the case when stressful circumstances are chronic, such as when providing care for a 
chronically ill spouse (Schulz, 2004; Vitaliano, 2003). It has also been well documented that the way 
people perceive and appraise events codetermines whether a situation or event is experienced as 
stressful and that stressful appraisals in turn initiate and activate the physiological stress reaction 
(Lazarus, 1991). Thus, stress can make us sick and that is in part due to what we think about stressful 
events. Yet, stress researchers have confined their attention mainly to what we think during these 
events and how that leads to enhanced physiological stress reactions during a stressful situation. 
Little attention has been paid to how these thoughts, when they persevere after (or before, in 
anticipation of) stressful events, can prolong the stress response. Yet, as we will argue in this chapter, 
it is the prolongation of stress responses, and not so much acute stress responses that form a crucial 
link between stressors and later mental (McEwen, 2003; Thayer & Lane, 2000) and somatic problems 
(Selye, 1951; Ursin & Eriksen, 2004; Linden, Earle, Gerin, & Christenfeld, 1997; Brosschot, Pieper, & 
Thayer, 2005; Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006). Thus, as yet scientists have hardly addressed the 
important issue of when, how often and how long we think about stressful events and how 
'perseverative thinking' about stressors might prolong the stress response. In psychopathology 
research though, during the past decade, perseverative cognitive processes have received increasing 
attention, and have been recognized as core etiological factors in the maintenance of several mental 
disorders, such as mood and anxiety disorders. We have recently hypothesized perseverative 
cognition as the mediator of the effects of stressors on not only mental but also somatic illness, 
because it prolongs not only psychological but also physiological responses to stressors. Brosschot 
Gerin & Thayer (2006) have stated that stress can only lead to disease when physiological stress 
responses are prolonged by perseverative cognition. Perseverative cognition refers to mental 
representations of the stressful events, such as worrisome anticipation before or ruminative thinking 
after the stressful events. Just as stressful cognitions during stressful events shape the concomitant 
physiological and emotional stress reaction, perseveration of these representations is hypothesized 
to prolong this physiological and emotional activity, thereby adding to the total time that stressors 
can have an impact on our mental and somatic well-being. 
Several reasons can be forwarded why insight into how perseverative thoughts prolong 
physiological activity after or before a stressful event is likely to improve our understanding of how 
stress influences our health. First, the prolonged cognitive effects of stressful events seem to outlast 
to a great extent the duration of the stressful events themselves. For example, Gilboa and Revelle 




(1994) found that even minor negative daily events can evoke worrisome thoughts that might last up 
to 11 hours after the stressful event. Second, many, if not most, stress responses are due to stressors 
that have not yet occurred or will never occur, but are anticipated (i.e. feared) nevertheless. In other 
words, their anticipation in the form of worrying is in fact their only manifestation. Anticipated 
stressors - as opposed to actually occurring stressors - is such an extremely common form of stress-
related cognition that it is quite surprising that is has received such little attention in stress science. 
For example, in a large scale survey amongst Dutch employees, one third reported to experience 
sleeping difficulties every Sunday night due to worries about the upcoming work week 
(Monsterboard, 2008). In addition, a majority of employees have difficulties in relaxing after work 
because they keep on worrying about their next stressful workday. Third, studies on the temporal 
aspects of emotions show that initial emotional reactivity during stressful events is only weakly 
related to the duration of the emotional response (6 – 14% shared variance) and that even positive 
changes in the stressful event, such as when a conflict between an employee and their boss is 
resolved, are only weakly associated with the duration of the emotional responses to it (6% shared 
variance; Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994). In conclusion then, it seems clear that cognitive, emotional and 
physiological reactivity during real life stressful events is only one side of the coin, and that 
investigating the total duration of stress related psychological and physiological activity, even beyond 
the presence of the real life stressor is of high importance. 
In this chapter we will review recent evidence for the perseverative cognition hypothesis, 
including its effects on mental as well as somatic health. In it we specifically focus on the real life 
dynamics of perseverative cognition. Furthermore, we will provide a self regulation perspective on 
perseverative cognition clarifying the notion that perseverative cognition is in fact the default 
response to stressful situations, a response which is successfully inhibited by most healthy people. 
We will illustrate how goal directed cognition can lead to pathological perseverative cognition as 
seen in mood and anxiety disorders. Finally, we will discuss the neurophysiological underpinnings of 
perseverative cognition. First, the concept of perseverative cognition itself, its manifestation and 
prevalence will be introduced.  
 
The concept and prevalence of perseverative cognition 
Perseverative cognition is defined as “the repeated or chronic activation of the cognitive 
representation of one or more psychological stressors” (Brosschot et al., 2006). A stressor is defined 
as a situation involving potential harm, without or with low perceived control, that is a threat to the 
psychobiological integrity of oneself or to the attainment of one’s higher order goals. Although many 
terms are used by psychologists to refer to perseverative thinking, such as “rumination”, “repetitive 





term ‘perseverative cognition’ (Brosschot, van Dijk, & Thayer, 2002; Brosschot et al., 2006) within the 
framework of psychobiological stress research. These reasons are that (1) related terms involve 
either too broad or too narrow definitions to be used in a stress model, (2) these terms lack an 
emphasis on the importance of the perseverative process itself for health, and (3) our definition of 
perseverative cognition as a “mental representation of psychological stressors" allows to include 
alternative cognitive processes, for example automatic or unconscious cognitive processes, that may 
have substantial health-relevant effects. Below, we will discuss each of these arguments in more 
detail. 
First, several concepts involving conscious perseverative thinking exist that are either too 
broadly defined, such as rumination, defined as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around an 
instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring the 
thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 7) and repetitive thinking, defined as the “process of thinking 
attentively, repetitively or frequently about one’s self and one’s world” (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, 
& Shortridge, 2003, p. 909). Both of these terms can also refer to positive thoughts, whereas 
perseverative cognition deals with negative thoughts that are specifically concerned with stressors. 
Other terms are too specifically or narrowly defined, such as depressive rumination: “behaviors and 
thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of these 
symptoms” ((Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991p. 569) and worry: “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively 
affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage in 
mental problem-solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or 
more negative outcomes. Consequently, worry relates closely to fear process.” (Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10). Worry as well as depressive rumination deal with stressors, being 
either future stressors or ones depressive symptoms, and are the most thoroughly investigated types 
of perseverative cognition. Perseverative cognition encompasses worry as well as rumination, and 
also other related concepts, such as intrusive thoughts, and negative flashbacks.  
Second, the term ‘perseverative' makes clear that the pathological ingredient of mentally 
representing stressors is their perseveration, that is, the duration of exposure of the organism to the 
(cognitive representation of) the stressor (threat). As argued above, the duration of the stress 
response is its toxic element, for mental as well as for somatic health. Only persistent emotional or 
physiological responses can lead to problems in either mental or somatic health.  
Third, perseverative cognition not only refers to conscious thoughts about stressors, but also 
to prolonged automatic processing of stressor related information, as reflected in for example 
attentional hypervigilance or enhanced memory retrieval of stress related information (e.g., 
Rothermund, 2003). The perseverative cognition hypothesis is therefore not strictly limited to 
conscious thinking about stressors, but also accommodates automatic, or unconscious, stress-related 




cognition. Since the greater part of any cognitive processing appears to operate without awareness 
(Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), a considerable part of perseverative cognition is likely to be unconscious 
as well. Even minor stressful events cause people to persistently scan the environment for threat and 
this attentional hypervigilance is only possible when a mental representation, or ‘cognition’ 
concerning threat is still present (Wells & Matthews, 1996). This very basic representation of threat is 
fundamental for survival, and it occurs automatically and without conscious awareness. Although a 
recent study showed that emotional information reaches conscious access at a lower threshold than 
neutral information (Gaillard et al., 2006), it is likely that people are not aware of most of their stress-
related cognitive processes, as they are not aware of most of the cognitive processes ongoing in daily 
life.  
 
Perseverative cognition, psychopathology and somatic health problems 
Below we provide an overview of the mental and somatic problems that have been associated with 
perseverative cognition.  
 
Psychopathology: Research into the mental health effects of worry started in the early 1980’s with 
the finding that frequent nighttime worrying is a predictor of the onset and maintenance of insomnia 
(Borkovec, 1982). Nowadays, perseverative thoughts like worry and rumination are recognized as 
fundamental characteristics of several psychopathological conditions (Watkins, 2008). For example, 
worry is a central feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Borkovec, 1998; Wells & Matthews, 
1996) and depressive rumination is recognized as a central feature of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991). Moreover, perseverative cognition is found in hypochondriasis (Looper & Kirmayer, 2001), 
social phobia (Abbott & Rapee, 2004) and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Holeva, Tarrier & 
Wells, 2001).  
Perseverative cognition is not just a symptom or epiphenomenon of these pathological 
conditions. For example, experimental studies show that perseverative cognition is causally related 
to negative mood. In addition, in prospective studies it has been observed that perseverative 
thoughts predict the onset and maintenance of anxious and depressed mood (for a review see: 
Watkins, 2008). Yet, it is unclear at what levels of intensity, i.e., at which frequency and duration, 
perseverative thinking can be regarded as pathological. Although most research has focused on 
clinical conditions, perseverative cognitions are not only experienced by people suffering from 
psychological disorders, but also by healthy people. Recent diary studies among several populations 
(undergraduates, teachers, and a community sample) showed that, on average, the total duration of 
worry episodes was 30 minutes a day, while only a minor part (< 4%) of the participants reported no 





Thayer, 2007; Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 2007b).   Unfortunately, ambulatory studies are not 
regularly conducted with clinical populations and therefore little is known about the exact frequency 
and duration of perseverative thoughts in these populations. In one of our own studies we found 
that whereas clinical outpatients suffering from burnout do not seem to worry more than healthy 
people during the daytime, but that they do worry more during the nighttime (approximately 30 
minutes; Verkuil, Brosschot, Korrelboom, Reul-Verlaan & Thayer, submitted). This is in line with the 
idea that burnout patients have difficulties with disengaging from work. In addition, one ambulatory 
study conducted with GAD patients showed that they worry approximately 310 minutes per day 
suggesting that it places a great burden on their daily lives (Dupuy, Beaudoin, Rheaume, Ladouceur, 
& Dugas, 2001). Indeed, GAD patients even worry about the possible damaging consequences of the 
worrisome thoughts themselves that they experience (called meta-worry), which adds to the total 
time these people are in fact worrying. This meta-worry is often taken as a signal that the worry has 
become pathological and that the person's condition warrants treatment.  
Automatic, unconscious or other 'low-level' stress- or threat-related cognitive processes have 
been associated with mental health in a plethora of studies during the past 30 years (Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Mineka, 1992). Thus, attentional hypervigilance, for example 
operationalized as selective attention for threat related stimuli, as well as automatic vigilance, for 
example operationalized as enhanced memory for threatening stimuli, have been amply documented 
to play a role in mental health problems. Yet, very few of these studies have actually sought evidence 
that such forms of perseverative cognition preceded or caused the disorder. A thrilling recent 
development in experimental psychopathology is that researchers are now attempting to address 
these automatic processes in order to develop new therapeutic tools. Evidence is now growing that 
reversing cognitive biases by 'attentional retraining' procedures can reduce symptoms of mood and 
anxiety disorders suggesting that these biases may have a causal role in the onset and maintenance 
of such disorders (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Hazen, Vasey, & 
Schmidt, 2009; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006).  
 
Somatic health: Importantly, for somatic outcomes, the perseverative cognition hypothesis is not 
restricted to pathological worry. It is likely that somatic problems can be caused by much less severe, 
or intense, levels of worry, if only maintained long enough. One of the earliest findings suggesting 
that perseverative cognition plays an important role in the link between stress and somatic disease 
was that among elderly men who had a myocardial infarction, those who frequently worried were at 
heightened risk for experiencing a second myocardial infarction (Kubzansky et al., 1996). In addition, 
it has been shown that during experimentally induced worry as well as during worry in daily life 
cardiovascular activity is increased (Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995; Thayer, Friedman, & 




Borkovec, 1996; Verkuil, Brosschot, Borkovec, & Thayer, in press; Pieper et al., 2007). Furthermore, a 
recent review concluded that perseverative cognition is associated with enhanced activation in 
endocrine and immune systems (see Brosschot et al., 2006). Finally, more recently it was shown that 
worry is associated with lowered levels of antibody titers in caregivers (Segerstrom, 2008) and that 
ruminating after emotional events is linked to enhanced levels of cortisol, in daily life (McCullough, 
Orsulak, Brandon, & Akers, 2007), as well as in the laboratory (Zoccola, Dickerson, & Zaldivar, 2008). 
These findings are in line with the perseverative cognition hypothesis (Brosschot et al., 2006), 
stating that perseverative cognition prolongs physiological activity which, in turn, leads to a 
pathogenic state in which one is more vulnerable to developing a somatic disease. However, the 
discussed studies have mainly focussed on physiological activity, and not so much on disease 
outcomes. Few studies have suggested that perseverative cognition can indeed lead to somatic 
disease. Recently, a study by Holman et al. showed that in US citizens suffering from acute stress 
after the 9/11 attacks, ongoing worries about terrorism predicted cardiovascular health problems up 
to three years after the attacks (Holman et al., 2008). More indirect evidence for the impact of 
perseverative cognition on somatic disease is provided by the fact that risk for cardiovascular 
problems is heightened in people suffering from anxiety disorders and depression (e.g., Wulsin, 
Vaillant, & Wells, 1999), which are characterized by high perseverative cognition. In addition, studies 
focusing on work stress have found that reduced mental recovery, or reduced ‘unwinding’ after work 
is predictive of cardiovascular mortality (van Amelsvoort, Kant, Bultmann, & Swaen, 2003; Kivimaki et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, at least two studies among patients suffering from somatic health problems 
have suggested that perseverative cognition might be an important mediator of the effects of some 
somatic treatments. In one study it was found that in patients awaiting surgery for their hernia, 
greater worry about the surgery predicted lower levels of immune cells at the wound site, greater 
pain, poorer self-rated recovery and a longer recovery time (Broadbent, Petrie, Alley, & Booth, 2003). 
Furthermore, heightened levels of trait worry in psoriasis patients were predictive of a slowed 
recovery from photochemotherapy (Fortune et al., 2003). Still, more evidence is needed to test the 
perseverative cognition hypothesis with respect to disease outcomes. An important venture for 
future research is to conduct more prospective studies examining whether perseverative cognition is 
indeed the pathogenic link between stressful events and the onset and maintenance of somatic 
disease.  
It is a highly exciting idea that automatic or unconscious perseverative cognition can cause 
prolonged stress-related physiological activity, and in the long term even somatic disease. To date, 
no study has directly addressed the possibility that automatic vigilance or other forms of unconscious 
perseverative cognition have physiological effects. Three exceptions are studies showing relatively 





startle reflex (Ruiz-Padial & Vila, 2007) and skin conductance (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Moreover, 
two of our own recent studies have yielded some indirect evidence for the somatic effects of 
unconscious perseverative cognition. Firstly, in an ambulatory study we found - quite unexpectedly - 
that worry episodes were not only associated with enhanced heart activity, but that the worry 
episodes themselves also had prolonged cardiac effects, until up to two hours after the worry 
episode had ended (Pieper et al., 2007). This effect was independent of ongoing worry, emotions, 
health behaviors and physical activity, and therefore we concluded that it must have been due to 
some unconscious, or at least not verbally reportable form of worry. It is important to note, that this 
finding can not be due to 'just slow recovery', since such a mild high cardiac increase when caused by 
a non-emotional stressor such as physical effort normally recovers within a matter of minutes. 
Secondly, in another ambulatory study we found that conscious daytime worrying predicted 
heightened heart rate during the subsequent night (Brosschot, van Dijk & Thayer, 2007). During sleep 
people obviously do not worry consciously, but the hypervigilance that is evoked by stressful events 
might be prolonged into the night. This was also demonstrated by Hall and colleagues (2004), who 
found that participants who had to give a speech in the morning, showed decreased levels of 
parasympathetic activity (low heart rate variability) during the following non-rapid eye movement 
and rapid eye movement sleep periods (Hall et al., 2004). Although a lot has to be discovered on 
what exactly happens cognitively during sleep, studies with rats and humans have shown that 
daytime neuronal activity seems to be repeated or ‘replayed’ just before or during sleep (Skaggs & 
McNaughton, 1996; Stickgold, Malia, Maguire, Roddenberry, & O'Connor, 2000). Furthermore, sleep 
promotes procedural learning and consolidation of memories (Walker & Stickgold, 2004). It is 
therefore not unlikely that daytime stressful events are mentally represented during sleep in one 
way or another and that this interferes with physiological recovery during sleep. It is obvious that this 
will prolong the total amount of physiological ‘wear and tear’ that stressful events have on the 
human body, since sleep covers about one third of our lives. Sleep is generally considered to be a 
basically stress-free recovery period, and therefore the most important restorative period. Future 
studies are warranted to investigate to what extent and how stressful events and hypervigilance 
influence physiological recovery during sleep.   
 
Subjective Somatic Health. Ambulatory studies by our group have shown that in several non-
clinical populations (students, high school teachers; worry duration of 30 minutes per day on 
average) non-clinical levels of worry were positively and prospectively associated with subjective 
health complaints like fatigue, headache and lower backpain (Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006). A 
simple worry intervention, consisting of postponing worry to a daily 30-minute worry period, 
reduced these health complaints. The effects of the intervention were not restricted to certain types 




of complaints, but pertained to a range of different complaints (e.g. cough, palpitations, neck pain). 
Interestingly, worry duration and not or not so much worry frequency predicted increases in health 
complaints and mediated the effect of the worry intervention (Brosschot & Van der Doef, 2006), 
which is in line with the perseverative cognition hypothesis. Further evidence for the effects of 
perseverative cognition on subjective health comes from another ambulatory study in which it was 
found that people who reported to be ruminating a lot about conflicting goals reported heightened 
levels of somatic complaints (Emmons & King, 1988).  
Perseverative cognition specifically related to health problems, that is, health worry or illness 
worry seems to be of specific importance for subjective somatic health complaints.  Being – often 
even severe - stressors themselves, somatic health problems often give rise to worries. For example, 
chronic pain patients have been found to worry about pain for 20 minutes per day on average, 
compared to 17 minutes for non-pain-related topics (Eccleston, Crombez, Aldrich, & Stannard, 2001). 
Except for having physiological effects just as other worries, these health worries may affect 
subjective somatic health through an alternative pathway: Enhanced worrisome thinking about 
somatic signals might promote complaining about them. Indeed, health worry has been found to 
predict the occurrence of health complaints (Kaptein et al., 2005; Petrie et al., 2005; Devoulyte & 
Sullivan, 2003) and is associated with increases in pain (Turner, Mancl, & Aaron, 2004). Furthermore, 
not surprisingly, health worry has been associated with increased doctor consulting (Hay, Buckley, & 
Ostroff, 2005) and with intensive health care utilization (Looper & Kirmayer, 2001). One mechanism 
that may underlie these effects is that in people who worry excessively about illness bodily 
sensations are more likely to trigger illness-related cognitive networks which promote selective 
cognitive processing and misinterpretations of these bodily sensations as symptoms of illness 
(Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004). In turn, such worries might lower the threshold for actually 
complaining about these presumed symptoms of illness. Indeed, we recently found that the 
association between illness-related cognitive bias (increased recall of illness information) and health 
complaints was mediated by illness worry (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 2007a; Brosschot, 2002). 
In short, perseverative cognition, even at non-clinical levels, might influence somatic health 
either via prolonged activity in endocrine, immune and cardiovascular systems or, in the case of 
specific health worry, via enhanced processing of illness related information.   
 
A self regulation perspective on perseverative cognition 
The stress response, and therefore its prolongation via perseverative cognition, can be basically 
understood as the (default) response to threats to the attainment of a person's goals. The detection 
of potential threats to one's goals and of signs of failure in attaining these goals is a continuous 





their threat value (i.e. 'fast route', LeDoux, 2000) and once something has been detected that could 
be a possible threat to one's goals, it immediately leads to an rapid and indiscriminate defensive 
response, even if it eventually turns out to be only a novel or ambiguous stimulus (LeDoux, 2000; 
Thayer & Lane, 2000). This defensive response, or motivational state, consists of changes on several 
levels in the organism: Cognitive changes (attentional hypervigilance and 'higher' perseverative 
cognition), physiological changes (e.g. increased autonomic nervous activity and release of stress 
hormones) and behavioral changes (avoidance or approach behavior), known in psychophysiology as 
the 'defense response' (Lang, 1995). The duration of this defensive response depends on how quickly 
the system ascertains the safety of the situation. This shutting down of the response because of 
safety is dependent on a more deliberate cortical processing ('slow route'; LeDoux, 2000) of the 
potential threat. Thus, the default response to any potential threat is this immediate defensive 
response, served by subcortical networks in the brain, which, under normal circumstances, is under 
chronic inhibitory control by the prefrontal cortex (Amat et al., 2005; Thayer & Sternberg, 2006; see 
below for more neurophysiological underpinnings). Interestingly, this default response to threat has 
been found to be enhanced in females, who, when presented with an equal amount of threat 
information, showed more persistent activation of subcortical structures in the brain compared to 
males (Williams et al., 2005). From an evolutionary perspective it makes sense that this defense 
system initially ‘errs on the side of caution’ by often responding initially to novel or ambiguous 
neutral information as if it was threatening, and subsequently either continues or stops after a more 
deliberate appraisal process has taken place. As a consequence when no safety signals can be 
provided the stress response is prolonged. This seems to be the case in conditions such as anxiety 
disorders and during chronically stressful situations. There is some evidence that at least in some 
people, especially high worriers, this is due to a failure to recognize these safety signals. We will 
return to this possible explanation later in the chapter.  
In the remainder of this section the concept of perseverative cognition will be regarded from 
a self-regulation perspective. More specifically, we will argue that perseverative cognition can be 
conceptualized as the perseveration of mental representations of goal discrepancies (hypervigilance 
and 'higher' perseverative thinking), and that perseverative cognition is the cognitive part of the 
default response to goal discrepancies. We will further contend that this response is enhanced in 
high worriers because: (1) they have psychological characteristics that make them likely to be more 
motivated to reduce goal discrepancies; (2) perseverative cognition is reinforced in these people in 
several possible ways; (3) their perseverative cognition is due to a deficiency in recognizing signals of 
safety which causes them to respond with the default perseverative cognition response not only 
when faced with threat, but to any situation containing ambiguity or novelty.  
 




Why people perseverate: perseverative cognition as the default response to potential threat to goal 
attainment 
The essence of perseverative cognition is to keep attention directed towards ones goals, to 
anticipate threats to goal attainment and, in the case of rumination, to protect oneself from the 
recurrence of mistakes made in the past (for related theoretical accounts see: Wells & Matthews, 
1996; Martin & Tesser, 1996). It has been consistently shown that intensive engagement in the 
pursuit of a goal has effects on information processing (Johnson, Chang, & Lord, 2006). Goal 
engagement leads to alterations in pre-attentive processes and the content of thoughts and dreams, 
and it enhances the perception and processing of goal related stimuli, (Klinger, 1975).  
In terms of self-regulation, a psychological stress response arises when people experience a 
discrepancy between an expected state and the actual state that they are in (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). 
Expected states can either be desired states in the present (‘standards’, such as being healthy or 
having enough money to buy food) as well as desired states that lie in the future (‘goals’, such as 
becoming a successful employee (Boldero & Francis, 2002). In daily life, one’s actual state is 
continuously monitored, occurring mostly automatically, and compared to these desired states, or, 
reference values. Discrepancies can be detected between a standard (e.g., being healthy) and one’s 
actual state (e.g., having received a diagnosis of cancer) which will result in the stress response. In 
the case of goals that lie in the future it is not so much the discrepancy that gives rise to the stress 
response, as setting a goal automatically implies that one hasn’t attained this goal. In this case it is 
the perceived rate or speed with which one is making progress towards attaining this desired state 
that is compared to one’s actual state (Carver & Scheier, 1990). When this speed is perceived to be 
too low this will also result in the stress response. In the remainder of this chapter we will refer to 
both types of discrepancies as goal discrepancies. 
When people are confronted with such goal discrepancies, information concerning these 
discrepancies tends to stay activated in the brain, whereas when goals are attained information 
about goal discrepancies is inhibited. Again, this suggests that the default response to perceiving a 
goal discrepancy is cognitive perseveration, in the sense that this response is simply maintained as 
long as the discrepancy is present. This was first shown by Zeigarnik more than 80 years ago, who 
showed that memory for interrupted tasks is better than for completed tasks (Zeigarnik, 1927). 
Perseveration of goal directed cognition has been found in several other studies (Marsh, Hicks, & 
Bink, 1998; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Rothermund, 2003). For example, Rothermund (2003) found that 
failure on a cognitive task was associated with slowed responses in a dual tasking experiment when 
participants were presented with failure related words, indicative of hypervigilance after failure. In 
another study, participants who were made to believe that they had failed on an intelligence task 





Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). In line with these findings on hypervigilance, conscious 
perseverative cognition has also been found to be associated with experiencing discrepancy, for 
example between one’s actual self and one’s ideal self (Roelofs et al., 2007; Jones, Papadakis, Hogan, 
& Strauman, 2009).   
Most studies have taken place in laboratory settings and have measured this perseveration 
of stressor related cognition immediately after the goal frustration (e.g., Rothermund, 2003) or after 
six minutes (Koole et al. 1999). Thus, it remains to be established how long this initial perseveration 
of stressor related cognition lasts. There are some interesting clues however. A study by Zadro et al. 
suggests that this perseveration can last much longer after a stressful event (Zadro, Boland, & 
Richardson, 2006). In this study participants that had been socially excluded from an online ball 
tossing game after 45 minutes still showed a bias towards interpreting ambiguous social situations in 
a more threatening manner. 
 
Psychological moderators of perseverative cognition duration  
In the next sections we will discuss how perseverative cognition can get enhanced, thereby foremost 
discussing studies that have been conducted with chronic (trait) worriers.  
 
(1) Goal commitment 
Although hypervigilance doesn’t have to be pathological per se, several authors have proposed that 
it is the fundamental process that underlies clinical worry and rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Indeed, most anxiety- and mood disorders are characterized by extreme 
hypervigilance and perseverative thinking. What determines difficulties to stop perseverating, or – to 
the same end - stimulates its continuation, to the extent that it starts to have health consequences?  
The initial duration of perseverative cognition after one has encountered a threat to goal 
attainment depends on how strong one is committed to attaining the goal, which differs between 
individuals and between situations. According to several authors (Shah & Higgins, 1997; Feather, 
1963) the strength of goal commitment is a function of the interaction between (1) the importance 
or value that people attach to their goals, and (2) the expectancy that one can either cope or not 
cope with the goal discrepancy and is either still able to attain the goal or not any more: both 
expectancies appear to produce perseverative cognition. Here we will review evidence that shows 









a) Value of the goals 
Several studies have found that the duration of hypervigilance is a function of higher level goals. For 
example, Koole et al. (1999) showed that hypervigilance persisted longer after failure on a task when 
people believed that completing this task successfully was very important for one of their higher 
order goals, for example obtaining a good job later in life, in contrast when people had the 
opportunity to scale down the importance of this task by focusing on other goals. In addition, in a 
study by Magee et al. (2003) it was shown that women who were over-invested in becoming a parent 
after recurrent miscarriage had more negative thoughts about the future than women who had 
other goals to focus on than becoming a parent (Magee, MacLeod, Tata, & Regan, 2003). 
Furthermore, the tendency to link the (non-) attainment of lower level goals to the (non-)attainment 
of higher level goals has been related to rumination and depression (Mcintosh, Harlow, & Martin, 
1995). In one study we also found that in a sample of single females higher commitment to the goal 
of finding a partner was associated with higher rumination about not having attained this goal 
(Gebhardt, Massey, van der Doef, Verhoeven & Verkuil, 2007). Several other studies have shown that 
perfectionism, the tendency to strive after high level self-set goals that are higher than one’s current 
performance level, is associated with the tendency to ruminate (e.g., O'Connor, O'Connor, & 
Marshal, 2007). 
 
b) Expectancy of goal attainment: negative outcome expectancies  
A second important factor that influences the initial duration of goal directed cognition is the 
expectancy of the outcome of the stressful event, or goal discrepancy. In their Cognitive Activation 
model of Stress, Ursin and Eriksen (2004) distinguish three kinds of outcome expectancies that are 
associated with different kinds of responses: positive outcome expectancies (coping), negative 
outcome expectancies (hopelessness) and no outcome expectancies (helplessness). As perseverative 
cognition is the default response to stress, it will arise when people hold negative or no outcome 
expectancies. Indeed, worry was found to be associated with doubts concerning ones problem-
solving skills and the tendency to be pessimistic about the outcome (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005). 
Likewise, people with low self-esteem are more prone to ruminate (Wood & Dodgson, 1996).  
 
(2) Reinforcement of perseverative cognition: coping 
Although people who frequently worry or ruminate might lack confidence in general coping skills, 
they paradoxically report to be very motivated to use perseverative cognition as a strategy to cope 
with goal discrepancies. For example, Szabó and Lovibond (2002) asked students to keep a log of 
their worries for a week and they found that almost 50% of the reported worries consisted of 





frequently worry think that "worrying helps solving problems" or that "ruminating about the problem 
will help gaining insight" (Roelofs et al., 2007; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). In addition, people 
suffering from GAD report that worry serves as a distraction from more emotionally laden topics 
(Borkovec & Roemer, 1995), suggesting that in some people worry might serve to cognitively avoid 
intense negative emotions. Both the motivated use of perseverative cognition as a problem solving 
strategy and the use of perseverative cognition as a cognitive-avoidance strategy have been 
proposed to be reinforcing perseverative cognition.  
Despite many worriers’ beliefs that  that worrying is helpful in solving one’s problems, 
research has shown that worry and rumination are ineffective strategies to cope with stressful 
situations, yielding only more perseverative cognition as a result. First, worry and rumination are 
characterized by an abstract way of thinking about problems, and “abstract models are unlikely to 
lead to concrete actions” (cited from: Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998, p. 566). For example, in the 
case of rumination, Watkins and Baracaia (2002) found that depressed patients who were led to ask 
themselves abstract, ruminative problem solving questions (‘why do I feel this way?’) in a problem 
solving task came up with less relevant solutions than depressed patients who were led to ask 
themselves concrete, process focused questions (‘how am I deciding what to do next?’). This abstract 
way of thinking might be due to the fact that trait worriers link the frustration of lower order goals to 
the frustration of higher order, or abstract goals, and therefore might focus more on solving abstract 
problems. Second, even if worrying leads to concrete solutions, worriers are not highly likely to come 
into action and implement their solutions. Worriers have less confidence in their problem solving 
skills (Davey, 1994), have elevated needs for evidence that a given solution will work (Tallis, Eysenck, 
& Mathews, 1991) and try to come up with as many solutions as possible before trying out these 
solutions (Startup & Davey, 2003; Davey, 2006). Behaviorally implementing a solution is also difficult 
when the problems that people are worrying about have already happened or might happen in the 
future. Additionally, worry also seems to become reinforced as the worst case scenarios that people 
worry about almost never happen, which might lead to the superstitious belief worry has been a 
successful coping strategy (Borkovec et al., 1998).  
In sum, although worry itself might be appraised by the individual as helpful, enhancing one’s 
positive outcome expectancy about worry, negative outcome expectancies will likely persist as no 
concrete action will be taken to reduce or remove the current or future threat, leading to a vicious 
cycle in which possibly threatening events are coped with by worrying. Furthermore, although the 
discussed studies have mainly focused on the outcome expectancies associated with conscious 
perseverative cognition, unconscious perseverative cognition (threat related hypervigilance or 
cognitive bias) is suggested to be part of a worrisome coping style (Wells & Matthews, 1996) and is 
likely to be subject to the same reinforcing factors. Although the authors are not aware of studies 




showing operant conditioning of for example threat-related cognitive biases, indirect evidence for 
the effects of outcome expectancies on automatic processing comes from a recent study showing 
that expectancies of reward can modulate saccadic eye movements (Milstein & Dorris, 2007). 
Another way in which perseverative cognition is reinforced has been put forward by 
Borkovec et al. (1998). In studies with non-clinical as well as clinical populations he demonstrated 
that worry might be a cognitive avoidance response to threat. High worriers are thought to have 
learned to use worry as an emotion regulation strategy because worry suppresses somatic anxiety, 
due to the verbal nature of worrying (Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993; Borkovec & Hu, 
1990). Indeed, threatening thoughts yield smaller cardiovascular responses than threatening images 
about the same material (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). In addition, worry, in contrast to 
relaxation, has been associated with blunted cardiovascular responses to threatening imagery 
(Borkovec & Hu, 1990). Furthermore, worry is likely to bias information processing away from 
threatening images. Several studies have shown that verbally memorizing information impairs the 
retrieval of the visual memory of this material, called ‘verbal overshadowing’ (Schooler & Engstler-
School, 1990). Importantly, suppressing, blunting and ‘verbal overshadowing’ result in a reduction of  
the total time that people are exposed to aversive, possibly traumatic, images and this is thought to 
negatively reinforce the use of worry as an emotion regulation strategy. Although this might be 
adaptive in the short term, persistently avoiding threatening information and its associated somatic 
arousal, by relying on worrisome thought, interferes with the integration and extinction of 
threatening material in memory (Foa & Kozak, 1986). It increases the risk that threatening 
information is repetitively retrieved from memory (for example in the form of intrusive thoughts; 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004) and warrants further use of worry.  
Although most studies have focused on the avoidance function of worry, it is likely that 
rumination has the same function, which is also a verbal and abstract thinking style. Furthermore, it 
is unknown whether this avoidance function also pertains to unconscious perseverative cognition, 
and to date it is unclear to what extent unconscious mental representations consists of verbal or 
imaginary parts. Yet, one study has shown that being consciously motivated to cognitively avoid 
certain information, enhances the automatic cognitive bias for this information (Lavy & Van den 
Hout, 1994), providing some indirect evidence that attempts to avoid threat-related imagery might 
prolong threat-related unconscious perseverative cognition.  
In short, there are several reasons why worrying might become associated with positive 
outcome expectancies, and as a result might be prolonged and difficult to unlearn (disengage from). 
Since worry seldom actually helps to solve problems, these positive reinforcers suggest a vicious 






(3) Not recognizing safety signals 
A third important factor that influences the duration of perseverative cognition is the (in)ability to 
recognize novel and ambiguous stimuli as safe. As mentioned above, the default cognitive response 
to stressful events will cease once a safety signal is recognized that signals that no goal is currently 
threatened. In line with this idea, Woody and Rachman (1994; p. 745) stated that: “Safety signals de-
limit the range and duration of threat and, hence, of fear. In the presence of an established safety 
signal the animal/person is assured of safety from threat in that place at that time. Having attained a 
safety signal, the person/animal can rest and reduce vigilance for a time.” As mentioned earlier, 
pathological worriers are strongly engaged in the pursuit of their goals and they require a lot of 
evidence before they dare to implement a solution to try solve the problem. A consequence of this 
might be that at least pathological worriers do not easily recognize novel and ambiguous situations 
as safe. Recent evidence supports this idea. For example, in a study conducted with GAD patients and 
healthy controls where participants were repeatedly shown cues (colored dots) that signaled either 
novel neutral or threat-related words while their cardiac responses were recorded simultaneously. It 
was shown that whereas the cardiac responses of healthy control participants to the neutral words 
showed habituation to the repeated presentation of neutral words, the GAD patients showed no 
habituation to these words, suggesting that they have difficulties in disengaging attention from these 
novel neutral stimuli in the context of threat (cf. Thayer, Friedman, Borkovec, Johnsen, & Molina, 
2000). Other authors suggested that GAD patients show subcortical brain activity to neutral 
information as if it was threatening (Hoehn-Saric, Schlund, & Wong, 2004; Nitschke et al., 2009). 
Thus, high worriers seem to indiscriminately keep on responding to threatening as well as neutral 
stimuli, and thereby do not recognize safety signals. Not recognizing safety signals is possibly due to 
elevated requirements for evidence that has been found in high worriers, which in this case could be 
enhanced requirements for proof that a signal indeed signifies safety. By not recognizing safety, the 
fear response and perseverative cognition are therefore prolonged.  
 
Biological vulnerability for perseverative cognition  
In the sections above we referred to how the default stress response, and with it perseverative 
cognition, initiated by sub-cortical brain structures, is under tonic inhibitory control by the prefrontal 
cortex (Amat, et al., 2005; Thayer et al., 2006). There are several conditions in which this prefrontal 
inhibition is tuned down, making one vulnerable for perseverative cognition. Conditions involving low 
prefrontal inhibition include being in a chronic stress situation or being an anxiety patient. In their 
Neurovisceral model of perseverative thinking Thayer and Lane (2000) and Thayer and Brosschot 
(2005) explain how low prefrontal inhibition is characterized by low parasympathetic activation, 
which can be measured by low heart rate variability (HRV), and how low prefrontal inhibition leads to 




prolonged and indiscriminate responses to environmental stimuli. We will provide a shortened 
account below. 
Heart rate variability (HRV) is the variability of the time periods between adjacent heart 
beats, e.g. interbeat intervals (IBI). This variability is the result of the dynamic interplay between the 
fast acting parasympathetic nervous system and the relatively slower sympathetic nervous system. 
Cortical and subcortical areas in the brain that are responsible for the integration of internal and 
environmental information, including emotionally relevant information, are directly linked to HRV. 
These circuits are referred to as the Central Autonomic Network (CAN). Structurally, the CAN includes 
the anterior cingulate, insular, and ventromedial prefrontal cortices, the central nucleus of the 
amygdala, the paraventricular and related nuclei of the hypothalamus, the periaquaductal gray 
matter, the parabrachial nucleus, the nucleus of the solitary tract (NTS), the nucleus ambiguus, the 
ventrolateral medulla, the ventromedial medulla, and the medullary tegmental field. The primary 
output of the CAN is mediated through the preganglionic sympathetic and parasympathetic neurons. 
Importantly, these neurons innervate the heart via the stellate ganglia and the vagus nerve. The 
interplay of these inputs to the sino-atrial node of the heart is the source of the complex variability 
that characterizes the healthy heart rate time series (Saul, 1990). Thus, the output of the CAN is 
directly linked to HRV. It is logical that systems that control emotion, attention and autonomic 
nervous system activity are strongly interconnected and even largely overlap. Attention is always in 
the service of information that pertains to an organism or person's important goals, and hence 
related to the emotional value of the information. Likewise, when highly relevant goals are at stake 
autonomic activity is strongly needed to support approach or avoidance behavior. Therefore, these 
structures are bound to be highly interconnected and often activated in concert. 
 Low tonic levels of HRV might indicate a predisposition to keep on ‘erring on the side of 
caution’ when confronted with threat, novelty and ambiguity because such a chronically low HRV 
represents a breakdown of the inhibitory influences discussed earlier, that allows for efficient self-
regulation including the interruption of on-going behavior. As such, an excitatory positive feedback 
loop is allowed to emerge, reflected on the psychological level in hypervigilance and perseverative 
thinking. As we discussed in the previous section, this response might become ever more enhanced 
once people implicitly or explicitly start to believe that this response actually helps them in solving 
their problems. As a consequence, the normally fine-tuned ability to adjust to changing environmental 
factors becomes a rigid, inflexible response disposition, which is in fact a continuation of the default 
defense response in the absence of clear threat signals. This is reflected in a failure to recognize safe 
environmental signals and in responding to them as if they are threatening. In support of this idea 
patients suffering from GAD have been shown to have lower tonic levels of HRV, when compared to 





an attentional bias for threatening information, and interpret ambiguous situations more negatively 
(Shook, Peña, Fazio, Soller III, & Thayer, 2007).  
Besides in mood- and anxiety disorders, there might be several not so obvious conditions 
that are also associated with low prefrontal inhibition such as having a low aerobic fitness (Hansen, 
Johnsen, Sollers, Stenvik, & Thayer, 2004) or suffering from somatic health problems (e.g., diabetes 
and immune dysfunction (Masi, Hawkley, Rickett, & Cacioppo, 2007; Thayer & Lane, 2007; Thayer & 
Lane, 2000; Thayer & Sternberg, 2006). These conditions are associated with heightened risks to 
develop other stress-related mental and somatic problems, which may in fact be associated with the 
above mentioned excitatory positive feedback loop. For example, normotensive salt-sensitive men, a 
group that is at risk of developing hypertension, has been shown to have low levels of HRV at rest 
and during mental challenge (Buchholz, Schachinger, Wagner, Sharma, & Deter, 2003), indicating low 
prefrontal inhibition. Other studies have also shown that these men, compared to matched healthy 
controls, are also characterized by enhanced startle responses to negative information (Buchholz et 
al., 2001) and enhanced cortisol responses during stress (Weber et al., 2008), suggesting that default 
responding to stress is not only enhanced but also perseverates. It is an intriguing idea, that people 
that have low HRV for other reasons than chronic stress, i.e. diabetes, obesity, low aerobic fitness 
etc., would also cognitively perseverate (worry, ruminate) more as a result of the lower prefrontal 
inhibition associated with their condition. To the authors knowledge, this has never been tested. 
In sum, we propose that low prefrontal inhibition reflected in low HRV predisposes people to 
respond with enhanced cognitive, affective and physiological activity to stressors. This, in 
combination with the psychological vulnerability factors for perseverative cognition discussed above, 
causes even seemingly neutral stimuli to trigger the stress response. As a consequence, the total 
time that people worry about stressful events increases, thereby adding to the total duration of 




In this chapter we have provided an overview of the role that perseverative cognition plays in the 
onset and maintenance of stress-related mental and somatic health problems. Perseverative 
cognition is a common reaction to stressful events in everyday life, and it can account for stress-
related physiological activity that is prolonged beyond the presence of actual real life stressors. This 
prolonged physiological activity is proposed to be the missing link in the relationship between 
psycho-social factors and the chronic pathogenic state in which one is more prone to develop mental 
and somatic problems. Furthermore, we have discussed that perseverative cognition forms part of 
the default response to threat, novelty and ambiguity, which basically is an adaptive self-regulatory 




response. We also outlined which psychological and biological factors enhance this default response. 
Excessive commitment to one’s goals, the motivated but exaggerated use of perseverative cognition 
as a strategy to cope with possible threats to goal attainment and the inability to recognize signals of 
safety were forwarded as pathogenic psychological processes that lead to a vicious cycle where one 
worry episode enhances the likelihood of the occurrence of another episode. This increases the total 
amount of time that stressful events have a prolonged ‘wear and tear’ effect on the human body.  
Although the pivotal (causal) role of unconscious perseverative cognition in psychopathology 
has been acknowledged for a long time, its effects on somatic health have remained largely 
unexplored. However, while evidence is accumulating, numerous studies have already supported the 
perseverative cognition hypothesis. We have speculated on a role of unconscious perseverative 
cognition that may be as important or even more important, than that of conscious perseverative 
cognition. By focusing on conscious perseverative cognition alone we may have been only touching 








Capturing worry in daily life: Are trait questionnaires sufficient? 
 



































Worry is crucial in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders and has been associated 
with several other adverse health outcomes. Yet, little is known about the frequency and 
perseveration of worry in daily life, and its predictability by widely used trait questionnaires. 
In this study 432 students completed the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), the Worry 
Domains Questionnaire (WDQ) and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Version (STAI-T) and kept a 
log of worry frequency and duration during six consecutive days and nights.  
The results showed that worry is a very common phenomenon that is predicted by the two trait 
worry questionnaires, independent of trait anxiety. The often clinically utilized PSWQ predicted 
worry duration better than the WDQ, and exclusively predicted night-time worry and several other 
indices of perseverative and potentially pathogenic worry.  
Although this study provides some support for the predictive validity of the PSWQ and the WDQ, 
these questionnaires did not account for the larger part of variance in daily worry. Future studies of 
worry and its associated perseverative processes should consider using momentary assessments.  
 






Perseverative cognition, such as worry and rumination, is crucial in the development and 
maintenance of mood disorders, anxiety disorders and insomnia (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Moreover, perseverative cognition is attracting growing interest in research 
concerned with the somatic health effects of stress (for a review see: Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 
2006). A great deal of research on perseverative cognition has focused on worry, which is 
traditionally studied in relation to anxiety and insomnia (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 
1983). For example, uncontrollable and excessive worries are the core characteristics of generalized 
anxiety disorder (GAD; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Recently, worry has also been found 
to predict depressive mood (Hong, 2007), post traumatic stress symptoms (Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 
2001) and subjective health complaints (Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006; Petrie et al., 2005).  
Worry can be measured by trait questionnaires as well as by ecological momentary 
assessment methods that measure state worry. The most frequently used trait questionnaires are 
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and the 
Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992). The PSWQ is often used to 
measure pathogenic aspects of worry, for example its uncontrollability. Several studies that have 
been important in developing and testing theoretical models of GAD have used the PSWQ, for 
example to link pathological worry to potentially pathogenic phenomena and processes such as 
negative mood and ‘stop rules’ (Startup & Davey, 2003; Davey & Levy, 1998), intolerance of 
uncertainty (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998) and meta-worry (Wells & Carter, 2001). 
Moreover, the PSWQ has been used as an outcome measure in several studies evaluating the 
efficacy of cognitive-behavioral therapies (Borkovec & Costello, 1993; Borkovec, Newman, Pincus, & 
Lytle, 2002; Dugas et al., 2003) and pharmacological treatments for GAD (Mogg, Bradley, Baldwin, & 
Brodrick, 2004). Whereas the PSWQ is a measure of pathological worry and the worry process, the 
WDQ was developed to measure the content of worries. In contrast with the PSWQ, the WDQ has 
been found to tap into constructive worrying (Davey, 1993). The WDQ has proven useful to 
differentiate worry topics associated with anxious mood and depressive mood (Diefenbach et al., 
2001). Furthermore, in studies concerned with the differences between worry and obsessive 
thoughts, the WDQ and its short form (Stöber & Joormann, 2001) have proven useful in helping 
participants identify their most worrisome thoughts (Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 2000b; 
Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 2000a; Lee, Lee, Kim, Kwon, & Telch, 2005).  
Several studies have shown that both the PSWQ and the WDQ have promising psychometric 
properties (Brown, 2003; Davey, 1993; Meyer et al., 1990; Stöber, 1998). However, the hallmark of 





measure, that is, its frequency and its duration. This issue does not appear to be conclusively 
addressed for the PSWQ and the WDQ, as we will argue below. Also, it is important to know whether 
these trait worry questionnaires are better predictors of worry in daily life than the closely related 
and broadly used phenomenon of trait anxiety  (Startup & Erickson, 2006). Finally, it is also essential 
to know whether the clinically used PSWQ predicts potentially pathogenic aspects of worry in daily 
life better than the WDQ, for example the perseverance of worry during several days and the 
continuation of daily worry into the night.  
The first validation study of the PSWQ showed that subjects scoring high on the PSWQ 
estimated that they had spent more time worrying per day during the past week than those scoring 
in the middle or low range (Meyer et al., 1990). In contrast, in a study with GAD patients, the PSWQ 
did not significantly correlate with estimates of the percentage of time spent worrying per day during 
the past month (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992). However, Dupuy et al. (2001), using daily 
measurements for fourteen days, found that PSWQ scores predicted worry duration (r = .59) in a 
group of healthy participants and in a group of participants diagnosed with GAD (r = .42). 
Nevertheless, recent research has shown that pathological worry as observed in GAD patients and 
normal worry as observed in, for example, healthy students are not separate phenomena but mainly 
differ in severity, particularly its frequency and duration (Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001). 
Therefore, it is important to examine to what extent trait worry questionnaires predict worry on this 
full severity range. Furthermore, the latter study did not differentiate between the frequency and the 
duration of worry, while it seems that worry duration is more pathogenic than worry frequency. 
According to Davey (2006, p. 218): “dysfunctional perseveration is one of the critical defining 
features of pathological worry”. Short worry episodes may reflect successful problem solving while 
longer worry episodes may imply potentially pathogenic processes. Duration of worry, and not or 
much less so frequency, predicted negative health outcomes (Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006), and 
mediated the effects of daily stress on heart activity during subsequent nocturnal sleep (Brosschot, 
van Dijk, & Thayer, 2007). Only two other diary studies have looked at correlations between the 
PSWQ and worry frequency as well as worry duration. Szábo and Lovibond (2002) found that the 
PSWQ predicted worry frequency (r=0.48) during seven days, but not worry duration. In contrast, 
Brosschot and van der Doef  (2006) found that in high school students the PSWQ predicted worry 
frequency (r = 0.37) and worry duration (r = 0.37) during six days. To our knowledge, no studies have 
investigated the predictability of worry in daily life by the WDQ. Surprisingly, none of these studies 
differentiated between daily worry and evening/nightly worry, although a study by Tallis, Davey and 
Capuzzo (1994) showed that most worrying in students takes place between 9 p.m. and 3 p.m. 
Furthermore, worry at night is an often reported complaint of people suffering from insomnia 
(Harvey, Tang, & Browning, 2005) and GAD (Belanger, Morin, Langlois, & Ladouceur, 2004). Also, it 





has been suggested to be a predictor of adverse cardiac activity patterns during sleep (Brosschot et 
al., 2007; Hall et al., 2004).  
In short, it has not been shown whether these two broadly used tests of trait worry predict 
actual worry, whether they do this better than trait anxiety, or whether the PSWQ is better at 
predicting perseverative (i.e. pathogenic) aspects of worry than the WDQ. These issues were 
addressed in this study, which is the first to do this by using momentary assessment to investigate 
worry frequency and duration in the daytime as well as the night-time. In this study we defined the 
perseverative aspects of worry not only as the prolongation (duration) of individual worry episodes, 
but also in a exploratory way, as (a) the persistence of daytime worry into the night-time, (b) the 
persistence of worry into the following day(s), and (c) the total number of days and nights that 
people reported worrying over the six days. The latter is in line with the DSM-IV that states that a 
defining feature of pathological worry is that it occurs “more days than not, for at least 6 months” 




The sample consisted of 432 first year psychology students. Eighty one percent of the sample was 
female and 19% was male. The mean age was 21, with a minimum of 17 and a maximum of 59 years. 
Data were obtained during obligatory courses that were taught during the second semesters of four 
successive years (1999-2002). Five hundred and eighteen students were invited to participate, 
however 16.6% of these failed to return their worry logs. Students received course credit for 
partaking in this course. 
 
Instruments 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990; Dutch translation: van Rijsoort, 
Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999). This questionnaire consists of 16 self-report items. Items are 
directed at the excessiveness, duration and uncontrollability of worry as experienced in clients 
diagnosed with GAD, for example: “Once I start worrying, I can’t stop”. The PSWQ has demonstrated 
high reliability as well as high temporal stability and substantial validity in the assessment of trait 
worry (Meyer et al., 1990; van Rijsoort et al., 1999). 
 
Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis et al., 1992 ; Dutch translation: van Rijsoort et al., 1999). 
The Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ) was administered to assess the content and amount of 





will lose close friends”), Lack of Confidence (e.g., “that I lack confidence”), Aimless Future (e.g., “that 
I’ll never achieve my ambitions”), Work Incompetence (e.g., “that I will not keep my workload up to 
date”), and Financial (e.g., “that I’m not able to afford things”). Internal reliability (van Rijsoort et al., 
1999) and 4-week retest reliability of the total score and all subscales are satisfactory (Stöber, 1998).  
 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Form (STAI-T; Dutch version: van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 
1980). To measure trait anxiety we administered the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory. The STAI-T is a questionnaire that measures the participants’ predisposition to anxiety and 
has often been used in studies evaluating the effectiveness of treatments for GAD (Fisher & Durham, 
1999). It consists of 20 self-report items and earlier use has shown good internal consistency and 
validity (van der Ploeg et al., 1980).  
 
Worry log. The worry log is a one-page A4 form that has previously been used in a study by Brosschot 
and van der Doef (2006; see the Appendix for an example). On this form an adapted version of 
Borkovec’s et al.’s (1983) working definition of worry was given (see below). All participants were 
instructed to register their worries during 6 days by tallying each worry episode. More specifically, 
they were instructed to register a worry episode whenever they noticed that they were worrying, or 
immediately after they had been worrying. At the end of each day they were asked to estimate the 
total number of worry episodes (daily worry frequency) and the total duration of these episodes (in 
minutes), based on their tallies. Each morning, they were requested to estimate the frequency and 
total duration of any nightly worry episodes (worry frequency and duration in the night-time). 
 To operationalize perseveration of worry, three additional and exploratory worry 
perseveration indices were calculated: (a) the persistence of daytime worry into the night-time, (b) 
the persistence of worry into the following day(s) and (c) the total number of days and nights that 
participants worried. These perseveration indices were calculated as follows. For each day and night, 
the data from the worry log were recoded into dummy variables that indicated whether participants 
had been worrying (‘1’) or not at all (‘0’). The total number of days and nights that people had been 
worrying were summed to obtain (c). The dummy variables for the daytime and night-time for each 
day were added up. A score of 1 was given for daytime and night-time worrying respectively. These 
scores were added up per day, whereby a score of 2 indicates perseveration of worrying into the 
night. By counting the total number of perseveration scores we obtained (a). Likewise, the 
persistence of worry into the following day(s) (b) was calculated by counting perseveration scores for 
every two consecutive days and nights.  
 
Procedure 





The experiment consisted of two group sessions, with an interval of two weeks between them. 
During the first session the participants completed the questionnaires and received instructions 
concerning the registration of worry. These instructions were also printed on the back of the worry 
log. More precisely, they were told that (after the working definition of Borkovec et al., 1983): 
‘worrying involves thinking about a subject that has or can have negative consequences for you, and 
for which there is no, or not yet, a solution; it often, but not always, consists of a chain of negative 
thoughts, about the same or different topics, and often concerns something in the future, and the 
thought often takes shape as ‘Imagine that . . . ’ or ‘What would happen if . . .? ’; The same thoughts 
often return; when you are engaged in worrying it is difficult to stop or hold. It definitely occupies 
your mind, and it is often ‘disturbing and intensive.’ Participants were urged to conform their idea of 
worry as much as possible to this definition.  
At the second group session the participants returned their worry logs and were debriefed.  
 
Statistical analyses 
The predictability of worry duration, worry frequency and worry perseveration by trait 
questionnaires was analyzed with Pearson correlations, hierarchical, and forced entry regression 
analyses. The distributions of worry duration, worry frequency and worry perseveration (i.e. number 
of days and nights worrying and number of successive days worrying) were significantly skewed and 
were transformed into normal distributions using logarithmic transformations. When describing the 
data (see section 3.1 and table 1), we report the untransformed data. All data were analyzed using 




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the most important variables in this study. On average, 
participants worried 28 minutes: 22.5 minutes during the daytime, and 5.5 minutes during the night-
time. On average, participants worried during 4.69 days (S.D. = 1.62) and 1.93 nights (S.D. = 1.87). 
Only 2% of the participants indicated that they had not been worrying at all during the six 
registration days and nights. Thirty-nine participants scored above the suggested clinical cut-point of 
62 on the PSWQ (Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2003). On average, these participants worried 
61.81 minutes a day (S.D. = 48.39).  
The trait questionnaires showed satisfactory levels of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α: 
PSWQ = .93, WDQ = .90, STAI-T = .90). The mean scores on the PSWQ (M = 43.51; S.D. = 12.97), the 





for healthy subjects and are comparable with mean scores found in other studies using young adults 
(Brosschot & van der Doef, 2006; Tallis et al., 1994).  
The participants that did not return their worry logs did not differ significantly from those 
who did return their logs on the PSWQ, WDQ and STAI-T. In line with earlier studies on gender 
differences in worry (Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003), women scored significantly higher than 
men on all worry and anxiety variables.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of worry episodes and trait questionnaires 
 Measure  M SD Minimum Maximum 
Worry duration      
Total  28.04 41.62 0.00 524.33 
Daytime  22.51 35.61 0.00 481.67 
Night-time  5.52 9.42 0.00 72.50 
Worry frequency      
Total  3.55 3.81 0.00 30.00 
Daytime  3.01 3.35 0.00 29.17 
Night-time  0.54 0.84 0.00 7.50 
PSWQ  43.51 12.97 16.00 78.00 
WDQ  21.41 14.71 0.00 82.00 
STAI-T  37.45 8.77 21.00 66.00 
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; WDQ = Worry Domains Questionnaire; STAI-T = State  
Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version. 
 
Prediction of worry duration and frequency by trait questionnaires 
Pearson correlations between trait questionnaires and worry duration and worry frequency are 
shown in table 2. Total worry duration correlated moderately with the PSWQ (r=.49, p<.01), the 
WDQ (r=.41, p<.01) and the STAI-T (r=.43, p<.01). In addition, total worry frequency correlated 
moderately with the PSWQ (r=.44, p<.01), the WDQ (r=.41, p<.01) and the STAI-T (r=.43, p<.01). To 
examine the extent to which trait worry questionnaires independently predict worry duration and 
frequency, forced entry regression analyses were conducted (see table 3 for results). Total worry 
duration was best predicted, (R² = .26; F(3, 372) = 43.10, p<.001), by the trait worry questionnaires, 
the PSWQ, (β = .33, p< .01), and the WDQ, (β = .14, p< .05), but not by the STAI-T, β = .10, ns). Total 
worry frequency was best predicted (R² = .23; F(3, 383) = 38.36, p<.001) by the PSWQ (β = .20, p< 
.01) , the WDQ (β = .19, p< .01) and the STAI-T (β = .16, p< .05) together.  
 
 










PSWQ WDQ STAI-T 
Worry duration -     
Worry frequency .73 -    
PSWQ .49 .44 -   
WDQ .41 .41 .63 -  
STAI-T .43 .43 .76 .64 - 
Note. All correlations are significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
WDQ = Worry Domains Questionnaire; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version.   
 
Table 3. Forced entry regression analysis of worry in daily life 
 Total worry duration  Total worry frequency 
Measure β p R² F   β p R² F  
   .26 43.10    .23 38.36 
PSWQ .33 .000    .20 .005   
WDQ .14 .020    .19 .003   
STAI-T .10 .195    .16 .030   
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; WDQ = Worry Domains Questionnaire; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory-Trait version.   
 
 Specific prediction of night-time worry 
To assess which trait questionnaire specifically, and exclusively, predicted worry in the night-time 
independent of worry in the daytime, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted. Daytime 
worry was entered in the analysis in the first block and the three trait questionnaires were entered in 
the second block. Results are shown in table 4. After controlling for daytime worry, only the PSWQ 














Table 4. Hierarchical regression analysis of worry in the night-time 
  Worry duration night-time  Worry frequency night-time 
Block 
Measure β p ΔR² 
F 
Change 
 β p ΔR² F Change 





.47 .000    .48 .000   
2    .03 5.99    .02 4.07 
 PSWQ .18 .008    .14 .036   
 WDQ .06 .271    .07 .247   
 STAI-T -.03 .655    -.04 .548   
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; WDQ = Worry Domains Questionnaire; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory-Trait version. 
a  
Worry duration in the daytime was used to predict worry duration in the night-time, worry 
frequency in the daytime was used to predict worry frequency in the night-time.  
 
Specific prediction of the perseveration of worry 
The prediction that the PSWQ is a better predictor of the worry perseveration indices than the WDQ 
and the STAI-T was explored by conducting forced entry regression analyses. Number of nights 
worrying and number of days during which daily worry persisted into the night-time were only 
predicted by the PSWQ, (respectively β = .23 and β = .24, p’s< .01). Number of days worrying and 
number of days worrying in a row were predicted by the PSWQ, (respectively β = .23 and β = .19, p’s< 
.05), and the WDQ, (respectively β = .13 and β = .15, p’s< .05), although stronger by the former.  
 
Discussion 
This study is the first to investigate the predictive validity of the PSWQ and the WDQ, two widely 
used trait worry questionnaires, and the superiority of the PSWQ in predicting potential pathogenic 
worry. Collectively, the findings provide acceptable support for the predictive validity of these 
questionnaires and for the specific clinical applicability of the PSWQ. Furthermore, the study yielded 
descriptive data of normal daily worry, portraying worry as a very common phenomenon in non-
clinical persons, with more days spent worrying than not.  
 The PSWQ and the WDQ both predicted worry duration and worry frequency in daily life, 
independent of each other and of trait anxiety. Together, the trait worry questionnaires accounted 
for approximately 24% of the variance of worry in daily life. This percentage is comparable with that 
found in other studies using momentary assessment of worry (Dupuy et al, 2001; Brosschot & van 
der Doef, 2006) and studies concerned with the prediction of daily negative affect by neuroticism 
(Eid & Diener, 1999; Mroczek & Almeida, 2004). It is not very high, but may become higher when 





periods longer than six days are considered, making the state measurements less situationally 
determined. However, these figures also imply that the bulk of the daily experience of worry is not 
predicted by trait measures. This might be an issue to consider when investigating the outcomes of 
worry, since adverse health outcomes might be independently predicted by trait and state levels of 
negative emotional variables, such as has been shown for negative affect (Cohen et al., 1995; Tang & 
Gibson, 2005). It is possible that trait worry and state worry might reveal similar differential effects. 
At least one recent study showed that while trait worry was cross-sectionally associated with somatic 
health complaints, daily worry episodes predicted an increase in these complaints (Brosschot & van 
der Doef, 2006). Somewhat more indirect evidence comes from a GAD treatment study in which it 
was found that cognitive-behavioral therapy was effective in reducing worry as measured by the 
PSWQ, whereas applied relaxation therapy was specifically effective in reducing daily reports of 
anxiety (Borkovec & Costello, 1993). Thus, studies untangling the mechanisms whereby worry affects 
health should consider combining trait measures with momentary assessments of worry.   
 This study also provided support for the use of the PSWQ as a measure of pathogenic worry. 
We found that the PSWQ was a better predictor of total worry duration and frequency than the 
WDQ and the STAI-T. In addition, the PSWQ was the only trait measure that predicted worry at night. 
Night-time worry is often observed in insomnia (Harvey et al., 2005) and GAD (Belanger et al., 2004), 
and is believed to play a crucial etiological role in these disorders. Exploratory analysis showed that 
the PSWQ was the best predictor of worry perseveration as indexed by total number of days and 
nights spent worrying and the persistence of worry into the night and into the following days. Thus, 
the PSWQ and not the WDQ or trait anxiety predicted high levels of perseverative worry in daily life, 
as operationalized by various indices, including total duration, nocturnal worry, and persistence of 
worry across consecutive days and nights.  
 These findings have to be interpreted in the light of several methodological limitations. Our 
measurement of worry at night could have been prone to retrospective bias as participants were 
asked to register worry the following morning, instead of during the night, while they were worrying. 
It might be argued that especially high PSWQ scorers might have overestimated worry at night. On 
the other hand, overestimations of the time lying awake have been found in both healthy subjects 
and insomniacs (Nelson & Harvey, 2003; Baker, Maloney, & Driver, 1999), and might thus not be 
restricted to high PSWQ scorers. In addition, it remains unclear whether worry episodes at night took 
place while participants were actively engaged in activities or while they were passively lying in bed. 
Moreover, worry episodes at night could have occurred before or after participants had fallen asleep. 
This is a potential flaw that necessitates a more rigorous study that includes nocturnal momentary 





without interfering with sleep. Furthermore, one could argue that the percentage of participants that 
did not return their worry logs was relatively large. However, this was comparable to that found in 
another study (Brosschot & van der Doef, 2006) and there were no differences between the studies 
on the scores on the trait questionnaires. In addition, the participants who did not return their worry 
logs did not differ on the scores on the trait questionnaires from those who did return their logs. Our 
sample therefore seemed to cover the full worry range. Another concern can be raised about our 
operationalization of pathological worry. We did not include a measure of GAD to assure whether 
worry was pathological as defined by the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). However, Ruscio (2002) showed that 
although high levels of worry are a main characteristic of GAD, a large group of people who show 
high levels of worry do not receive a full GAD diagnosis. In addition, several studies suggest that 
student samples are suitable to investigate worry on the full severity range (Borkovec & Roemer, 
1995; Ruscio, 2002; Roemer, Borkovec, Posa, & Borkovec, 1995). Our interest was in the prediction of 
the perseveration of worry, indexed in a variety of ways and not in predicting diagnoses of GAD. 
Finally, the instructions given to participants need some consideration. Specifically, it is possible that 
our definition of worry as ‘uncontrollable’ and ‘often disturbing and intensive’ led to an under-
reporting of episodes of ‘constructive worry’ (Davey, 1993). It is important to note that the 
superiority of the PSWQ in predicting worry in daily life is likely to be limited to pathological worry. In 
contrast, the finding of daily worry duration that was twice as long by Dupuy et al. (2001; 60 min 
versus 30 min by us and by the related study of Brosschot & Van der Doef, 2006) was possibly due to 
the fact that Dupuy et al. (2001) emphasized that worry was accompanied by anxiety, whereas the 
definition of worry that we provided laid more emphasis on worry as a process of repetitive negative 
thinking. The former definition could have led participants to report worry as well as anxiety 
episodes, thereby creating a bias in total worry duration. In addition, Szábo and Lovibond (2002) 
provided their participants with no definition of worry and found that 11% of the worry episodes 
were actually rumination episodes. This short outline makes clear that it is essential to consider in 
great detail what one exactly wants to measure and how one instructs participants.  
In sum, this study provides reasonable support for the predictive validity of both the PSWQ 
and the WDQ, their superiority in predicting daily worry over the STAI-T, and their differential 
predictive validity with respect to perseverative or pathogenic aspects of worry. However, this study 
also suggests that future studies concerned with the emotional and health outcomes of worry should 
consider combining trait questionnaires with momentary assessments.  
 














Register during daytime:   Fill in at the end of the day: 
 
Number of worry episodes (one tally  
for each episode)                                    
 
         (None?: Fill in: 0) 
     
                                                                          (None?: Fill in: 0) 
        


















Effects of momentary assessed stressful events and worry episodes on somatic health complaints 
 


































Somatic health complaints are extremely common and are responsible for a large part of human 
suffering and health care costs. It has been recognized that psychosocial stress can affect somatic 
health. Yet, according to the “perseverative cognition hypothesis”, stressful events can only affect 
somatic health when people keep on worrying about them. Worry would prolong stress-related 
physiological activity that can ultimately lead to health problems. In this ambulatory study we tested 
whether stressful events and worry predict daily somatic complaints, and whether worry mediates 
the effects of stressful events. In addition, it was tested whether these effects were independent 
from negative affect. Using electronic diaries, sixty-nine teachers (age 21 - 60) from Dutch primary 
and secondary schools reported daily stressful events, worry episodes, negative affect and somatic 
complaints for a period of six days. Results showed that worry intensity predicted the number of 
somatic complaints and mediated the effect of stressful events on somatic complaints. Furthermore, 
these results were independent from biobehavioral variables and daily negative affect. These 
findings support the perseverative cognition hypothesis proposing that the negative somatic health 
effects of stressful events are largely due to the worry, that is, to the prolonged cognitive 










Somatic health complaints are extremely common. A survey among more than 1 million people in 
the US revealed that 40% to 55% were subject to headaches, 33% to 46% fatigue, and 15% sore 
throat at the point in time that they were being examined (Hammond, 1964). In a study in the Nordic 
European countries (Eriksen, Svendsrod, Ursin, & Ursin, 1998) 75% of the respondents reported one 
or more subjective health complaints. A recent investigation in a general Dutch population (older 
than 25 yr) found that low back pain, shoulder pain and neck pain occurred in respectively 26.9%, 
20.9% and 20.6% of the subjects (Picavet & Schouten, 2003). Between 33 and 42% of those with 
complaints consulted their general practitioner about their pain. In addition, most of these 
complaints concern vague symptoms without a clear medical diagnosis (Kroenke & Mangelsdorff, 
1989). A survey in seven outpatient clinics in London, across a variety of specialties, showed that 52% 
of the patients fulfilled criteria for medically unexplained symptoms. In some specialties, it was the 
most common diagnosis (Nimnuan, Hotopf, & Wessely, 2001). In addition, the costs for the 
investigations are frequently high, taking into account the medical actions involved, which come on 
top of sick leave compensations and the loss of productivity (Eriksen & Ihlebaek, 2002). This short 
analysis makes clear that it is important to investigate which processes underlie the reporting of 
somatic complaints.  
It has been recognized for a long time that psychosocial stress can affect somatic health. The 
perception of a stressful event triggers the physiological stress response and when this response is 
prolonged for too long it can become detrimental for ones somatic health (Mcewen, 1998; Brosschot 
& Thayer, 1998; Linden, Earle, Gerin, & Christenfeld, 1997; Schwartz et al., 2003; Pieper & Brosschot, 
2005). One important feature of stressful events is that they not only trigger the physiological stress 
response, but also trigger perseverative thoughts about these events. In recent years, this 
perseverative thinking, such as worrying about upcoming stressful events, has been put forward as 
the central pathological mechanism mediating between the perception of stressful situations and 
poor somatic health, including somatic complaints (Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005; Brosschot, 
Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Watkins, 2008). According to this “perseverative cognition hypothesis” 
(Brosschot et al., 2006), worrying about stressors prolongs the total amount of time that these 
stressors adversely affect physiological functioning. Several studies provide evidence for this idea, in 
the laboratory (see Brosschot et al., 2006, and more recent: Gerin, Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal, & 
Schwartz, 2006; Key, Campbell, Bacon, & Gerin, 2008; Zoccola, Dickerson, & Zaldivar, 2008) but also 
in daily life. With respect to the latter, worry mediated the effect of stressful events on cardiac 
activity during waking as well as sleeping at night (Brosschot, van Dijk, & Thayer, 2007). Other 
ambulatory studies have shown that worry about stressful events at work is related to heightened 





sample of teachers (Pieper, Brosschot, van der Leeden, & Thayer, 2007). In addition, people who 
keep on worrying about their work after the workday has passed, have difficulties ‘unwinding’ and 
suffer from more emotional and somatoform symptoms (Geurts & Sonnentag, 2006; Sonnentag, 
Binnewies, & Mojza, 2008) than those who do not. Moreover, prospective studies have provided 
evidence that the tendency to worry about things and the inability to ‘unwind’ or disengage after 
work is associated with cardiovascular morbidity (van Amelsvoort, Kant, Bultmann, & Swaen, 2003) 
and even mortality (Kivimaki et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, the perseverative cognition hypothesis predicts that worry – through these 
prolonged physiological responses - leads to somatic complaints, and mediates the effects of 
stressful events on these complaints. There is some evidence that stressful events have such an 
influence on somatic complaints. Cross-sectional studies have shown that worry is associated with 
several somatic health complaints, especially with (neck) pain (Freeston et al., 1996; Thomsen et al., 
2004). Also, Emmons and King (1988) found that individuals who spend a large amount of time 
ruminating about their conflicting life goals show higher levels of somatic complaints. More recently, 
in a prospective study, Brosschot and Van der Doef (2006) found in a sample of adolescents that a 
simple worry intervention was helpful in reducing worry during six consecutive days. This reduction 
in worry in turn, predicted a decrease in the number of subjective health complaint assessed before 
and after the six days of the worry intervention. Their study is the first to show that worry was 
prospectively and therefore perhaps causally related to the number of somatic complaints. The 
present study was set up to extend the findings from Brosschot and Van der Doef's (2006) study and 
more precisely test the perseverative cognition hypothesis. Firstly, the effects of (daily) stressful 
events on somatic complaints were not taken into account in that study. Secondly, only worry 
episodes were assessed using daily assessments whereas all other variables (including somatic 
complaints and negative affect) were measured retrospectively. Concerning the first issue, it could 
still be possible that the worry episodes were an indirect indication of the experience of stressful 
events. Indeed several studies have shown that stressful events are associated with somatic 
complaints (see e.g. Joksimovic, Starke, Knesebeck, & Siegrist, 2002; Godin & Kittel, 2004; Lepore, 
Miles, & Levy, 1997) and the perseverative cognition hypothesis predicts that worry about these 
events might have mediated their effects. To test this, in the present study we tried to replicate the 
finding that worry was prospectively related to somatic complaints, while also taking the number of 
stressful events into account. Concerning the second issue, Brosschot and Van der Doef (2006) only 
measured the number of somatic complaints before and after a period of six days, during which the 
worry intervention took place, and asked participants to report on the number of complaints 
experienced "during the last three days". This latter retrospective way of measuring complaints could 
have introduced a so called ‘retrospective bias’. Houtveen and Oei (2007) recently showed that the 




total number of somatic complaints experienced during a week is higher when this is assessed at the 
end of the week, compared to when these complaints are assessed each single day during a week, 
suggesting that participants use different memory retrieval strategies for these two kinds of 
assessments. Thus, by using a retrospective method some participants – especially those who 
worried a lot during the week - might have overestimated their complaints in the Brosschot and Van 
der Doef study. We therefore used a daily measurement of somatic complaints in the present study.  
Stressful events not only result in worrisome thoughts about these events, but are also 
accompanied by negative affect. Recent evidence suggests that negative affect is prolonged beyond 
the presence of actual stressors by worry (Watkins, 2008). Negative affect has also been shown to 
increase the reporting of somatic symptoms, either by enhancing adverse physiological responding 
to, for example, infections (Cohen et al., 1995) or by biasing attention towards (threatening) 
misinterpretations of harmless bodily sensations (Petrie, Moss-Morris, Grey, & Shaw, 2004; Rief & 
Broadbent, 2007). It is plausible that the effects of worry on somatic complaints are in their turn 
mediated by negative affect – being an indication of prolonged physiological arousal or prolonged 
attention towards bodily sensations. Yet, not all studies have found independent effects of negative 
affect on health-related variables. For example, recent studies by us indicated that negative affect 
has no or only minor effects on cardiac activity (Pieper et al., 2007; Verkuil, Brosschot, Borkovec, & 
Thayer, 2009). On the other hand, Thomson et al. (2004) found that negative affect mediated the 
effect of rumination on poor somatic health in elderly people. However, this finding was restricted to 
the cross-sectional part of their study and was not apparent in the prospective part. Taken together, 
it is not yet clear what the role of negative affect is in explaining somatic health complaints, and the 
effect of stress and worry on them. We therefore examined, in the present study, the role of 
negative affect by including a daily measurement of negative affectivity.  
In short, the present study tested whether (1a) stressful events predict the number of 
somatic complaints and whether (1b) worry episodes predict the number of and (1c) whether worry 
mediates the effects of stressful events on the number of somatic complaints. Finally, (2a), we tested 
whether worry predicts negative affect and (2b) whether the effects of worry on somatic complaints 
are mediated by negative affect. Importantly, and different from previous studies, all variables were 




The managers of fifteen primary schools and seven secondary schools were contacted and were 
asked whether they gave permission to the researchers to contact their teachers for the purpose of 





carrying out this study (undergraduate students in psychology) were familiar with many of these 
teachers, which were from their former schools. All teachers received written information about the 
study and were asked to respond in case they were willing to participate. In total, 102 teachers 
responded. In the end, 30 of these teachers could not participate in the study, due to sickness or 
logistic difficulties, resulting in a final sample of 72 participants. All participants gave written 




Daily reports on the variables of interest were collected using electronic diaries. Participants were 
handed a Palm-top computer (either a Palm Tungsten E2 or a Palm M100). The usage of the Palmtop 
was explained by one of the research assistants. For six consecutive days participants were prompted 
five times a day (from 8.00 until 21.30). The prompts were separated by randomly varying time 
periods, each lasting at least 2¾ hours, but maximally 3¾ hours. Daily assessments were gathered via 




Subjective health complaints 
At every last assessment of the day, the Subjective Health Complaints questionnaire (SHC) was 
administered (Eriksen, Ihlebaek, & Ursin, 1999). This questionnaire consists of 29-items measuring 
the presence and severity of health complaints in five different areas of complaints: musculoskeletal 
pain; pseudo-neurological; gastrointestinal problems; allergic problems; and flu. The SHC is a reliable, 
easy, and systematic way to score subjective health complaints as they are experienced by the 
general population (Eriksen et al., 1999). The items ‘anxious’ and ‘depressed’ were removed before 
the analyses. Due to a programming error, the item ‘migraine’ was not included in the palmtop 
version of the questionnaire, yet unpublished data by us show that this complaint is very seldom. The 
item ‘headache’ however, was retained. The total number of the remaining twenty-six SHCs was 
used as our outcome measure.  
 
Worry episodes 
The experience of worry episodes was assessed at each prompt. Participants were provided with a 
definition of worry based upon Borkovec et al. (1983). This definition was also printed on the case of 
the PDA. As the Dutch word for worry (‘piekeren’) also refers to ‘thinking hard’, we referred to worry 
as rumination (‘rumineren’; see also, Pieper et al. 2007) while providing the following description: 




“rumination involves repeatedly and constantly thinking about negative events or situations in the 
past, present or future. The thoughts are often accompanied by negative tension”. At every prompt, 
participants had to indicate whether they had been worrying, and if this was the case, then they 
were asked to indicate for how long (less than 5 minutesˇ 5 to 30 minutes; 30 – 60 minutes; more 
than 60 minutes). Subsequently, they were asked to indicate the total intensity of the worry 
episode(s) by dragging a slider on a scale ranging from ‘slightly intense’ to ‘very intense’ (end points 
ranging from 0-10). Finally, there were asked to indicate whether the worrying concerned private or 
work related issues. The latter aspects (intensity and content) were also new compared to the 
Brosschot and Van der Doef study. 
 
Stressful events  
Stressful events were also assessed at each prompt. Participants were provided with a definition of 
stressful events, based upon the definition described in the Daily Hassles Scale (APL, see below): 
‘Stressful events are minor and major events that have made you feel tense, irritated, angry, sad, 
disappointed or negative in any other way’. Participants were asked to indicate the number of 
stressful events that had experienced (‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5 or  more’) since the last prompt. In case 
they had experienced one or more stressful events, they were asked to indicate whether the event 
concerned private or work related issues.  
 
Negative affect 
At every last assessment of the day, negative affect was measured with the negative affect subscale 
of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Example 
items are ‘distressed’, ‘scared’ and ‘irritable’. The scale point are: 1 ‘very 
slightly or not at all’, 2 ‘a little’, 3 ‘moderately’, 4 ‘quite a bit’ and 5 ‘very much’. Participants were 
asked to report on the amount of negative affect experienced during the preceding day.  
 
Biobehavioral variables 
To be able to control for the effects of biobehavioral variables on somatic complaints, participants 
were asked at the last assessment of the day to report the number alcoholic beverages, the number 
of cups of coffee and the number of cigarettes smoked (‘0’, ‘1-2’, ‘3-4’, ‘4 or more’), the amount of 
physical effort (five point scale ranging from ‘none’ to ‘very much’). In addition, to control for the 
effects of bad sleep on somatic complaints, each morning at the first assessment, participants were 
asked to report on the sleep quality during the previous night. Sleep quality was measured on a VAS-









The number of somatic complaints experienced during the three days before the start of the 
experiment was assessed with the paper and pencil version of the SHC described above. In order to 
control for the effects of SHC during the previous day, including the mean number of complaints 




The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) was used to measure the level of (pathological) trait-
worry. The PSWQ has proven to be a reliable and valid measure (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990; Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 2007b). Examples of items are “I am always worrying about 
something” and “Once I start worrying, I can’t stop.” The items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale, 
with a score of 1 representing “Not at all typical” (for me) and a score of 5 representing “Very 
typical” (for me).  
 
Daily hassles 
Stressful events during the past two months were measured with the Daily Problems Checklist 
(Vingerhoets, Jeninga, & Menges, 1989)). The DPC is based on the Daily Hassle Scale by Lazurus and 
colleagues(Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981) and has been previously used in stress 
research in teachers (see e.g. Brosschot et al., 1994). Items include “One of your family members had 
health problems” and “You had a conflict with your partner”. Participants were asked to indicate 
whether they had experienced such an event, and to what extent they were annoyed by these events 
(five points scale ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’). The total sum on this questionnaire was 
used as our measure of experienced stress at baseline.  
 
Trait negative affect 




Multilevel or hierarchical regression analyses were used to analyze the associations between the 
variables of interest (Singer & Willett, 2003). Multilevel analysis is especially suitable to analyze 
repeated measures data because it accounts for the dependencies of the different measurements 




(level 1) that are nested within individuals (level 2). Another advantage is that multilevel analysis 
allows for models to be estimated on all available data from each individual and can handle 
unbalanced datasets that contain irregularly spaced measurement intervals. Missing values on the 
questionnaires were imputed using the algorithm provided by Van Ginkel & Van der Ark (2005). 
Multilevel hierarchical regression analyses were performed with SPSS version 14.0.  
To test whether worry mediated the effects of stressful events on somatic complaints, and 
possibly negative affect on turn mediated these effects, a mediation analysis was conducted in line 
with the guidelines provided by Baron and Kenny (1986).  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics  
Of the initial 72 participants, three participants did not complete the study. The final sample 
consisted of 69 Dutch secondary school teachers, of which 44 were female and 24 male. Age ranged 
from 21 to 60 years, with an average of 38.88 years (SD = 12.89). Baseline descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 1. 
Concerning the daily assessments of somatic complaints, fatigue was the most reported 
somatic complaint, which is in line with previous studies on the prevalence of SHCs (Eriksen et al., 
1999); in 59.9% of all daily reports participants complained about fatigue (including missed reports). 
Other frequently reported complaints were low back pain (27.3%), flatulence / “wind” (25.6%), 
sleeping difficulties (25.4%) and cold / flu (23.7%). 
The mean number of stressful events per day was 2.60 (SD = 1.91), whereas the mean 
number of worry episodes per day was 1.49 (SD = 1.24), which is slightly higher than previously 
observed in comparable studies (e.g. 1.58 and 1.06 respectively, by Pieper et al., 2007). The total 
duration of the worry episodes per day was 37 minutes (SD = 48.56), which is in line with previous 
studies in non-clinical samples (Verkuil et al., 2007b). The mean intensity score per worry episode 





   
Table 1. Descriptive statistics at baseline. 
 % M  SD 
    
Gender 64.7% female   
Education 79.4% HBO    
 20.6% MBO   
Age  38.88 12.89 
SHC  4.66 3.71 
PANAS  16.30 4.66 
DHC  33.55 23.17 
PSWQ  42.94 11.40 
Note. SHC = Subjective Health Complaints; PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule;  
DHC = Daily Hassles Checklist; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
 
Preliminary analyses 
To assess whether multilevel analysis would be appropriate to analyze the effects of stressful events 
and worry episodes on somatic complaints, we first estimated the intra-class correlation in a baseline 
model with a random intercept and with SHC as the dependent variable, but without any predictors. 
The results showed that the intraclass correlation was .59, showing that 59% of the variance was due 
to individual differences between participants, thereby providing evidence for a 2-level hierarchical 
structure of the data. In addition, since the somatic complaints were measured repeatedly within 
subjects, we tested whether the error terms of the model would be correlated. Residual error 
covariance was modeled using the first-order auto-regressive covariance matrix, which showed that 
the estimated auto-correlation (ρ) was .22 (p = .017). With respect to the model predicting daily 
negative affect, a baseline random intercept model without predictors showed that the intra-class 
correlation was .46, that 46% of the variance was due to individual differences between participants. 
Because residual error covariance using the first-order auto-regressive covariance matrix did not 




Effects of stressful events and worry episodes on daily somatic complaints 
First we examined whether stressful events were associated with the number of SHC, while 
controlling for SHC the previous day. The effect of stressful events on SHC was significant (B = .191, p 
< .0001, 95% CI: .087 - .294). When stressful work and private events were entered separately into 




the model, the results showed that work related stressors had a larger effect on somatic complaints 
(B = .366, p < .01, 95% CI: .114 - .617) than private stressors (B = .290, p < .05, 95% CI: .052 - .527).  
Next, we examined the effects of the worry variables, (frequency, duration and intensity) on 
the number of SHC. The correlations between these variables were high (rs > .87). In a first step, SHC 
was regressed on worry frequency and worry duration (the variables used in the study by Brosschot 
& van der Doef [2006]), while controlling for the number of somatic complaints during the previous 
day. Worry frequency significantly predicted the number of somatic complaints (B = .451, p < .01, 
95% CI: .152 - .749), and worry duration did this marginally (B = .008, p = .082, 95% CI: -.001 - .019). 
When worry intensity was entered into the model, only worry intensity predicted the number of SHC 
(B = .094, p < .01, 95% CI: .028 - .160), whereas the effects of worry frequency (B = .137, p = .460) and 
worry duration (B = .000, p = .954) were not significant anymore.  
 
Mediating effects of worry episodes between stressful events and somatic complaints 
To test whether the effect of stressful events on SHC was mediated by worry intensity, worry 
intensity was regressed on the number of stressful events. The number of stressful events was 
significantly related to worry intensity (B = 1.165, p < .0001, 95% CI: .863 - 1.467). In a subsequent 
model, stressful events and worry intensity were both added as predictors of SHC. When controlling 
for the effect of worry intensity, the effect of stressful events on SHC was reduced and became non-
significant (B = .053, p = .337, 95% CI: -.055 - .161), whereas the effect of worry intensity was still 
significant (B = .106, p < .0001, 95% CI: .071 - .140), suggesting full mediation. Sobel’s z-score of this 
mediated effect was 4.82 showing that the mediation effect was significant (p < .0001; Baron & 
Kenny, 1986).  
 In a final model we tested whether worry intensity was related to SHC while controlling for 
biobehavioral variables (age, gender, education level, smoking, alcohol use, sleep quality, baseline 
traits and daily hassles during the last two months) and SHC during the previous day. The results are 






Table 2. Estimates of fixed effects predicting the number of somatic complaints with and without 
negative affect (baseline and daily measurements) 
 B SE t p  B SE t p 
Intercept 4.67 0.38 12.18 .00  4.68 0.36 12.97 .00 
Stressful events -0.03 0.06 -0.43 .67  -0.05 0.06 -0.78 .44 
Worry intensity 0.11 0.02 5.99 .00  0.10 0.02 4.88 .00 
Age 0.00 0.02 0.05 .96  0.00 0.02 -0.01 .99 
Gender 0.63 0.59 1.07 .29  0.48 0.55 0.87 .39 
Education -0.68 0.67 -1.02 .32  -0.57 0.61 -0.92 .36 
Caffeine 0.04 0.10 0.41 .68  0.05 0.10 0.52 .60 
Smoking 0.10 0.06 1.77 .08  0.16 0.06 2.47 .01 
Alcohol 0.10 0.10 0.96 .34  0.05 0.10 0.49 .62 
Physical effort -0.10 0.12 -0.85 .40  -0.10 0.12 -0.83 .41 
PSWQ -0.04 0.03 -1.58 .12  -0.04 0.03 -1.54 .13 
DHC 0.03 0.01 2.24 .03  0.02 0.01 1.78 .08 
Previous SHC 0.03 0.05 0.64 .52  0.06 0.05 1.11 .27 
Sleep quality previous night -0.07 0.15 -0.47 .64  -0.18 0.15 -1.17 .24 
Time -0.26 0.08 -3.43 .00  -0.23 0.08 -3.10 .00 
Baseline negative affect      -0.05 0.07 -0.71 .48 
Daily Negative affect      0.14 0.04 3.37 .00 
          
Deviance (-2 log likelihood) 1138.435     1103.456    
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; DHC = Daily Hassles Checklist; SHC = Subjective Health Complaints. 
 
Effects of stressful events and worry episodes on negative affect 
First, negative affect was regressed on the number of stressful events, while controlling for negative 
affect during the previous day. Stressful events significantly predicted negative affect (B = 0.520, p < 
.0001, 95% CI: 0.334 - 0.706). Stressful events related to work were a slightly better predictor of 
negative affect (B = 0.934, p < .0001, 95% CI: 0.516 - 1.353) than stressful private events (B = 0.698, p 
< .0001, 95% CI: 0.308 - 1.089). Next, negative affect was regressed on worry frequency and worry 
duration. Only worry duration predicted negative affect (B = 0.022, p < .05, 95% CI: 0.005 - 0.038), 
whereas worry frequency did not (B = 0.382, p = .144). When worry intensity was entered into the 
model, only worry intensity predicted negative affect (B = .144, p < .05, 95% CI: 0.033 - 0.254), 
whereas the effects of worry frequency (B = -.065, p = .839) and worry duration (B = .010, p  = .308) 
were not significant anymore. When controlling for the effect of negative affect  during the previous 
day and worry intensity, the effect of stressful events on negative affect was still significant (B = .323, 




p < .01, 95% CI: 0.127 - .519), as was the effect of worry intensity (B = .131, p < .0001, 95% CI: .077 - 
.184).  
In the final model, negative affect was regressed on stressful events, worry intensity, the 
biobehavioral variables, negative affect at baseline and negative affect during the previous day (see 
Table 3). Negative affect was significantly predicted by negative affect at baseline (B = 0.154, p = 
.098, 95% CI: -0.030 - 0.338), worry intensity (B = 0.128, p < .0001, 95% CI: 0.069 - 0.187) and, yet 
marginally, by age (B = 0.057, p = .067, 95% CI: -0.064 - 0.366), but not any more by stressful events.  
 
Table 3. Estimates of fixed effects predicting daily negative affect. 
 B SE t p 
Intercept 13.50 0.54 25.07 .00 
Worry intensity 0.13 0.03 4.29 .00 
Stressful events 0.15 0.11 1.38 .17 
Age 0.06 0.03 1.90 .07 
Gender 0.84 0.74 1.13 .27 
Education -0.28 0.85 -0.34 .74 
Caffeine -0.22 0.15 -1.48 .14 
Smoking -0.06 0.09 -0.67 .51 
Alcohol 0.09 0.15 0.59 .56 
Physical effort -0.06 0.18 -0.31 .75 
PSWQ 0.01 0.04 0.31 .76 
DHC 0.02 0.02 0.81 .42 
Negative Affect previous day 0.07 0.06 1.05 .30 
Sleep quality previous night -0.05 0.23 -0.20 .84 
Time -0.08 0.12 -0.66 .51 
Baseline negative affect 0.15 0.09 1.71 .10 
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; DHC = Daily Hassles Checklist. 
 
Mediating effects of negative affect between worry and somatic complaints 
To examine whether baseline negative affect and daily negative affect could add to the model 
predicting the number of SHC, and whether daily negative affect mediated the effect of worry 
intensity on SHC, these variables were added as predictors in the model discussed above. In this final 
model, SHC was independently predicted by daily negative affect (B = 0.118, p = .010, 95% CI: 0.029 - 
0.208), smoking (B = 0.145, p = .025, 95% CI: 0.018 - 0.272), and worry intensity (B = 0.095, p < .0001, 





the effect of worry intensity on SHC was not reduced by adding daily negative affect to the model, 
the hypothesis that negative affect mediates the effect of worry on SHC could not be confirmed. 
Another possible role of negative affect might be that it interacts with worry and thereby enhances 
the effects of worry on somatic complaints. However, exploratory analysis showed that the 
interaction between worry intensity and daily negative affect on SHC was not significant.  
 
Effects on specific complaints 
To examine whether worry intensity was associated with the occurrence of specific somatic 
complaints, multilevel random intercept logistic regression models were fit (using MLwiN software) 
on the specific complaints. Results showed that worry intensity was significantly associated with the 
occurrence of 13 of the 26 complaints. These complaints were: neck pain, stomach pains, fatigue, 
sleeping difficulties, pain in arms, headache, asthma, flatulence / ‘wind’, chest pains, vertigo, pain in 
shoulders, stomach discomfort and cold / flu.   
 
Discussion 
In this study the effects of stressful events and worry on somatic complaints were examined. In line 
with previous work, the present study demonstrated that worry was prospectively associated with 
somatic health (Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006; Thomsen et al., 2004). Importantly, this study adds 
to previous studies the finding that worry mediates the effects of stressful events on somatic health 
complaints. These effects of worry were independent of negative affect and biobehavioral variables. 
Moreover we used a more precise measure of worry, that did not contain the connotation of 
'thinking hard' of the Dutch word for worry ('piekeren'). Furthermore, health complaints were 
measured on a daily basis instead of retrospectively as in Brosschot & Van Der Doef (2006).  This 
study therefore provide further evidence for the perseverative cognition hypothesis which states 
that worry is the crucial link between stressful events and somatic health (Brosschot et al., 2006). The 
effects of worry were visible on a range of different single complaints, suggesting that there is not 
one specific biological system involved, but that the effect is the results of a general physiological 
stress response. This study focused on a group of teachers, workers who are considered to be highly 
vulnerable for developing work stress related psychological and somatic complaints. As Brosschot & 
Van der Doef (2006) have found that a relatively simple worry intervention is helpful in reducing 
worry and somatic complaints in adolescents, a next step might be to test the effectiveness of such a 
worry intervention in a vulnerable group like this one. Reducing the harmful effects of prolonged 
stress responses such as worry might be an important addition to existing (preventive) stress 
management interventions that are aimed at reducing the immediate effects of stressful events, for 
example assertiveness training. If proven to be effective, this is expected to have large implications 




not only for the wellbeing of workers, but, as a consequence, also on the economical costs associated 
with somatic health complaints.  
  One reason that worry had stronger effects than stressful events might not have to do with 
the fact that worry mediated their effects, but with the much larger scope of worry. Worry is always 
about stressors and by measuring the effects of worry episodes we aggregated the effects of one or 
many more stressful events at once, including many events outside the time window of this study. 
Moreover, worries are mostly about very significant personal events, in the (regretted) past as well 
as in the (feared) future, and these cognitive representations of stressful events are always highly 
personally relevant. In contrast, by measuring stressful events – that are time-locked - only effects of 
single stressful events at a time are measured, pertaining only to the here and now. Moreover, 
stressful events might not necessarily reflect highly personally relevant events, and therefore not 
lead to any somatic complaints, or, for that matter, worrying. 
 Furthermore, in line with previous studies, stressful events and worry intensity 
independently predicted the level of daily negative affect (Watkins, 2008). However, daily negative 
affect did not mediate or moderate the relation between worry intensity and somatic complaints. 
Yet, both worry intensity and negative affect were independently associated with the number of 
somatic complaints. Although worry and negative affect are both signs of prolonged effects of 
stressful events, the present results suggest that they are associated with the reporting of somatic 
complaints via separate routes. Worry has been shown to be closely associated with prolonged 
stress-related physiological activity in daily life and might lead to somatic complaints via such a route. 
The physiological effects of negative affect, independent of worry and stressors, are less clear (e.g. 
Pieper et al., 2007). Negative affect might lead to complaints by biasing information processing 
towards the detection of bodily sensations and interpreting these sensations as threatening or 
harmful (Petrie et al., 2004; Rief & Broadbent, 2007).  This suggestion has to be examined in future 
studies. What is more, we have previously shown that one specific form of worrying, that is, worrying 
about ones health, is also associated with enhanced memory for health related information and that 
this was associated with heightened levels of somatic complaints (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 
2007a), suggesting that worry itself can lead to somatic complaints via different routes. Future 
studies should therefore distinguish between more general worries about stressful external events 
and worry about internal bodily sensations.  
 Interestingly, of the measures used to capture worry in daily life, worry intensity was most 
strongly associated with somatic complaints and explained the effects of worry frequency and worry 
duration on somatic complaints and negative affect. Although worry frequency, duration and 
intensity were highly correlated (rs > .85), we expected that worry duration would be associated with 





Unexpectedly, worry duration was not only related to complaints more weakly than worry intensity, 
but also than worry frequency, compared to the Brosschot and Van Der Doef study. One explanation 
may be that in this latter study, total worry duration was estimated by participants at the end of the 
day, whereas in this study worry duration was measured at random intervals during the day by 
asking participants to choose from several answer options on their PDA. As the duration of very 
intense worry episodes might be better recalled at the end of the day, compared to mild worry 
episodes that possibly occur relatively automatically, the worry duration measure by Brosschot & 
Van der Doef (2006) might have been more a measure of worry intensity, than a precise measure of 
worry duration. Yet, this speculative suggestion has to be addressed in future studies on how to best 
capture worry in daily life. 
 There are several limitations to this ambulatory study. Although it is prospective, its 
correlational nature precludes the definite conclusion that worry actually causes somatic complaints. 
Yet, the intervention study by Brosschot and Van der Doef (2006) has already provided beginning 
evidence that this is likely the case. Secondly, in this study we measured somatic complaints but did 
not assess objective illness and absence from work. Thus, it still seems important to investigate what 
factors predict why people eventually decide to actually not attend work. Thirdly, we only focused on 
worry in this study, whereas the perseverative cognition hypothesis pertains to a broader range of 
cognitive representations of stressors, such as negative intrusive thoughts and ruminative thoughts. 
In addition, as a large part of cognitive processing occurs without conscious awareness, it is likely 
that stress-related perseverative thoughts occur unconsciously too. It might underlie the effects of 
negative affect in this study, since it is likely that some form of stress-related cognition must have 
prolonged negative affect. Unconscious perseveration, such as hypervigilance for threat, cannot be 
measured using explicit measures such as verbal reports, but warrants the use of implicit measures 
such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) or the dot probe task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Future 
studies could benefit from including portable instruments to measure these types of perseverative 
cognition. On a related note, previous studies have shown that daytime stressors and worries have 
prolonged effects during sleep (Hall et al., 2004; Brosschot et al., 2007). This seems to suggest that a 
part of (unconscious) perseverative cognition takes place during sleeping. This, reduced recovery 
from stress during sleep might create a vicious cycle in which worry influences recovery during sleep 
which in turn amplifies the level of experienced stress and worries the next day. Although  there 
were no substantial effects of reduced sleep quality, this might not be very relevant, since these 
physiological effects during sleep seem also not dependent on sleep quality (Hall et al., 2004; 
Brosschot et al., 2007). Thus, it is still possible that an even greater portion of somatic complaints can 
be explained by perseverative cognition that lingers on, together with its physiological effects, during 
sleep. As still little is known about the role of sleep in the link between stress – worry and somatic 




complaints, while sleep is clearly the largest natural restorative period in normal human life, it seems 
extremely worthwhile to search for ways to investigate the role of perseverative cognition during 
sleep in future studies.  
 In sum, in this study evidence was provided that stressful events as well as worry are 
prospectively associated with somatic complaints and that this effect is mediated by worry intensity. 
Furthermore, worry intensity was associated with somatic complaints, independently from negative 
affect. Future studies testing the effectiveness of worry interventions in people at risk for the 








Pretreatment of worry enhances the effects of stress management therapy: a randomized clinical 
trial 
 


































In this randomized trial it was tested whether a two-week worry postponement and disengagement 
intervention (WPD) reduces work stress symptoms and whether it enhances stress management 
therapy (SMT). WPD effectiveness was investigated in sixty-two outpatients, suffering from 
adjustment and unspecified somatoform disorders, awaiting SMT provided at a mental health center. 
Twenty-two patients received WPD two weeks before the onset of SMT. Immediate and additive 
effects of WPD were compared to “worry registration-only” (N = 15) or to “waiting list control” (N = 
25). Although short term effects on somatoform, anxiety and depressive symptoms were not 
significant, WPD added to SMT effectiveness. Decreases in nighttime worry and work stress 
symptoms after SMT and at follow-up were substantially more pronounced in the WPD condition. 
Compared to waiting list, WPD tended to induce decreases in pathological worry during SMT. In 
conclusion, a brief worry intervention that can be administered by psychologists and occupational 
physicians may be effective in reducing work stress and may enhance the effects of subsequent 
SMTs.   
 






It has been known for a long time that stressful work situations are associated with huge personal 
suffering and place a high economical burden on society due to absenteeism, loss of productivity and 
the use of health care systems (for reviews see: Van Der Doef & Maes, 1999; Michie & Williams, 
2003). As has already been proposed by early stress-researchers (Selye, 1951) stress can only affect 
our health when it is sustained for too long. Prolonged stress responses, and not or not so much 
acute stress responses are the crucial link between stressors and later mental (McEwen, 2003; 
Thayer & Lane, 2000) as well as somatic problems (Selye, 1951; Ursin & Eriksen, 2004; Linden, Earle, 
Gerin, & Christenfeld, 1997; Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006). In recent years, worrying about the 
stressful situations has been proposed to be one of the central pathological mechanisms between 
the experience of stressful situations and poor mental and somatic health (Brosschot et al., 2006; 
Watkins, 2008). 
According to the perseverative cognition hypothesis (Brosschot et al., 2006), worrying about 
(work) stressors prolongs the total amount of time that these stressors adversely affect physiological 
and emotional functioning. Several studies provide evidence for this hypothesis. For example, 
ambulatory studies have shown that worrying about work stress is related to heightened cortisol 
levels (Schlotz, Hellhammer, Schulz, & Stone, 2004) and with heightened heart rate (Pieper, 
Brosschot, van der Leeden & Thayer, 2007). In addition, people who keep on worrying about their 
work after the workday have more difficulties ‘unwinding’ and suffer from more emotional and 
somatoform symptoms (Geurts & Sonnentag, 2006; Sonnentag, Binnewies, & Mojza, 2008) than 
those who do not. Moreover, prospective studies have provided evidence that the tendency to worry 
about things and the inability to ‘unwind’ or disengage after work is associated with cardiovascular 
morbidity (van Amelsvoort, Kant, Bultmann, & Swaen, 2003; Kubzansky et al., 1997) and even 
mortality (Kivimaki et al., 2006).  
Accordingly, when trying to reduce the negative effects of stressful work situations on 
psychological and somatic health, interventions seem needed that are able to reduce worry about 
work in order to minimize the total ‘wear and tear’ (cf McEwen, 2003) that these situations can have. 
This focus on preventing prolonged stress responses is in line with Guidance on work related stress 
by the European Commission which states that: “Stress is inevitable. What is not inevitable is 
prolonged, recurrent and/or intense distress” (p. 79, Levi, 2000). In the present study we tested the 
effectiveness of a short and easy to administer guided self help intervention aimed at reducing the 
total time spent worrying in people suffering from work related stress. This intervention might 
specifically be suited to be administered by occupational physicians and general practitioners, who 
are the first points of contact for people suffering from work stress and typically have limited time to 





is a so-called ‘stimulus control intervention’, and requires people to reschedule their day and 
nighttime worry episodes to a specific moment of the day during which worrying is allowed. This 
intervention is part of the cognitive behavioral treatment for people suffering from generalized 
anxiety disorder, of which chronic worry is the main feature, and has previously been found to be 
effective in reducing worry and its associated tension (Borkovec et al, 1983) and somatoform 
symptoms (Jellesma, Verkuil, & Brosschot, 2009; Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006) in relatively 
healthy subjects. However, it remains unclear whether this simple intervention is also effective in 
reducing worry and somatic and emotional complaints in people suffering from work stress.   
This study was designed to test the short term effects of this worry intervention on the 
duration and frequency of worry episodes in people suffering from work stress, diagnosed according 
to the DSM-IV with adjustment disorder or undifferentiated somatoform disorder. We tested 
whether the intervention is effective in reducing work stress–related somatoform, anxiety and 
depressive symptoms which have been shown to be caused by worry (Watkins, 2008). Moreover, we 
also tested if and to what extent this short intervention - aimed as it is at a crucial prolongator of 
work stress, i.e. worry - adds to a typical cognitive behavioral based stress management therapy 
(SMT) of people suffering from work stress. The tendency to worry has been suggested to be an 
important mediator of the treatment effects of CBT and mindfulness meditation and a reduction of 
worry might be a prerequisite for CBT to be fully effective. However, empirical evidence is still scarce 
and previous studies have found mixed results for the mediating role of worry in the context of CBT 
in general as well as for work stress (Jain et al., 2007; Ciesla & Roberts, 2002). If the worry 
intervention appears to have positive effects in this study, either on itself or by boosting subsequent 
SMT, or both, it might offer general practitioners, occupational physicians and psychotherapists an 
alternative brief and easy-to-use intervention, or at least an enhancer of their standard treatment. In 
addition, it could make clear that interventions aimed at crucial mediators of CBT, such as worrying 
or biased attention - which can also be retrained (e.g., Hazen, Vasey, & Schmidt, 2009) enhances the 
effects of standard, more intensive, CBT. 
In short, we tested the following hypotheses: the worry postponement and disengagement 
intervention will: (1) Be effective in reducing the total time spent worrying; (2) Be effective in 
decreasing somatoform, anxiety and depression symptoms; (3) Add to the effects of a regular CBT-
based SMT on somatoform, anxiety and depression. Finally (4), we expect these latter two effects to 












The study took place at PsyQ Business, a psycho medical institution in The Hague, a division of one of 
the largest organizations for mental health care in the Netherlands. The institution is specialized in 
the treatment of psychopathology that is due to or affects stress at work. In general, patients are 
referred to this institution by their general practitioners or occupational physicians in order to follow 
stress management therapy (SMT). During a first interview with a clinical psychologist, patients are 
initially screened according to DSM-IV criteria for psychological disorders and a team of clinical 
psychologists thereafter proposes a subsequent treatment program. Patients were asked to 
participate in the present study when (1) they were referred to the SMT, based on a DSM-IV axis I 
diagnosis of either adjustment disorder, unspecified somatoform disorder (burnout), or severe work 
problems (axis IV) and (2) when they had to wait at least two weeks before starting with this SMT in 
order to be able to implement the pretreatment intervention. In these patients, we were interested 
in finding strong effects, that is, d >.80 (Cohen, 1988). To find such an effect we needed 63 patients. 
Excluded from the SMT, and therefore this study, were participants with substance abuse as the 
primary axis I diagnosis, serious medical conditions, organic psychiatric disorders, severe suicidality 
or a history of schizophrenia. All participants gave written informed consent before entering the 
study. No financial incentives were given and treatment costs were covered by mandatory insurance 
for mental health or by the employers of the participants. The study was approved by the Medical 
Ethical Committee of PsyQ.  
 
Procedure 
Participants who were willing to participate were invited at the institution for the first baseline 
measurement. During this session participants provided informed consent and completed the 
symptom questionnaires. Thereafter, participants were randomly allocated to one of three 
conditions: the Worry Postponement and Disengagement intervention (WPD) or to one of the two 
control conditions, that is, the Registering of Worry (WR) or a waitlist control condition, Treatment 
As Usual (TAU). Randomization was performed by the researchers in separate blocks (each consisting 
of 2 – 6 participants) by opening blinded envelopes in which the conditions were concealed in 
advance. Participants in the WPD and WR conditions then received the appropriate intervention. 









As the worry intervention has been previously shown to reduce somatoform symptoms, the primary 
outcome in this study was the total number of somatoform symptoms, assessed with 27 items of the 
Dutch version of the Subjective Health Complaints questionnaire (SHC; Eriksen, Ihlebaek, & Ursin, 
1999; the original version contains 29 items, but two items measuring anxiety and depression were 
removed before analysis). Secondary outcome measures were Dutch version of the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory  - Trait version (van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 1980), measuring anxiety 
symptoms, and the Dutch version of the Beck Depression Inventory – Second version (BDI-II; van der 
Does, 2002), measuring symptoms of depression. Participants were asked to complete the outcome 
questionnaires before the start of the SMT (2 weeks after the baseline assessment), at the end of the 
SMT (14 weeks after the baseline assessment) and after a follow-up period of three months (26 
weeks after the baseline assessment). In addition, to test whether changes in worry mediated the 
direct effects of the worry pretreatment on the outcomes we asked participants in the WPD and WR 
conditions to keep a log of the frequency and duration of their worry episodes (Verkuil, Brosschot, & 
Thayer, 2007) and to return these before the start of the SMT. Furthermore, they were asked to 
report to what extent the worry intervention (worry postponement or worry registration only) had 
been helpful in reducing worries on a ten-point scale. To be able to test whether the pretreatment of 
worry also reduced the level of pathological worry during the subsequent SMT and whether this 
mediated the treatment effect on the outcomes we also administered the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ) at baseline and at the end of the SMT. Questionnaires were sent to the 
participants via mail and could be returned using prepaid envelopes.  
 
Worry intervention conditions 
Worry postponement and disengagement (WPD) 
Participants in this condition were provided with information on the functions of worry during a 
meeting that lasted approximately 30 - 45 minutes. More specifically, it was explained to them that 
worry can be regarded as a thwarted problem solving strategy and that worrisome problem solving 
while one is supposed to do other things (e.g., job demands) is likely to be unsuccessful. Participants 
also received a booklet containing the information and exercise described below. The intervention 
consisted of two parts. The first part concerned managing worry episodes that occurred during daily 
life. They were asked to deal with these naturally occurring worry episodes by: (a) becoming aware of 
the fact that they were worrying by keeping a log of their worries, and by (b) disengaging from their 
worries and postponing them to a moment later that day, a so called worry half-an-hour. The 





postponement of worry episodes was based on the protocol developed by Borkovec et al. for the 
treatment of pathological worrying (Borkovec, Wilkinson, Folensbee, & Lerman, 1983; Brosschot & 
Van Der Doef, 2006) and forms part of the manual for stress counseling available to occupational 
physicians (van der Klink & van Dijk, 2003), but is believed to be seldom used by them. The second 
part of the intervention concerned the worry half-an-hour. During this period participants were 
instructed to deal with the registered problems that they had been worrying about during the day by 
(a) deciding whether the problems concerned issues that they could influence or control themselves, 
or whether the problems concerned issues (temporarily) out of their control. To help guiding this 
decision, they were asked to write down several problem solving steps (i.e., a problem description, 
the kind of solutions that they had already tried out, possible alternative solutions and, finally, their 
decision to either try to solve the problem or disengage from it). Guided writing about worry 
problems has previously been shown to be effective in reducing anxiety symptoms (Bowman, Scogin, 
Floyd, Patton, & Gist, 1997). If the problems could be managed (b), they were encouraged to plan 
when to implement the solution and to subsequently put this into practice. If they decided that a 
solution could not be implemented and that they had to disengage from the worry topic (c), they 
were instructed to practice with an exercise in (temporarily) disengaging from the worry problems, 
which is based on a worry reduction protocol developed by Korrelboom (Competitive Memory 
Training; Korrelboom, Van der Gaag, Hendriks, Huijbrechts, & Beretty, 2008). For this exercise 
participants had to recall moments in their lives during which they had realized that they had 
disengaged from a previously worrisome problem. They then practiced with thinking about the 
current worrisome problem while simultaneously recalling the disengagement experience from 
memory. More details on the whole WPD intervention can be provided by the authors on request. 
After one week, participants were called to remind them about the registration of worry and to 
inquire about whether they had any trouble with putting the worry intervention into practice. No 
interventions were given during the calls, which lasted a maximum of five minutes. 
 
Worry registration (WR) 
To control for the possible beneficial effects of getting extra attention and of the effects of becoming 
aware of worry episodes (step 1 as described above), participants in the worry registration condition 
were asked to keep a log of their worries, based upon the rationale that worry is a habit and that 
when one wants to change ones behavior, becoming aware of its manifestation is the first step to 
take. After one week, the participants were also called to remind them about the registration of 
worry and to inquire about whether participants had any trouble with putting the worry registration 






Treatment as usual (TAU) 
To control for effects of time, a third group of participants were told that they had been randomized 
to wait for the start of the stress management therapy. They did not receive any extra treatment or 
attention during this period. 
 
Stress management therapy (SMT) 
After two weeks, participants started with the stress management group therapy. Each group 
consisted of about eight people. The therapy consisted of 12 weekly sessions taking two hours each. 
The therapy groups were led by two out of four experienced clinical psychologists that were blind to 
the pre-SMT conditions that the participants were allocated to. The therapy consisted of a 
combination of psycho-education and cognitive behavioral psychotherapy. In their review of work 
stress interventions, Van der Klink et al. found that such cognitive behavioral SMTs had a moderate 
effect on symptoms of anxiety and depression, with a mean effect size of Cohen’s d = .55 (Van der 
Klink, Blonk, Schene, & Van Dijk, 2001), whereas effects on somatoform symptoms are mixed (e.g., 
Eriksen et al., 2002). During the first phase of the therapy participants worked at reducing their 
complaints by restoring their energy-imbalance, mostly by actively planning relaxing activities and by 
monitoring of their energy levels. Subsequent phases of the therapy focused on promoting 
assertiveness skills and practicing cognitive therapy to teach participants how to identify and correct 
dysfunctional beliefs. During the course of the study, therapists were allowed to provide cognitive 
interventions aimed to reduce worrying, such as by using cognitive restructuring techniques or by 
using the Socratic dialogue. However, they were instructed not to provide interventions aimed at the 
temporal dynamics of worrying, especially not the worry registration or postponement and 
disengagement interventions. This was done in order to keep the most important manipulation of 
the pre-SMT worry intervention as pure as possible while at the same time allowing typical and 
potentially probable effective ingredients of the therapy to remain intact and to keep this group 
therapy as standard as possible. A protocol of the SMT can be provided by the authors on request. 
 
Statistical analysis 
Multilevel growth curve models were used to analyze differences between the pretreatment 
conditions in the development of the outcome measures over time (Singer & Willett, 2003). 
Multilevel analysis (MLA) is especially suitable to analyze repeated measures data because it 
accounts for the dependencies of the different measurements (level 1) that are nested within 
individuals (level 2). Another advantage is that multilevel growth curve analysis allows for individual 
time curves to be estimated on all available data from each individual and can handle unbalanced 
datasets that contain irregularly spaced measurement intervals. Analyses were performed on the 





intention to treat sample. Missing values on the questionnaires were imputed using the algorithm 
provided by Van Ginkel & Van der Ark (2005). 
At the first level, the effect of time was examined. When analyzing the worry diary data, time 
reflected the 14 days of the worry registration period. When analyzing the treatment outcome 
measures, time reflected the four time points (expressed in number of weeks since start of the 
experiment) at which the outcome measures were administered, coded as 0 (baseline), 2 (end of 
experimental phase / start of SMT-treatment), 14 (end of SMT) and 26 (follow up). The second level 
of measurement was the individual level, as the time series were nested within the different 
individuals. To test the hypotheses, multilevel regression models were estimated for all outcome 
measures, allowing for individual variation in regression intercepts and, when it improved the fit of 
the model as assessed with -2 log likelihood tests, individual variation in regression slopes. In the 
present study two a priori contrasts tested the following null hypotheses: (1) no difference between 
Worry Postponement and Disengagement (WPD) and Treatment As Usual (TAU), (2) no difference 
between WPD and Worry registration (WR). Significant interactions were explored further with t-
tests and correlation analyses. Additionally, between condition effect sizes were calculated (Cohen, 
1988) as well as the percentages of participants that showed clinically significant and reliable 
changes (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Due to our unequivocal expectations we used one-tailed 
significance tests. The mediation hypothesis was examined using the guidelines provided by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). Significance of mediation effects were tested with Sobel tests.  
 
Results 
Sample characteristics and drop-out 
Sixty-three patients decided to participate in the study (for descriptive statistics see Table 1). Several 
participants did not return their questionnaires at the follow up measurements: ten at T2, twelve 
others at T3 and two others at T4 (see Figure 1). In addition, one participant in the WR condition 
stopped with the SMT because another treatment was indicated (marital counseling). Chi square 
tests showed that there were no significant differences between the conditions in the total number 
of participants that left the study at T1 (χ²(2) = .39, p = .82), T2 (χ²(2) = 1.33, p = .52) or T3 (χ²(2) = .27, 
p = .88). There were no significant baseline differences between the treatment groups in scores on 
the SHC, STAI, BDI-II or PSWQ. There were also no significant differences between the conditions in 
DSM-IV diagnoses, the number of attended treatment sessions and the subjective rating to what 
extent the therapy was rated as helpful. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires are provided in 
Table 2. To give an impression of the severity of  somatoform complaints in this sample: In normative 
samples symptoms are seldom scored by more than 50% (e.g., Eriksen et al., 1999), while in the 





fatigue (91.9%), sleeping difficulties (74.2%), lower back pain (64.5%), headache (66.1%), shoulder 
pain (54.8%) and neck pain (53.2%). Scores on the STAI-T, BDI-II and PSWQ were similar to levels 
observed in clinically anxious and dysphoric outpatients (Startup & Erickson, 2006; Dozois, Dobson, & 
Ahnberg, 1998).  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  TAU (N = 25) WR (N = 15) WDP (N = 22)    
  M SD M SD M SD χ² (df) F (df) p 
Female %  60  40  59.1  1.76 (2)  .414 
Marital status, %       3.87 (6)  .695 
 Married 36.00  21.43  42.86     
 Living together 48.00  14.29  19.05     
 Divorced 4.00  0.00  4.76     
 Unmarried 12.00  64.29  33.33     
Education, %       .60 (6)  .996 
 Secondary school 8.33  13.33  14.29     
 Lower education 54.17  53.33  47.62     
 Higher education 29.17  26.67  28.57     
 University 8.33  6.67  9.52     
DSM-IV axis I classification (%)          
 Adjustment disorder 40.0  73.3  54.4     
 Undifferentiated somatoform disorder 12.0  6.7  9.1     
 Depressive episode 12.0  -  -     
 Anxiety disorder -  -  4.5     
 None reported
a 
12.0  20.0  31.8     
Antidepressant medication at baseline, % 12.00  6.67  22.72  2.07 (2)  .356 
Age, years  45.00 8.31 39.80 8.02 40.91 7.54  2.504 (2) .090 
Number of cigarettes p/w 4.32 7.20 5.70 9.02 3.70 7.59  0.296 (2) .745 
Alcoholic beverages p/w 3.48 6.31 6.64 6.50 4.68 7.05  1.022 (2) .366 
Total hours of exercise p/w 1.96 2.32 1.87 2.80 2.50 3.36  .296 (2) .745 
Note: 
a 
Not all participants had received an axis I diagnosis, and some diagnoses at the start of the stress management 
therapy were not reported in the patients files. These patients had for example been successfully treated for a DSM-IV axis I 
diagnosis in a previous treatment but still suffered from work stress symptoms and participated in the SMT due to severe 
work problems (reported on axis IV); WPD = worry postponement and disengagement intervention; TAU = treatment as 
usual; WR = worry registration 





Table 2. Primary and secondary outcome variables means and standard deviations at baseline and 
follow-ups. 
  
  Time in weeks           
  Baseline Start therapy  
(2 weeks) 
Follow up  
(14 weeks) 
Follow up  
(26 weeks) 
  N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD 
SHC TAU 25 9.04 4.36 19 8.53 3.84 18 8.44 4.95 16 8.88 5.11 
 WR 15 8.20 4.26 14 8.14 4.02 8 6.50 4.31 9 6.78 5.74 
 WPD 22 9.14 4.06 18 8.39 3.96 13 7.15 5.52 13 6.62 4.70 
STAI-T TAU 25 52.56 10.15 20 50.10 10.60 18 43.78 10.03 16 42.19 8.78 
 WR 15 54.53 8.98 14 54.21 10.39 8 42.50 9.29 9 43.56 10.14 
 WPD 22 52.91 9.53 18 50.89 9.63 13 38.92 9.87 13 40.62 13.12 
BDI-II TAU 24 18.42 9.23 20 17.05 9.66 18 9.89 8.13 16 11.69 7.12 
 WR 15 21.67 9.32 14 22.29 10.61 8 11.25 7.36 9 10.89 7.99 
 WPD 22 18.82 8.17 18 17.17 10.18 13 8.54 7.53 11 6.82 7.15 
PSWQ TAU 25 53.04 11.47    18 45.83 11.27    
 WR 15 59.33 11.49    8 49.75 12.13    
 WPD 22 56.04 9.11    13 42.85 8.42    
Note: SHC = Subjective Health Complaints; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition; STAI = State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory-Trait version; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; TAU = treatment as usual; WR = worry registration; WPD 
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Figure 1. Overview of the study  





Effects of worry pretreatment on state and trait worry 
Visual inspection of the worry data suggested that these could best be described by quadratic trends, 
which proved to be significant when tested in a baseline growth curve model. Table 3 shows the 
results of the MLA on the worry data for WPD and WR conditions (NB. the waitlist control group 
(TAU) did not yield worry data). In both groups daytime worry duration and worry frequency 
decreased. Although worry duration seemed to drop more in the WPD condition, there were no 
significant differences between the two conditions in total daytime worry duration and worry 
frequency, nor any interactions with the time variables. However, an overall decrease in nighttime 
worry was apparent and the linear and quadratic time curves for the nighttime worry data were 
different for the two conditions. For WPD, worry duration and frequency decreased during the first 
week of the intervention period, while increasing again during the second week. The reverse pattern 
was apparent for the registration group. T-tests showed less frequent nighttime worry episodes 
(t(435) = 2.392, p = .009; M = 1.32 episodes per night, SD = 1.67) and shorter worry nighttime 
duration (t(433) = 2.671, p = .004; M = 19.66 minutes per night, SD = 42.14) in WPD compared to WR 
(M = 2.04 episodes, SD = 5.51 and M = 22.24 minutes, SD = 27.91 respectively). The difference 
between WPD (M = 5.31, SD = 1.38) and WR (M = 4.42, SD = 2.35) in self reported deceases in worry, 
although in the expected direction, was not significant (t(23) = 1.167, p = .128).  
 Pathological worry (PSWQ) was measured at baseline and after the SMT. MLA showed that 
there was a significant decrease in PSWQ scores before and after SMT for all patients (B = -13.80, p < 
.0001, 95 % CI: -20.64 - -6.90). The difference between the decreases in PSWQ scores between WPD 
and TAU was marginally significant (B = 7.063, p = .063, 95 % CI = -2.064 – 16.191), whereas the 
difference between WPD and WR was not significant (B = 5.019, p = .184, 95 % CI = -6.113 – 16.152).  
  
Table 3. The effect of condition (worry registration versus worry postponement and disengagement) 
on worry duration and – frequency during the pre-SMT period. 
Variables Time Condition Time x Condition 
 B(SE) B(SE) B(SE)  
linear quadratic  linear Quadratic 
Daytime worry duration -.1766 (.0605)* .0122 (.0043)* .0696 (.4280) .0392 (.0925) -.0038 (.0065) 
Daytime worry frequency -.0668 (.0329)* .0047 (.0023)* .0586 (.2279) -.0039 (.0504) .0001 (.0034) 
Nighttime worry duration -.1414 (.0740)
p = .057
 .0112 (.0053)* -.1963 (.5220) .3346 (.1149)* -.0251 (.0083)* 
Nighttime worry frequency -.0601 (.0299)* .0045 (.0022)* -.0309 (.2031) .1005 (.0464)* -.0078 (.0034)* 






Effects of worry interventions on somatoform, anxiety and depressive symptoms 
First, the time course of the somatoform, anxiety and depressive symptoms during the whole study 
was estimated using multilevel models. Concerning the number of somatoform symptoms (SHC), the 
MLA random intercept model showed that there was a significant decrease for all participants (B = -
.129, p < .0001, 95 % CI = -.198 – - .062) in SHC from baseline to follow-up three months after the 
SMT. The preplanned contrasts showed that the linear decrease in symptoms from baseline to 
follow-up after the SMT differed significantly between WPD and TAU (B = .099, p = .017, 95 % CI = 
.008 – .190), whereas there was a trend for WPD to be more effective than WR (B = .067, p = .109, 95 
% CI = -.039 – .173). See also Figure 2 for a graphic representation of the predicted model. 
Concerning the levels of anxiety (STAI-T), the MLA random intercept model showed a 
significant overall decrease in anxiety (B = -.589, p < .0001, 95 % CI = -.789 – -.410). In addition, the 
linear time trend differed significantly between the WPD condition and TAU (B = .203, p = .048, 95 % 
CI = -.037 – .444), whereas the difference between WPD and WR was not significant (B = .105, p = 
.229, 95 % CI = -.176 – .386). The same pattern was found for depressive symptoms. A random 
intercept - random slope MLA model showed a significant overall decrease in depressive symptoms 
(BDI-II; B = -.495, p < .0001, 95 % CI = -.675 – -.314), Furthermore, the difference between WPD and 
TAU was marginally significant (B = .195, p = .054, 95 % CI = -.044 – .434) whereas the difference 











Table 4. Multilevel models predicting changes in somatoform, depressive and anxiety symptoms.   
Variables Time Condition 
(main effects) 
Time x condition contrasts Cohen’s d Cohen’s d Cohen’s d 
WPD vs TAU WPD vs WR WPD vs TAU WPD vs WR 


























SHC -.129 (.034)* .071 (1.164) -.669 (1.324) .099 (.046)* .067 (.054) 
p = .109
 
.13 .40 .54 .47 .65 .59 




.22 .43 .95 .43 .42  .36 








.21 .38 .64 .26 .62 .19 
Note: * p < .05, one-tailed. WP = worry postponement pretreatment; TAU = treatment as usual; WR = worry registration; 
SHC = Subjective Health Complaints; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition; STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety 






Figure 2. Effects of the worry postponement and disengagement intervention (WPD) versus worry registration (WR) and 
treatment as usual (TAU) on somatoform symptoms. 
 
Direct effects of worry postponement and disengagement  
To examine whether these differences between the time course in symptoms between WPD and TAU 
were present during the two weeks before SMT, follow-up tests were conducted on data from 
participants in these two conditions. Concerning the number of SHC, paired t-tests showed that there 
was a significant decline in SHC during the two weeks of the worry pretreatment period in the WPD 
condition (t(17) = 3.12, p = .003), whereas the decline was not significant in TAU (t(18) = 1.05, p = 
.15). However, an ANCOVA with SHC at baseline as a covariate and Condition as a between subjects 
factor did not yield any significant differences between the conditions in SHC at two weeks. 
Concerning the STAI-T, there was a trend towards a significant decline in anxiety symptoms during 
the two weeks of the worry pretreatment period in the WPD condition (t(17) = 1.63, p = .06), which 
was not apparent for TAU (t(19) = 0.827, p = .209). There were no significant differences between the 
conditions in STAI-T scores however. Finally, there was a trend towards a significant decline in BDI-II 
scores during the two weeks of the worry pretreatment period in the WPD condition (t(17) = 1.460, p 
= .081), which was not apparent for TAU (t(18) = 0.635, p = .267). There were no significant 
differences between the conditions in BDI-II scores.  
 





Additive effects of the worry postponement and disengagement on SMT effectiveness 
To test the third hypothesis, that the WPD intervention would enhance the effects of the SMT on 
work stress symptoms, a second set of follow-up tests was conducted. Concerning the SHC, directly 
after the SMT, the number of somatoform symptoms was significantly lower compared to baseline in 
WPD (t(12) = 2.086, p = .029), whereas a trend was apparent in TAU (t(17) = 1.383, p = .092). At 
follow-up, the decrease in somatoform symptoms compared to baseline was significant for both 
conditions. ANCOVAs showed that at follow-up, but not directly after the SMT, participants in the 
WPD condition reported significantly less SHC than participants in TAU (F(1,26) = 2.950, p = .049). 
Concerning the STAI-T scores, in both conditions the level of anxiety symptoms directly after the SMT 
and at follow-up had significantly decreased below baseline levels (all ts > 2.5). Participants in the 
WPD condition reported lower levels of anxiety directly after the SMT (F(1,28) = 3.894, p = .029), but 
not at follow-up, when compared to participants in TAU. Concerning the BDI-II scores, in both 
conditions the level of depressive symptoms directly after the SMT and at follow-up had significantly 
decreased below baseline levels (all ts > 3.5). At follow-up but not directly after the SMT, participants 
in the WPD condition had significantly less depressive symptoms than participants in TAU (F(1,23) = 
2.964, p = .049). 
 
Effect sizes 
Raw change scores in symptoms from baseline to the follow up measurements were used to 
calculate between group effect sizes (Table 4). Effect sizes of .20 indicate small effects, effect sizes of 
.50 indicate medium effects and effect sizes of .80 show large effects (Cohen, 1988). From Table 4 it 
can be derived that, while not all differences between the conditions were significant, most effect 
sizes were small to medium, and there was a large effect for the difference between WPD and TAU in 
the level of anxiety symptoms directly after the treatment. 
 The clinical significance of the results was determined by examining the percentage of 
participants that showed reliable reductions in the outcome variables that went below clinical cut-off 
points (Jacobson & Truax, 1991). Reliable change was calculated on the basis of the formula provided 
by Jacobson and Truax (1991) with Cronbach’s alphas as the indices of questionnaire reliability. The 
numbers of participants that showed reliable changes below clinical cut-off points were compared 
between the conditions with exact chi-square tests. Cut-off points were determined as follows: STAI-
T: 46 (Fisher & Durham, 1999); BDI-II: 12 (Dozois et al., 1998), PSWQ: 45 (Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & 
Borkovec, 2003). As there were no such data available for the total number of SHC, clinically 
significant reductions in SHC scores were determined by outcome scores that fell two standard 
deviations below baseline scores (i.e. a reduction of 8 complaints). Paired comparisons between the 





a significant difference between WPD and TAU in clinical change on the STAI scores directly following 
the SMT. Eight participants (62%) in the WPD condition showed a clinical change, compared to four 
(29%) in TAU (χ²(1, N = 31) 4.918, p = .032). The difference between WPD and WR, in which two 
participants (25%) showed clinical change, was not significant, (χ²(1, N = 21) = 2.651, p = .119). No 
other differences between the conditions were apparent.  
 Overall, the percentages of participants realizing clinical and reliable change during the two 
week pre-SMT period were: 0% (SHC), 12.5% (STAI-T) and 3.1% (BDI-II). Directly after the SMT and at 
follow-up, the percentages of reliable changes were: 9.5% and 9.1% (SHC), 47% and 50% (STAI-T), 
38% and 40% (BDI-II) and 33% (PSWQ measured only after SMT).   
 
Mediating effects of momentary assessed and trait worry on treatment outcome 
Our next hypotheses concerned whether changes in worry would mediate the effects of the WPD 
intervention on changes in anxiety, depressive and somatoform symptoms. As symptoms levels 
during the course of treatment did not significantly differ between WPD and WR conditions, it was 
therefore irrelevant to test whether changes in daily worry during the two intervention weeks 
mediated the differential effects of these worry intervention. Yet, correlation analysis within these 
conditions indicated that reductions in the number of nighttime worry episodes were associated with 
reductions in SHC (r(28) = .35, p = .043), whereas reductions in the duration of the nighttime worry 
episodes were associated with reductions in BDI-II (r(24) = .37, p = .036) and STAI (r(24) = .36, p = 
.043). When controlling for reductions in the other outcomes, however, these associations became 
non-significant, suggesting that reductions in daily worry had a relatively small independent 
contribution to reductions in work stress symptoms. In addition, self reported change in worry due to 
the worry interventions was associated with changes in SHC (r(25) = .39, p = .027) and BDI-II (r(25) = 
.57, p = .001). Thus, people who reported to have been worrying less during the 2 weeks before the 
SMT also reported lower levels of somatoform and depressive symptoms.   
 In addition, although differences between WPD and TAU in PSWQ scores after the SMT were 
only marginally significant (i.e. the first step of the mediation analysis according to Baron and Kenny 
(1986)), we decided to explore whether PSWQ-Change mediated the effects of the WPD condition on 
the outcomes. Although the effects of Time*PSWQ-Change on the outcomes were significant and 












This study examined the effectiveness of a simple and easy to administer worry intervention, i.e. 
worry postponement and disengagement (WPD), in reducing worry and its associated symptoms of 
work stress. Thus, it was hypothesized that this worry intervention would not only reduce worry but 
also symptoms of work stress, theoretically because it would reduce the total load on mind and body 
produced by worrying. It was investigated whether the WPD intervention would be effective by itself 
at the short term (within two weeks), or whether it would enhance the effectiveness of a subsequent 
stress management therapy (SMT), or both. In addition, it was hypothesized that reductions in 
(pathological) worry would mediate reductions in work stress symptoms and the effects of the SMT 
on work stress symptoms. The results partially confirm our hypotheses.   
First of all, we found that the WPD intervention, but also the registering of worry episodes 
(WR), led to decreases in daytime and nighttime worry. Importantly, the WPD intervention was 
specifically associated with decreases in the frequency and duration of nighttime worry episodes. 
With regard to the work stress symptoms, the WPD intervention did not have significant short term 
effects, although these symptoms tended to deviate from baseline more strongly in the WPD 
condition. The most important and innovative finding from this study was that during the whole 
course of the study, participants who had received the WPD intervention showed the largest 
decreases in somatoform, anxiety, and - to a lesser extent - depressive symptoms. This was most 
apparent when the effects of WPD were compared to the effects of a waitlist control group who had 
received no intervention before the SMT, and thus only treatment as usual (TAU). Significant 
differences between the conditions were found in symptom levels directly after the SMT and at a 
follow-up of three months. Directly after the SMT, participants in the WPD condition reported less 
symptoms of anxiety compared to TAU, and at a three month follow-up measurement they also 
reported less somatoform and depressive symptoms. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
show that a ‘pretreatment’ intervention directed at a crucial pathogenic process, in this case worry, 
enhances the effectiveness of a standard cognitive-behavioral therapy. This finding is even more 
important with respect to the somatoform effects, since previous studies showed no effects of SMT 
on somatoform symptoms (e.g., Eriksen et al., 2002; Tveito & Eriksen, 2009). Since these symptoms 
are associated with high health care costs and long term sickness absence, is it encouraging that 
adding a time-limited and simple worry intervention potentially can enhance the somatic effects of 
such a standard SMT.  
Especially nighttime worries could be considered as a pathological feature of worry and 
were, as mentioned, reduced by the WPD intervention. Nighttime worries likely indicate difficulties 
in disengaging from work and other stressful events. As such, nighttime worries might play a crucial 





recovery during sleep (Brosschot, van Dijk, & Thayer, 2007). Interestingly, reductions in nighttime 
worry were associated with reductions in work stress symptoms.  
A point that requires some future attention is that the difference between the effects of 
WPD and mere registering of worries (WR) on symptoms was not significant. Although this is most 
likely due to our small sample size as the differences were in the expected direction, it leaves open 
the interesting possibility that the effects of WPD could be largely attributed to becoming more 
aware of one’s worries. If this is the case, than this might indicate that an even more simple 
intervention than WPD could already be effective in enhancing SMT. Another point pertains to our 
mediation hypothesis. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find any mediating effects of 
pathological worry and the data did not permit us to test mediating effects of momentary assessed 
worry, because this variable was not available for participants in the TAU condition. As such, the 
precise temporal mechanisms underlying reductions in work stress symptoms during the course of 
the SMT remain indistinct. Follow-up studies are warranted that investigate this issue more 
thoroughly, for example by measuring worry and work stress symptoms more frequently during the 
course of treatment. 
While the results of this study are encouraging and hopefully stimulate more research into 
the short term and additive effects of short and easy to administer interventions, there are some 
limitations. First, the time period for our follow-up measurement, three months after the SMT, was 
relatively short and it is not clear to what extent the results pertain to longer follow-up periods. With 
respect to its clinical relevance, one could argue that it is a weakness of this study that participants 
were not screened on psychopathology using structured clinical interviews like the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM Disorders (SCID). However, the most common DSM-IV classifications to diagnose 
clinical forms of work stress are ‘adjustment disorder’ and ‘unspecified somatoform disorder’, which 
remain controversial (Mayou, Kirmayer, Simon, Kroenke, & Sharpe, 2005). Moreover, the use of the 
present convenience sample adds to the generalizability of the results of the study for at least two 
reasons. First, the inclusion of this sample closely resembles usual clinical practice in which inclusion 
criteria are often less strict than in randomized controlled trials aimed at specific psychopathologies. 
Second, the sample represents a large part of the population that suffers from somatoform, anxiety 
and depressive stress symptoms which are known to be highly comorbid. With respect to the effects 
of the WPD intervention, an alternative explanation for its effects that cannot be ruled out is that 
these were partially due to attention. Participants in the WPD and WR conditions received more 
attention from psychologists before the start of the SMT, as they were called up after one week to 
check whether there were any problems with the worry registration. Future studies that compare 
the effectiveness of WPD to interventions not primarily focused on worrying are needed to test these 
suggestions. Another limitation is that in testing the effects of WPD on worry, we focused merely on 





the frequency and duration of worries, but not on the content of worries. It would be interesting to 
examine whether WPD stimulates another way of thinking about problems. For example, a recent 
study showed that manipulating the concreteness of worrisome thinking causes changes in 
depressive symptoms (Watkins & Moberly, 2009). Although the present intervention is mainly aimed 
at limiting the total amount of wear and tear that worry episodes can have on the body 
(postponement and disengagement), we also asked participants to write down their worry problems, 
which might have enhanced a more concrete thinking style that reduced nighttime and pathological 
worrying. Finally, this study focused on outpatients suffering from work stress and it remains unclear 
to what extent these findings extend to other populations. For example, it remains unclear whether 
the findings extend to cognitive behavioral therapies for anxiety and mood disorders, and whether 
the additional effects of WPD are limited to subsequent group interventions. On a broader scale it 
might be interesting to test whether worry interventions are effective in preventing severe forms of 
work stress, for example in workers vulnerable for developing work stress (e.g. teachers, nurses). 
This is in line with recent calls for the promotion of self help strategies to reduce stress among the 
general population (Jorm & Griffiths, 2006). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study is the first to show that a simple guided self 
help intervention helps reducing worry, especially nighttime worry and that it enhances the effects of 
a subsequent SMT on both mental and somatic symptoms of work stress. Since work stress 
symptoms form a major humanitarian and economic burden, and are also a vulnerability factor for 
the development of severe conditions such as cardiovascular disease and mental health problems, 
further testing of the effectiveness of simple interventions that aim to target mediators of 








Effects of explicit and implicit perseverative cognition on cardiac recovery after cognitive stress 
 






























Slow cardiovascular (CV) recovery after stress is a predictor of adverse CV outcomes. Perseverative 
cognition (PC) about stress has been hypothesized to co-determine slow recovery. In the present 
study, it was investigated whether two types of trait PC, i.e. trait worry and trait rumination, 
predicted delayed cardiac recovery after a cognitive stressor. Furthermore, it was examined whether 
explicit state PC (i.e. negative intrusive thoughts) or implicit state PC (i.e. automatic vigilance) 
additionally predicted delayed cardiac recovery.  
Fifty nine participants performed a stressful task, which consisted of an unsolvable synonym task. 
After a 6-minute recovery period, participants reported on their level of negative intrusive thoughts 
(i.e. explicit state PC), and performed a lexical decision task (LDT) to measure automatic vigilance for 
task-related information (i.e. implicit state PC). Cardiac activity was continuously measured using 
heart rate (HR) and heart rate variability (HRV). Trait worry and rumination were measured by the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) and the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS), respectively. 
The results showed that high trait worriers had a slower HR recovery from the cognitive stressor 
compared to low trait worriers. They also showed delayed HRV recovery, but only when the 
tendency to dwell upon ones negative mood (the ‘brooding’ subscale of the RRS) was low. Slow HR 
recovery was associated with high levels of negative intrusive thoughts and with automatic vigilance, 
but in the unexpected direction for the latter. These results provide evidence that delayed cardiac 
recovery is associated with trait as well as state PC, and suggest that brooding attenuates the HRV 
suppressing effect of high trait worry. 
 




A large body of research has made clear that stressful events can have profound effects on the 
pathogenesis of cardiovascular diseases (e.g., Rozanski, Blumenthal, & Kaplan, 1999; Black & Garbutt, 
2002; Krantz & McCeney, 2002; Rosengren et al., 2004). The investigation of how stressful events can 
affect cardiovascular health has for a long period focused on adverse cardiovascular activity during 
these stressful events, while in more recent years the insight has grown that stress-related 
cardiovascular activity that is prolonged beyond the presence of these stressors might be much more 
detrimental (McEwen, 1998; Pieper and Brosschot, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2003). Delayed heart rate 
recovery has indeed been found to be predictive of coronary events (Pitsavos, 2004), heightened 
levels of carotid atherosclerosis (Heponiemi, 2007; Jae et al., 2008) and even all-cause mortality 
(Cole, 2000; Nishime, Cole, Blackstone, Pashkow, & Lauer, 2000). In addition, delayed blood pressure 
recovery predicted hypertension 3 and 5 years later (Stewart & France, 2001; Borghi, Costa, Boschi, 
Mussi, & Ambrosioni, 1986, respectively). Clearly, it is important to elucidate the psychological, that 
is, cognitive-emotional, factors that contribute to this delayed cardiovascular recovery.  
It has been suggested that stressful events are associated with delayed cardiovascular 
recovery particularly because these events evoke negative, worrisome thoughts (Brosschot, Gerin & 
Thayer, 2006). According to the perseverative cognition (PC) hypothesis (Brosschot et al., 2006), 
worry and rumination extend the mental representation of a stressful event beyond its actual 
presence and this is suggested to delay cardiovascular recovery after this event. Perseverative 
cognition (PC) is defined as “the repeated or chronic activation of the cognitive representation of one 
or more psychological stressors” (cited from: Brosschot et al., 2006, p 114). This definition of PC is 
quite broad and as such, previous studies have focused on different operationalizations of PC when 
testing the PC hypothesis. First, PC can be measured as a trait or personality characteristic – some 
people are more prone to worry or ruminate than others – or as a state, that is, measuring the actual 
experience of negative repetitive thoughts during an experiment or in daily life. Trait and state worry 
appear only marginally related (Verkuil, Brosschot & Thayer, 2007). The second aspect is the content 
of the stressor that is represented. Whereas ‘worry’ refers to PC about future stressors, ‘depressive 
rumination’ refers to PC about ones current sad mood, while ‘angry rumination’ refers to PC about 
anger provocations.  Third, all previous studies have focused on explicit forms of PC whereas it likely 
that implicit forms of PC exist. Below we will discuss to what extent these different 
operationalizations of PC have yielded supportive evidence for the PC hypothesis.  
Several studies have suggested that high trait ruminators recover more slowly from stressful 




Campbell, Bacon, & Gerin, 2008). However, these studies measured trait anger rumination (Gerin et 
al., 2006) and trait depressive rumination (Key et al., 2008; Roger and Jamieson, 1988) and not trait 
worry, that is, anxious PC. Both trait worry and trait depressive rumination are important risk factors 
for the onset and maintenance of mood and anxiety disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Borkovec, 
Ray & Stöber, 1998) which are in turn important risk factors for the development of cardiovascular 
diseases (CVD) (Kawachi, Sparrow, Vokonas, & Weiss, 1994; Wulsin, Vaillant, & Wells, 1999). For 
example, worry is one of the central features of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and rumination 
plays an important role in Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). At least two study have shown that trait 
worry directly predicts cardiovascular health problems, that is myocardial infarction (Kubzansky et 
al., 1997) and the long term cardiovascular effects of a major stressful event (‘9/11’; Holman et al., 
2008). Although depressive rumination and anxious worry are related forms of PC, they possess 
some characteristics that distinguish them. For example, Watkins et al. (2005) found that worrisome 
thoughts are rated as more upsetting and disturbing than ruminative thoughts. This would imply that 
worrisome thoughts, which are typically measured with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), might have stronger cardiac effects than ruminative 
thoughts. On the contrary, depressive rumination, as typically measured by the items of the 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) might have 
somewhat less forthright physiological effects. This idea seems to be supported by empirical 
evidence. On the basis of their review of the physiological effects of PC, Brosschot et al. (2006) 
concluded that trait worry, as measured with the PSWQ is a the better predictor of delayed 
physiological recovery than trait rumination, as measured with the RRS. Moreover, worrisome 
thoughts were reported to continue for a greater number of years than rumination (Watkins, 
Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005), implying that worrying may cause longer ‘wear and tear’ on the body 
(cf: McEwen, 2003). In the present study, we addressed this issue and expected trait worry 
(measured by the PSWQ) to be the stronger predictor of delayed cardiac recovery than trait 
rumination (measured by the RRS). 
State worry has also been suggested to be implicated in slow CV recovery after stressful 
events (Brosschot et al., 2006). It has been shown that during experimentally induced worry as well 
as during worry in daily life cardiovascular activity is increased (Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995; 
Thayer, Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996; Verkuil, Brosschot, Borkovec, & Thayer, 2009; Pieper, 
Brosschot, van der Leeden, & Thayer, 2007). Worry has also been shown to mediate the effects of 
daily stressors on prolonged cardiac activity during waking and sleeping (Brosschot, van Dijk, & 
Thayer, 2007). Yet, direct evidence that delayed cardiovascular recovery after a stressful event is due 
to perseverative cognition is still scarce, as most experimental studies have only found an association 
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between delayed recovery and trait PC, and not, or not consistently, between state PC measured 
after or during the recovery period (Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002; Key et al., 2008; Gerin et al., 
2006). This may be due to several limitations of these latter studies. Firstly, these studies used anger 
provocation or emotional recall tasks as stressors, after which explicit state worry might just be less 
likely. For example, only 31% of the participants in a study by Glynn reported anger related thoughts 
after an anger recall task. The present study aimed to use a more general stressor, i.e. performance 
on an unsolvable cognitive task within an evaluative context. Such tasks have been previously shown 
to be experienced as physiologically and psychologically stressful (Brosschot et al., 1992; Weidner, 
Friend, Ficarrotto, & Mendell, 1989). Accordingly, in the present study we tested whether state PC 
concerning a previous stressor is associated with slowed cardiac recovery and adds to a model 
wherein slowed cardiac recovery is predicted by trait PC.  
A second limitation of these previous studies pertains to the nature of state PC. Gerin and 
colleagues found that although delayed cardiovascular recovery after recalling an anger provoking 
event was predicted by trait angry rumination (Gerin et al., 2006; Glynn et al., 2002), this was not 
due to state rumination, as measured by thought sampling. However, in a more recent study Key et 
al. (2008) did find an effect of state rumination on cardiovascular recovery, but this was – 
unexpectedly - only true for people low in trait rumination (Key et al., 2008). As a possible 
explanation for this finding the authors suggested that perseverative cognition in frequent 
ruminators occurs largely implicit, without conscious awareness, and would therefore be difficult to 
report. Thus, delayed cardiac recovery after stressful events might not or not only be caused by 
explicit PC, but also by implicit or unconscious PC related to these events. It is not unlikely that 
implicit PC exists. In the last decades it has become clear that a large part of our information 
processing in daily life occurs relatively implicit and without reflective conscious awareness (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Thus, there is reason to expect that stressful events not 
only give rise to explicit PC, but also to implicit PC. One example of implicit PC is ‘automatic vigilance’ 
for stressor related information. Automatic vigilance can be regarded as the increased sensitivity of 
the attentional system for task or stressor related information. This occurs for example after failure 
on a task (Rothermund, 2003; Smith, Ruiz, & Uchino, 2000). To date, no study has directly addressed 
the possibility that this type of PC causes prolonged stress-related physiological activity. Automatic 
vigilance or other forms of implicit or unconscious cognitive processing, such as after subliminal 
emotional stimulation, have not been tested for their physiological effects with the exception of 
relatively subtle effects on brain activity (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999), startle reflex (Ruiz-Padial & 




Finally, the role of mood in recovery from stressors remains unclear. It seems common sense 
that state negative mood is associated with cardiac activity. However, in several ambulatory 
(Brosschot et al., 2007) and laboratory studies (Verkuil et al., in press; Key et al., 2008) state mood 
was measured and was found to be unrelated to heightened or prolonged cardiovascular activity. In 
other studies of PC and recovery this was not tested, although effects of trait hostility on slowed 
blood pressure recovery have been reported (Anderson, Linden, & Habra, 2005). Therefore, in the 
present study we also investigated the effects of state anxiety and state sadness.  
Summarizing, this study tested the hypothesis that slowed cardiac recovery after a stressor is 
predicted by high trait PC, especially trait worry, and by explicit and implicit state PC (negative 
intrusive thoughts and automatic vigilance) and negative affect. To test this, we used an unsolvable 
cognitive task, which consisted of an intelligence test of which the participants were made to believe 
that it predicted future career success, thereby creating an evaluative environment. This task has 
been previously used to evoke automatic vigilance (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 
1999).  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-nine undergraduate students from Leiden University participated in this study (mean age = 22.4 
years, SD = 3.66; 12 males, 47 females). The sample was predominantly Caucasian (80%); 12% 
identified themselves as Black, 5% as Hispanic and 3% as Asian. They received € 4.50 or course-
credits for their participation. This study was approved by our Institutional Review Board. All subjects 
provided written informed consent. 
 
Instruments 
Cardiac activity. HR and HRV were continuously measured, in a non-invasive manner, with the Polar 
s810i wristwatch and the Polar Wearlink 31 belt band, which has a sampling rate of 1000 Hertz (Polar 
Electro Nederland BV; Gamelin et al., 2006). Before analyzing HR and HRV, the raw interbeat 
intervals (IBIs) were preprocessed for artifacts using the Polar Precision Software. The corrected IBI 
series were subsequently processed with the HRV Analysis program, using the smoothness priors 
based approach which removes the low frequency trend component of the IBIs (Niskanen et al., 
2004). For every 6-minute phase of the experiment (baseline, mental challenge, recovery) mean HR 
(in beats per minute, BPM) was calculated. In addition, to obtain a measure of HRV and vagal activity, 
spectral analyses using an autoregressive algorithm following the Task Force of the European Society 
of Cardiology and the North American Society of Pacing Electrophysiology (Task Force of the 
Cardiac effects of explicit and implicit PC 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 97 
European Society of Cardiology the North American Society of Pacing, 1996) guidelines were 
performed. Mean High Frequency (HF; 0.15 to 0.40 Hz) power (in milliseconds squared), was 
calculated for every phase of the experiment. In addition, the root mean of squared successive 
differences, RMSSD, in milliseconds was calculated for every phase.  
 
Trait perseverative cognition (PC) 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990; Dutch translation; van Rijsoort et 
al., 1999). This questionnaire consists of 16 self-report items. Items are directed at the excessiveness, 
duration and uncontrollability of worry, for example: ‘Once I start worrying, I can’t stop’. The PSWQ 
has demonstrated high reliability as well as high temporal stability and substantial construct and 
predictive validity in the assessment of trait worry (Verkuil et al., 2007). 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003; Dutch translation: Raes, Hermans & 
Eelen, 2003). The RRS consists of 22 items measuring ruminative responses to depressed mood. 
These items form three subscales: Brooding, defined as ‘a passive comparison of one’s current 
situation with some unachieved standard’, (cf. Treynor et al., 2003); Reflection, defined as ‘a 
purposeful turning inward to engage in cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive 
symptoms’; and a Depression scale. Only the rumination scales were used in this study: Reflection, 
consisting of five items (e.g., ‘I analyze recent events to try to understand why I am depressed’) and 
Brooding, consisting of three items (e.g., ‘I think “What am I doing to deserve this?” ’). The RRS 
possesses good internal consistency and of its subscales, the Brooding subscale correlated most 
highly with measures of chronic strain, providing evidence for its maladaptive features. 
 
Cognitive stress task 
Manipulated IQ task (derived from: Koole et al., 1999).  The cognitive stress task consisted of six 
verbal analogies that were modeled after a normal IQ test. Each analogy consists of two blank spaces 
that have to be filled after one minute. Example: “____” relates to ‘but’ as ‘however’ relates to “ 
____”.   For each blank space, four possible answers were given, one of which the participants had to 
choose, although all analogies were unsolvable and they were sufficiently ambiguous to allow giving 
bogus (positive and negative) feedback (see Procedure). After the recovery phase the participants 
were asked to report, on a Likert scale (ranging from ‘Not at all’ to ‘A great deal’), how much effort 







State perseverative cognition (PC) 
Implicit PC: Implicit PC concerning the cognitive stress task was operationalized as automatic 
vigilance and measured with a lexical decision task (LTD; cf. Koole et al., 1999). The LDT is typically 
used to assess implicit activation of cognitive schemata, for example in studies concerning persistent 
activation of information related to goal discrepancies or intentions (e.g., Forster, Liberman, & 
Higgins, 2005; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998) and therefore very well suited to measure implicit 
activation of cognitive representations related to the stress task. 
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen. They were told that on each trial of 
the task they were about to perform they would be shown a string of letters and that the task was to 
decide if the string was a word or a non-word. They could indicate their response by pressing one of 
two buttons on a response box and were asked to do this as quickly and accurately as possible. Each 
trial started with a fixation cross that lasted 2000 ms. Thereafter the letter strings were presented, 
with a maximum of 1000 ms per trial. The task started with ten practice trials. Subsequently, sixty-
four words and non-words were shown. The order of the presentation of the trials was randomized 
for each participant. The task was programmed in E-Prime 1.1 software. 
We used 8 words that were related to intelligence (e.g., ‘smart’, ‘intelligent’), 8 control words 
that were unrelated to intelligence but reflected generally positive characteristics (e.g. ‘brave’, 
‘tolerant’) and 16 neutral distracter words (‘piano’, ‘eyes’). The remaining 32 words were non-words. 
Intelligence related and control words were matched on word length and word frequency. The index 
for Automatic Vigilance was calculated by subtracting the reaction times (RTs) to intelligence related 
words from the RTs to control words. 
Explicit PC. To measure state PC related to the task, we used 7 items of the Sarason Cognitive 
Interference Scale (Sarason, 1978) which measures the level of distracting, intrusive thoughts of the 
participants experienced after the IQ task, during the recovery period (e.g. ‘After the IQ task, I was 
thinking about how bad I had performed on the IQ task’). The CIQ has been used frequently in test 
anxiety literature, and possesses good psychometric properties with internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha) estimates ranging from .71 to .91. Studies using the CIQ have demonstrated that it is sensitive 
to changes in intrusive thoughts that are related to individual and situational factors (cf Pierce, et al., 
1998). 
 
Mood states. During the baseline and recovery phases the levels of state anxiety and state sadness 
were assessed using visual analog scales (Brosschot et al., 1992; Johansson, 1976). Participants first 
indicated how they usually felt on this 100mm scale and thereafter rated their current levels of 
anxiety and sadness. We used the difference between ‘mood as usual’ and ‘current mood’ as indices 
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of state anxiety and state sadness. This method is relatively insensitive to the shifting of internal 
standards for reporting ones mood. 
 
Biobehavioral variables. Participants were asked to report the number of cigarettes, the number of 
cups of coffee and the number of alcoholic beverages they had consumed since awaking on the day 
of participation, as these factors could influence their cardiac activity. For the same reason, 
participants were also asked to report their height and weight, use of medication and whether they 
suffered from a chronic disease. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment started with a 6-minute baseline recording of HR and HRV during which participants 
reported their mood state on the visual analogue scales. Thereafter, participants were instructed to 
perform an intelligence test. They were told that “this test is a good measure of analytic ability and is 
a reliable predictor of future success in numerous careers”. The six analogies appeared one by one 
on the computer screen (see ‘Instruments’). After every analogy participants received feedback 
(“that was not the correct answer” or “that was the correct answer”). To manipulate the level of 
negative feedback (high versus low levels), half of the participants received negative feedback after 
each analogy, the other half received negative feedback after two analogies and positive feedback 
after four analogies. In both conditions, the computer informed the participants that 8 percent of the 
other attendants had the same score, i.e. zero or four respectively. However, we found no significant 
different effects of this feedback manipulation on cardiac activity or on the state PC variables, nor 
any interaction effects with trait or state PC and mood states. Given that the task itself was 
sufficiently stressful to increase cardiac activity independent of feedback (see results), we therefore 
discarded the latter in the rest of the analyses.  
After the cognitive task, participants performed a simple filler task (rate the attractiveness of 
several paintings) while HR and HRV were measured continuously, to allow a period of cardiac 
recovery for later analysis. After this 6-minute recovery phase, participants rated their current level 
of anxiety and sadness and performed the LDT (implicit PC). After these tasks had been completed, 




HF power and RMSSD were transformed logarithmically to normalize the distributions (consequently 




cardiac recovery, we used multilevel growth curve modeling (Singer and Willett, 2003) with HR or HF 
power as dependent variables1, and linear and quadratic time trends, based on visual inspection of 
the time curves of the cardiac data, and the PSWQ and the RRS subscales as predictors. The 
interactions of interest were the interactions between the linear Time trend and the PSWQ or the 
RRS subscales. Significant interactions were further explored by Pearson correlations and by analyses 
of (co)variance using the median splits of the trait scales. Only the biobehavioral variables that had a 
significant bivariate correlation with HR or HRV and that significantly improved the fit of the models 
(cf. Singer & Willett, 2003) were entered as covariates, (i.e. smoking and age in the HR and HRV 
analyses, respectively). This was also done as the number of measured biobehavioral variables was 
so large that entering them all would decrease the degrees of freedom too much for the present 
sample size. To examine whether trait PC was associated with negative intrusive thoughts, anxiety, 
sadness or automatic vigilance, we conducted analyses of variance and Pearson correlations. To test 
the hypothesis that these state PC variables and the mood states variables mediated the effect of 
trait PC on cardiac recovery, we conducted hierarchical multilevel regression analyses (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). All independent variables were centered on their grand mean in order to reduce 
multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). All analyses involved two-tailed tests, with alpha set at .05. 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables measured in this study. In line with 
previous studies females scored higher on Brooding, and had a trend for higher Trait Worry scores. 
Because of technical problems, cardiac measures of two participants were not available. Therefore 
the analyses of the cardiac variables are based upon 57 participants. Females had higher baseline HR, 
but no different lnHF power than men. The amount of effort spent on the task was rated above the 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Gender  
  Female (N = 47)  Male (N = 12)   
 M SD   M SD  p 
PSWQ 49.17 12.32   41.83 9.60  .07 
RRS 40.70 9.28   35.66 11.54  .12 
Brooding 6.51 1.77   5.17 1.59  .02 
Reflection 11.04 3.76   10.00 3.86  .40 
Baseline heart rate (bpm) 79.70 8.60   70.47 9.80  .00 
Baseline HF power (ms²) 579.07 714.39   534.91 654.51  .80 
Baseline RMSSD (ms) 55.89 43.93   58.71 33.71  .40 
RT intelligence related words 558 73   560 85  .95 
RT control 536 69   545 63  .68 
Negative Intrusive Thoughts 14.21 6.92   16.50 5.87  .30 
State anxiety 1.55 1.20   1.49 1.13  .46 
State Sadness 1.57 1.52   1.50 1.75  .88 
 
  
Trait PC and cardiac recovery  
Heart rate (HR). Preliminary inspection of graphs of the HR responses suggested that a 
quadratic time trend best described the data (see Figures 1 and 2). First, a baseline multilevel growth 
curve model was fitted with HR as dependent variable, and linear and quadratic time trends as 
predictor variables. Thereafter, Trait Worry, Brooding, Reflection and smoking were entered into the 
model as predictor variables. Adding these variables significantly improved the fit of the model (χ² = 
18.26, df = 7, p < .05). It was also apparent that a significant amount of variance in the data was due 
to correlations between the repeated cardiac measurements (AR rho = -.36, 95% CI: -.60 to -.05). 
Results showed a significant main effect of Time linear (B = 4.86, 95% CI: 1.91 – 7.82) and Time 
quadratic (B = -2.89, 95% CI = -4.34 to -1.44). Follow up paired t-tests showed that the cognitive 
stressor led to an increase in HR (M = 79.56, SD = 10.62) compared to baseline (M = 77.62, SD = 9.60); 
during the recovery period (M = 76.02, SD = 8.49) HR decreased below the baseline HR level (ps < 




Figure 1. Mean level of heart rate during the experiment for low and high trait worriers. Error bars show mean +/- 1 standard error.   
 
p < .05), as was the Time-linear x Brooding interaction (B = -.66, 95% CI: -1.21 to -.20, p < .05). As 
shown by the sign of the B values, the effects of Trait Worry and Brooding were in the opposite 
direction. To explore whether and how they influenced each other we tested whether the interaction 
between Time-linear x Trait Worry x Brooding was significant, which was not the case. No other main 
or interaction effects were significant. Figure 1 shows the effect of Trait Worry on HR recovery. For 
illustrative purposes Trait Worry scores were median split. High trait worriers had a higher HR (M = 
78.52, SD = 8.27) during the recovery period than low trait worriers (M = 73.77, SD = 8.17), while 
controlling for HR during baseline and during the cognitive task (F(1,53) = 4.57, p < .05). Figure 2 
suggests that high Brooders had lower HR during the cognitive task, but not during baseline or 
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Figure 2. Mean level of heart rate during the experiment for low and high brooders. Error bars show mean +/- 1 standard error.   
 
Heart rate variability (HRV). A baseline multilevel growth curve model was fitted with lnHF power as 
dependent variable, and linear and quadratic time trends as predictor variables. Adding Trait Worry, 
Brooding, Reflection and age as predictor variables significantly improved the fit of the model when 
compared to the baseline growth curve model (χ² = 18.57, df = 7, p < .05). The results showed a 
significant main effect of Time (linear, B = -.68, 95% CI: -1.05 to -0.32; quadratic, B = .32, 95% CI: .14 - 
.50). Follow up paired t-tests showed that the cognitive task led to an overall decrease in lnHF power 
(M = 5.34, SD = 1.23) compared to baseline (M = 5.69, SD = 1.21; p < .05). During the recovery period 
(M = 5.59, SD = 1.29) lnHF power did not differ from baseline. In addition, a main effect of Trait 
Worry appeared, with high trait worriers showing higher lnHF during the experiment (B = .03, 95% CI: 
.0001 - .061, p < .05). The expected effects of Time-linear x Trait Worry (B = -.01, 95% CI: -.02 - .00, p 
< .05) and Time-linear x Brooding (B = .08, 95% CI: .01 - .16, p < .05) were significant. In line with the 
results from the analyses on HR, the effects of Trait Worry and Brooding on lnHF during the 
experiment were in the opposite direction. Explorative analysis showed that these two-way 
interactions were subsumed by a significant three-way interaction between Time-linear x Trait Worry 






associated with low lnHF power during recovery, this effect was moderated by the level of Brooding: 
when Brooding was low, high trait worriers had a significantly lower lnHF during recovery than low 
trait worriers (F(1,32) = 4.24, p < .05). On the other hand when Brooding was high (figure 2B), lnHF 
power was also high during recovery, irrespective of Trait Worry status. No further main or 





Figure 3. Interaction between Trait Worry and Brooding on lnHF power recovery. Error bars show mean +/- 1 standard error.   
 
State PC and mood states after cognitive stress 
First we inspected whether the cognitive task led to implicit PC, as indexed by automatic vigilance. 
The reaction times (RTs) to the intelligence-related words on the LDT were significantly slower than 
the RTs to control words (see table 1). The Automatic Vigilance Index (RTs IQ – RTs control = - 21 ms) 
differed significantly from zero (t(58) = 3.15, p < .05),. Trait Worry was not associated with different 
responding to IQ-related versus control words on the LDT. However, an exploratory analysis showed 
that Trait Worry was associated with a general slowing down on all LDT trials (mean r(58) = .30, p < 
.05). No associations were found between Brooding or Reflection and LDT reaction latencies. In 
addition, the Automatic Vigilance index was also not associated with the amount of negative 
intrusive thoughts during recovery (r(58) = .05, ns).  
With regard to changes in mood states during the experiment, we found that state anxiety 
and state sadness during recovery were not significantly different from baseline. 




Effects of explicit and implicit PC and mood states on cardiac recovery 
Multilevel regression analyses were conducted to test whether state PC and the mood states 
influenced cardiac activity during recovery, and whether they could add to the effects of the PSWQ 
and Brooding on HR recovery. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2. When state PC 
(Automatic vigilance index and negative intrusive thoughts) and mood states were entered into the 
model already containing Trait Worry and Brooding (see above), the fit of the model significantly 
improved (χ² = 14.46, df = 6, p < .05). As shown in Table 2, in addition to the effects reported above 
(i.e. of Smoking, Time x Trait Worry, Time x Brooding), significant effects were also found for Time x 
Automatic Vigilance and, although marginally but still in the predicted direction, for Time x Negative 
intrusive thoughts. Exploration of the effect of Automatic Vigilance on HR recovery made clear that 
slower responding to control words, instead of IQ words, was associated with increased HR during 
recovery (r(55) = .28, p = .034). Importantly, by entering the cognitive emotional variables, the effect 
of trait worry was not reduced. Both Automatic Vigilance and Negative intrusive thoughts had 
independent effects on cardiac recovery. 
The same steps were repeated for lnHF power. However, entering the PC and mood states 
variables into the model did not significantly improve the fit of the model, and no significant effects 
were found for these variables. As females had higher brooding scores and previously also have been 
shown to have higher baseline HRV (Thayer et al., 1998; Chambers and Allen, 2007), we also checked 


















Table 2. Multilevel regression analysis predicting HR (bpm)  
Predictor B SE P 95% Confidence Interval 
        Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept 77.12 1.23 .00 74.67 79.56 
Time, linear 4.58 1.54 .00 1.51 7.66 
Time, quadratic -2.68 0.74 .00 -4.26 -1.28 
Smoking 0.62 0.30 .04 0.03 1.21 
Trait Worry 0.09 0.12 .46 -0.15 0.30 
Brooding -0.33 0.75 .65 -1.82 1.16 
Sadness 0.03 0.49 .95 -0.93 0.99 
Anxiety -0.20 0.48 .67 -1.16 0.74 
Automatic Vigilance -0.01 0.02 .76 -0.05 0.04 
Negative Intrusive Thoughts -0.17 0.18 .34 -0.54 0.19 
Time-linear * Trait Worry 0.07 0.03 .04 0.00 0.13 
Time-linear * Brooding -0.52 0.20 .01 -0.91 -0.11 
Time-linear * Sadness -0.35 0.33 .29 -1.02 0.32 
Time-linear * Anxiety 0.42 0.38 .27 -0.33 1.19 
Time-linear * Automatic Vigilance 0.01 0.01 .03 -0.02 0.00 




The present study aimed to test whether cardiac recovery from a cognitive task could be predicted 
by trait PC, especially worry, and whether the effects of trait PC on delayed cardiac recovery would 
be due to heightened levels of explicit and implicit PC or negative mood states after this task. The 
results partially confirm our expectations and are in line with previous studies that have tested the 
perseverative cognition hypothesis (see Brosschot et al., 2006). As predicted, high trait worriers had 
a slower HR recovery from the cognitive task compared to low trait worriers. This adds to previous 
studies showing that trait PC is associated with slowed cardiovascular recovery after stress 
(Brosschot et al., 2006; Brosschot et al., 2007; Pieper et al., 2007; Glynn et al., 2002; Gerin et al., 
2006; Key et al., 2008). The health effects of trait worry were recently also made clear by another 
study in which it was shown that high trait worriers showed enhanced heart rate, although not 
reduced HRV, during the anticipation and recovery phases of several laboratory tasks and also during 
the performance of these tasks (Knepp & Friedman, 2008). Given this accumulating amount of 
evidence, it is likely that trait worry exerts its damaging health effects (Kubzansky et al., 1997) by 
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prolonging the total physiological load that stressors have on the human body. The fact that this 
slowed recovery effect was restricted to trait worry is consistent with the results of a recent review 
(Brosschot et al., 2006) showing stronger effects of trait worry than other trait PC variables, such as 
trait depressive rumination. In fact, the effect of one of the rumination scales, Brooding, i.e. 
tendencies to dwell upon ones negative mood which is considered as a maladaptive aspect of 
rumination, was even reversed. Even more, trait worry and brooding had an interacting effect on 
HRV recovery; only when brooding tendencies were low, high trait worry was associated with slow 
HRV recovery. This suggests that Brooding attenuates the suppressing effect of trait worry on HRV 
recovery. Although we did not particularly expect these findings for brooding, they seem to be in line 
with several studies showing enhanced HRV levels in depressed women (Thayer, Smith, Rossy, 
Sollers, & Friedman, 1998; Chambers & Allen, 2007). Our sample consisted for the most part of 
women (80%). The increases in HRV in depressed women that have been previously found have been 
suggested to be a biological ‘compensatory response’ to counteract the detrimental effects of stress 
on cardiac activity. More specifically, increased HRV in women might reflect a compensatory 
response which counteracts the perseveration of negative thoughts and mood: a higher HRV is 
positively associated with emotion regulation and frontal cortical activity which are thought to 
modulate the subcortical activity involved in sustained emotional reactivity (Thayer & Lane, 2000). As 
brooding can be considered an emotion regulation strategy, although often unsuccessful, this idea 
fits the finding that women who respond to stress with brooding thoughts show enhanced HRV levels 
during recovery. As high HRV levels are cardioprotective, these speculations may also offer an 
explanation for the findings that women suffering from (sub-clinical) depression are at reduced risk 
for cardiovascular health problems when compared with men (Hybels, Pieper, & Blazer, 2002; Wulsin 
et al., 1999). They may also explain the present findings, and suggest that gender clearly is an 
important factor to be more systematically investigated in future studies. 
Our second aim was to examine whether the effects of trait worry and brooding on delayed 
cardiac recovery would be due to heightened levels of explicit and implicit PC after the cognitive 
stress task. The expected effect of negative intrusive thoughts on cardiac recovery was only found for 
HR recovery and was merely a statistical trend when using two tailed significance tests. Still, this 
finding is in line with the perseverative cognition hypothesis and with studies showing that state 
worry is associated with enhanced HR (Lyonfields et al., 1995; Thayer et al., 1996; Verkuil et al., in 
press; Pieper et al., 2007). The results concerning our hypothesis about the cardiac effects of implicit 
PC were less straightforward and cannot be easily explained. First of all, in contrast to what has been 
previously found, that is faster responses to concern related words compared to control words, we 




words. Second, although we found that slow cardiac recovery was associated with automatic 
vigilance after the mental challenge, follow up tests showed that delayed cardiac recovery was 
associated with slowed responses to control words on the LDT. A tentative explanation for these 
unexpected findings might be the following. Slowed LDT responses have been suggested to reflect an 
inability to disengage attention from the emotional value of the LDT words at the expense of 
attending to other aspects of the words (cf the 'affective interference hypothesis' posed by Siegle, 
Ingram & Matt, 2002). This might explain why for all participants reactions to the IQ words were 
slower than to the control words. In our LDT the control words reflected positive personality 
characteristics that were unrelated to intelligence. In this case, those participants that showed a 
slower HR recovery were those for who the cognitive task had most strongly threatened their 
general self-esteem, reflected specifically in slower responses to positive characteristics. However, 
these tentative suggestions should be examined in future studies for example by using other tasks 
measuring implicit cognition, like the Implicit Association Task (IAT) or flanker tasks (Rothermund, 
2003). In addition, future studies should include concern related negative words as a limitation of 
this study was that we only included concern related positive and more general positive words. 
Studying implicit PC seems especially warranted as a large part of our information processing in daily 
life occurs relatively automatically. Focusing on explicit reports about stressful experiences could 
result in an underestimation of the effects that stressful events have on physiological functioning. 
Investigating whether and how implicit processing of stress-related information has adverse effects 
on physiological functioning might lead to a better understanding of how stress can eventually lead 
to somatic disease and therefore seems an essential venture for future studies.   
We also explored the role of negative affect in delaying cardiac recovery. Trait worry was 
associated with heightened negative affect after the cognitive task, but no evidence was found for an 
association between negative affect and delayed cardiac recovery. This finding is in line with other 
studies that also have not found effects of negative affect on cardiac recovery (Key et al., 2008; 
Verkuil et al., in press). However, one possible explanation for not finding effects of negative affect in 
the present study is that the level of negative affect was relatively low. The cognitive task did not 
lead to overall significant increases in negative affect. Also, manipulating the type of feedback did not 
cause differential effects on cardiac activity, mood states or state PC. This is in contrast with previous 
studies that have provided (bogus) negative and positive feedback after cognitive tasks (Koole et al., 
1999; Thompson, Webber & Montgomery, 2002). This limits our results in the sense that our results 
may pertain to slow cardiac recovery after cognitively stressful tasks as opposed to more emotionally 
stressful tasks. All participants rated their effort on the task above average and performing the task 
resulted in the expected cardiac pattern. Thus, the task seems to have required effort and seems to 
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have been perceived as relatively neutral by most participants. This kind of task might resemble the 
tasks that people frequently engage in at work. Recent studies have already shown that high trait 
worriers recover more slowly from emotionally demanding tasks like recalling emotional events 
(Glynn et al., 2002; Key et al., 2008; Gerin et al., 2006). The present study adds to this the possibility 
that high trait worriers also recover more slowly from more cognitively demanding tasks that are not 
particularly emotional for most people. It remains a future challenge to find out why, and by what 
mechanisms, this is the case. As emphasized, we believe that implicit cognitive mechanisms may play 
a crucial role. 
Future studies could also examine other indices of the cardiovascular system. We focused on 
cardiac activity, that is, HR and HRV, and although these indices are associated with reduced future 
cardiovascular health, it remains unclear to what extent trait worry and brooding tendencies have 
differential effects on hemodynamic functioning, such as blood pressure, cardiac output and total 
peripheral resistance. Another limitation is that we used a relatively small, young and healthy 
sample. Although the sample of this study seemed to represent trait worriers on the full severity 
range, it would be useful to conduct a similar study with older participants and / or patients suffering 
from mood and anxiety disorders. Another limitation is that during the recovery period, participants 
performed a filler task that could have interfered with the experience of negative intrusive thoughts 
(e.g., Gerin et al., 2006) and therefore speeded up recovery. It is also possible that task performance 
during recovery slowed down recovery for all participants. In any case, it is possible that one or both 
of these mechanisms might have reduced diminishing the amount of variance in recovery that could 
be explained by trait and state PC. Thus, the prediction of recovery by worry might have been further 
improved when we had not used the filler task. Finally, one could argue that the cardiac effects of 
the current task were relatively small (e.g., 2 heart beats per minute) when compared to anger recall 
tasks (8 – 10 bpm). Yet, these latter tasks require participants to verbalize their thoughts possibly 
accounting for a part of these observed differences. More importantly, the increase of 2 heart beats 
per minute is in line with laboratory studies using a similar task (Weidner et al., 1989) and is in line 
with laboratory and ambulatory studies showing that stress and worry episodes increase heart rate 
with approximately 2 beats per minute (Verkuil et al., in press, Pieper et al., 2007). Still, it is possible 
that larger cardiac effects were obtained when the baseline period lasted longer than the six minutes 
that we currently used. Six minutes might have been too short to get a good estimation of baseline 
cardiac levels, especially since heart rate levels at the end of the recovery period were below 
baseline levels. Future studies should therefore include longer baseline periods.  
 In sum, the present study provides further evidence that delayed cardiac recovery is 




worry. The results could not confirm a mediating role of several forms of state PC. Trait worry and 
brooding tendencies are central elements in mood and anxiety disorders which, in turn, are 
important risk factors for the development of cardiovascular diseases. Therefore, investigating the 
long term implications of the present findings seems an important goal for future research.  




A sensitive body or a sensitive mind? Associations between somatic and cognitive sensitization, 
health worry and subjective health complaints 
 






























Psychobiological sensitization and health worry appear to be involved in the etiology of clinical 
manifestations of somatic health complaints (SHCs) via amplified processing of health-related 
information. However, it is not clear whether sensitization and health worry are also associated with 
common SHCs, which are extremely common and are responsible for a large part of both human 
suffering and health care costs. In this study we investigated whether SHCs are associated with 
health worry and two types of sensitization: cognitive health-related sensitization and somatic 
sensitization. We also examined whether health worry mediated the relation between cognitive 
sensitization and SHCs and whether both levels of sensitization interact.  
In this study a non-clinical sample of 47 female students completed questionnaires about recent 
subjective health and health worry and underwent tests for cognitive sensitization, operationalized 
as Stroop interference and free recall performance, and somatic sensitization, operationalized as 
pain tolerance and pain threshold in a Cold Pressor Task. 
Results showed that severity of health complaints was positively related with recall of health-related 
stimuli, but not with Stroop interference, and with worrying about health complaints. In addition, 
worry mediated the relationship between recall bias and severity of health complaints. Both the 
number and severity of recent health complaints were associated with pain tolerance. Pain threshold 
was associated with Stroop interference for health related information.   
The results suggest that specific types of cognitive and somatic sensitization are associated with 
common health complaints, and that worrying about one’s complaints might play a role by 
enhancing biased memory of health-related information.  





Somatic health complaints (SHCs) are extremely common and are responsible for a large part of both 
human suffering and health care costs (Ihlebaek, Eriksen, & Ursin, 2002; Eriksen, Svendsrod, Ursin, & 
Ursin, 1998; Picavet & Schouten, 2003). Moreover, SHC as well as self-rated health significantly 
predict mortality over and above objective measurements of health (Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Sha et 
al., 2005). Most SHCs concern difficult to diagnose vague symptoms - such as low back pain, 
headache or fatigue - and they are responsible for the majority of visits to general and other medical 
practitioners (Khan, Khan, Harezlak, Tu, & Kroenke, 2003). Typically, physicians can only find an 
organic basis for 10-20% of the most common symptoms, while only a small number receive a 
psychiatric diagnosis, for example somatoform disorder (Kroenke & Mangelsdorff, 1989). Clearly, it is 
essential to elucidate the processes underlying the reporting of health complaints.  
Research concerned with clinical manifestations of SHCs - somatoform or functional 
syndromes - has suggested that these syndromes are characterized by sensitization, operating at 
somatic, cognitive and even at behavioral and social levels (Ursin & Eriksen, 2001; Brosschot, 2002; 
Eriksen & Ursin, 2004; Ursin, 2005). Sensitization is the increased reactivity of a single neuron or 
neural systems, caused by their repeated usage, and is thought to be a basic mechanism underlying 
the formation of memory (Bailey & Chen, 1991). More recently, it has been put forward as a process 
that could explain how somatic sensations develop into somatoform or functional syndromes levels 
(Ursin & Eriksen, 2001; Brosschot, 2002; Eriksen & Ursin, 2004; Ursin, 2005). Somatic sensitization is 
manifested as the amplification of somatic sensations, especially the lowering of pain thresholds and 
reduced tolerance for pain. It appears to be implied in chronic conditions such as irritable bowel 
syndrome (Bouin, Meunier, Riberdy-Poitras, & Poitras, 2001; Rodrigues, Nicholas Verne, Schmidt, & 
Mauderli, 2005), whiplash (Kasch, Qerama, Bach, & Jensen, 2005), and fibromyalgia (Marques, 
Ferreira, Matsutani, Pereira, & Assumpção, 2005; Lautenbacher, Rollman, & Mccain, 1994; Stevens, 
Batra, Kotter, Bartels, & Schwarz, 2000). Furthermore, Edwards (2005) suggested that heightened 
pain somatic sensitization, combined with reduced pain-inhibitory capacity, may predict chronic pain 
syndromes in initially healthy pain-free people. At a higher, cognitive level, sensitization is 
manifested as cognitive bias (Brosschot, 2002), that is, selective processing of information that is of 
high relevance for individuals (Rosen & Schulkin, 1998). Cognitive biases for information related to 
complaints, including pain, have been found in several clinical groups that are difficult to diagnose 
and treat, including somatoform patients, chronic pain patients, fibromyalgia patients and persons 
with high health anxiety (Keogh, Ellery, Hunt, & Hannent, 2001; Pauli, Schwenzer, Brody, Rau, & 
Birbaumer, 1993; Snider, Asmundson, & Wiese, 2000; Pauli & Alpers, 2002; Lim & Kim, 2005; Pincus 





2005) as well as in patients with medically explained conditions that are influenced by stress such as 
psoriasis (Fortune et al., 2003) and asthma (Jessop, Rutter, Sharma, & Albery, 2004).   
 These clinical conditions however only represent ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of SHCs. Only 
recently have studies begun to address whether sensitization is implicated in common SHCs, that is, 
SHCs that are experienced by most of us (Ursin & Eriksen, 2001; Brosschot, 2002; Eriksen & Ursin, 
2004; Ursin, 2005). One study (Williams, Wasserman, & Lotto, 2003) showed an attentional bias for 
health related information in students scoring high on a 14-item SHC checklist and low self-rated 
health. However, this study has some limitations, including a failure to control for the possibility that 
the bias was in fact a general negative emotional bias. In another study (Buchgreitz, Lyngberg, 
Bendtsen, & Jensen, 2006), somatic sensitization, as indicated by pain intensity ratings during 
pressure controlled palpation, was found to be related to the frequency of tension-type headache in 
the general population. The first purpose of the present study was to replicate and extend these 
studies by examining whether the number and severity of SHCs are associated with somatic and 
cognitive sensitization, while controlling for a general negative emotional bias (see Method section 
for further details). Furthermore, two further elementary propositions from the sensitization theory 
(Brosschot, 2002) will be tested.  
 Firstly, the occurrence and severity of common SHC might also be influenced by health-
related worry (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004c; Looper & Kirmayer, 2002). Health worry has been 
found to predict the occurrence of health complaints (Kaptein et al., 2005; Petrie et al., 2005) and a 
particularly intense form of health worry, catastrophic thinking, has been associated with increases in 
pain (Turner, Mancl, & Aaron, 2004) and other somatic complaints (Devoulyte & Sullivan, 2003). 
Furthermore, health worry has been associated with consulting a physician (Hay, Buckley, & Ostroff, 
2005) and with intensive health care utilization (Looper & Kirmayer, 2001; Martin & Jacobi, 2006), 
suggesting that health worry is closely associated with the reporting of complaints. It is possible that 
bodily sensations trigger cognitive networks related to health, which promote selective cognitive 
processing and misinterpretations of these bodily sensations (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004; Looper 
& Kirmayer, 2002). In turn, highly accessible cognitive networks increase the likelihood of reporting 
SHC by causing worries about these complaints. Thus, a second aim of the present study is to 
investigate whether health worry is related to SHCs and whether health worry mediates – at least in 
part – the relationship between cognitive sensitization and SHCs.  
 Secondly, it has been proposed that the effects of somatic and cognitive sensitization and 
health worry on SHCs are closely related and add up or even strengthen each other (Brosschot, 
2002). It seems quite adaptive that frequent and intense bodily signals are not only enhanced by 
somatic sensitization, but are also given priority at higher levels of information processing, and are 
thus accompanied by cognitive sensitization (Brosschot, 2002). A possible downside, however, is that 




paying more attention to bodily sensations and worrying about them could result in increased 
reporting of symptoms (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004). Indeed, the widespread pain complaints of 
fibromyalgia patients are associated with both reduced pain thresholds and tolerance (indicating 
somatic sensitization (Marques et al., 2005; Lautenbacher et al., 1994; Stevens et al., 2000)) and 
hypervigilance (indicating cognitive sensitization (McDermid, Rollman, & McCain, 1996; Carrillo-de-
la-Pena, Vallet, Perez, & Gomez-Perretta, 2006)). Additional support for the multilevel view of 
sensitization comes from findings that show that sensitization of the spinal cord is under cognitive 
control (Matre, Casey, & Knardahl, 2006). Still, the multilevel theory has not been tested directly by 
showing that cognitive and somatic sensitization are related to each other and have additive or 
interacting effects on common SHC. Showing such evidence was therefore the third aim of the 
present study.  
 In summary, the present study was designed to test the following hypotheses: (1) SHCs are 
associated with somatic and cognitive sensitization, as well as with health worry (2a) health worry is 
associated with cognitive and somatic sensitization and (2b) the relationship between cognitive 
sensitization and SHCs is mediated by health worry, and (3), somatic sensitization is related to 
cognitive sensitization and their effects on SHCs interact.  
 
Materials and Method 
 
Subjects and procedure 
Fifty-one female students at Leiden University were invited to participate in the study. Four 
participants who indicated that they suffer from a chronic medical condition were removed from the 
analyses. The age of the final 47 subjects ranged from 18 to 33 with a mean of 20.5. 
 
After being introduced to the laboratory, participants gave informed consent and performed three 
tasks in the following order: a Cold Pressor Task (CPT), a modified Stroop task and an incidental recall 
task (see task descriptions below). Subsequently, they completed questionnaires and were debriefed 
and paid. They received € 6 or course credits as compensation for their 45 minute participation. 
 
Somatic sensitization: CPT  
Indices of somatic sensitization that are most often used are pain tolerance and pain threshold 
assessed using a CPT. Moreover, since these indices have been differentially related to clinical 
subjective somatic complaints (13-19), it seems necessary to use both of them. The CPT consisted of 
a water tank which was, on the surface of the water, divided into two sections, one filled with ice and 





pump kept the water flowing continuously to prevent a build up of warmer water around the hand. 
Mean water temperature was 2.5˚C (SD = .33). Participants were asked to immerse their dominant 
hand into the water and to indicate when it started to hurt, but to leave it there until the pain 
became intolerable. Pain threshold was taken as the time (in seconds) elapsed when it started to 
hurt, and pain tolerance was the time elapsed between the pain threshold and the moment the hand 
was withdrawn.  
  
Cognitive sensitization 
Cognitive sensitization can be operationalized in several ways, of which attentional and memory bias 
are the most common ones. Evidence from clinical populations suggests that at least clinical 
complaints are differentially associated with these operationalizations. For example, chronic pain 
seems to be associated mainly with recall bias, whereas somatoform disorders seem to be associated 
with attentional bias (for reviews see: 9 and 26). For these reasons, we employed a test for 
attentional bias (a modified Stroop task) as well as a memory task (incidental free recall task). 
 
Modified Stroop task 
The modified Stroop was presented on a Dell computer with a 17” LCD monitor. Latency in color 
naming was measured with a voice-key. Four categories of words were used (see Appendix): 7 
health-related words, 7 negative emotional words and 7 neutral words and 7 specific cold-pressor 
related words. The health words were based on studies of the most common health complaints in 
the general population such as ‘tired’, ‘back pain’ and ‘flu’ (Eriksen et al., 1998). The negative 
emotional words were added to control for a negative emotional cognitive bias. They were based on 
word familiarity ratings in the Dutch language area (Hermans & De Houwer, 1994; Crombez, 
Hermans, & Adriaensen, 2000) and included words related to angry, sad as well as anxious moods 
such as ‘scary’, ‘weak’ and ‘cruel’. Neutral words were vehicle related words (for example: ‘cylinder’ 
and ‘passenger’). We choose words that were semantically interrelated, instead of unrelated words 
(Williams et al., 2003), to make the properties of the categories more comparable. We also included 
CPT-related words to check for the possibility that the association between somatic and cognitive 
sensitisation is very specific, that is, restricted to words directly related to the somatic sensations 
during the CPT, instead of health in general. The CPT-related words were related to sensations 
experienced during a CPT (von Baeyer, Piira, Chambers, Trapanotto, & Zeltzer, 2005), and included 
‘wet’, ‘stinging’ and ‘cold’. The four categories of words were matched with regard to word length, 
number of syllables and word frequency according to the Integrated Language Database of Dutch 
(Institute for Dutch Lexicology, 1996). We tested whether the word categories had the expected 
different emotional valence ratings by asking participants to rate the valence of the words at the end 




of the experiment on a scale from -2 (extremely negative) to 2 (extremely positive). Overall, the 
negative (M = -1.34, SD = .37] and health-related words (M = -1.31, SD = .41) were rated as more 
negative than the CPT-related (M = -.90, SD = .35) and neutral words (M = .16, SD = .32); [F(3, 144) = 
246,74, p<.01]. Words of each category were presented in blocks and the order of the blocks and 
order of the words within the blocks were randomized across participants.  
 
Inaccurate responses (3.8%) due to voice key failures or incorrect responses were excluded from the 
analyses. Response latencies faster than 150 ms or slower than 2000 ms and individual mean 
latencies deviating more than 3 standard deviations (3.4%) were removed. An interference score was 
calculated by subtracting mean latencies to neutral words from mean latencies to negative, health 
and cold pressor words. 
 
Incidental free recall 
After the Stroop task participants received a blank A4 sheet. They were asked to write down as many 
words as they could remember from the Stroop task. No time limit was given, and after four minutes 
the task was ended by the experimenter (Williams et al., 2003; Russo et al., 2006). Recall 
performance was indexed by the total number of words that people could recall within each 
category. As the words were presented in clustered blocks it was possible that recall performance 
was confounded by order of appearance of the blocks. However, no association between the number 
of recalled health related words and order of appearance was found (Kruskal-Wallis χ² = 21.06, df = 
23, P > .05). 
 
Subjective Health 
Following the literature, subjective health was measured in a specific (discrete complaints) and 
general ways.  
Discrete SHCs were measured with the Subjective Health Complaints questionnaire (Brosschot & Van 
Der Doef, 2006; Eriksen, Ihlebaek, & Ursin, 1999). The SHC is a 29-item self-report questionnaire 
concerning severity and duration in days of subjective health complaints experienced during the last 
month from four different areas of complaints: musculoskeletal pain, pseudoneurology, 
gastrointestinal problems, allergy and flu. Example items are: ‘low back pain’, ‘cough’ and 
‘headache’. Severity of each complaint is rated on a 4-point scale. Total number of complaints as well 






In addition, we also measured general self-rated health (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). Participants were 
asked to rate their health in comparison with people of the same age. They could respond with 
“worse”, “the same” or “better”.  
 
Health worry 
Analogous with subjective health, health worry was also measured in specific (discrete complaints) 
and general ways. Complaint specific worry was assessed by counting the number of times 
participants indicated that they had been worrying about that complaint for each of the 29 
complaints on the SHC questionnaire.  
In addition, general tendency to worry about health was measured with three dichotomous 
items (e.g., ‘Do you worry a lot about your health?’) derived from the Whitely Index. These items 
have previously been confirmed to measure general illness worry (Fink et al., 1999).    
 
Statistical analyses  
All analyses were conducted using SPSS 14.0 software. The data were screened for normality using 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. The distributions of most variables were skewed and after 
transformations these variables were still skewed. Therefore, we used non-parametric tests 
(Spearman’s Rho, Mann Whitney’s U and Kruskal-Wallis tests) to test the hypothesized associations. 
To test the hypothesis that cognitive bias was a mediator – as defined by Baron and Kenny (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986) - between health worry and SHC, we used regression analysis (the assumption that 
residuals should be normally distributed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) was met, Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 





The mean number of complaints that participants had experienced during the last month was 7.91 
(SD = 3.37). The three most frequent complaints were “tiredness” (80.9% of the subjects; mean 
duration = 4.08 days, SD = 4.11), “cold, flu” (74.5%; M = 4.24 days, SD = 6.42) and “headache” (68.1%; 
M = 2.54 days, SD = 4.33), which is generally in line with the outcomes of other studies involving 
young females, although these percentages are somewhat above average (Eriksen et al., 1998; 
Haugland, Wold, Stevenson, Aaroe, & Woynarowska, 2001). The mean duration of the complaints 
was 4.54 days (SD = 3.60). With respect to self-rated health, 4.3% of the participants rated their 
health as “worse”, 82.3% as “the same,” and 8.5% as “better”, in comparison to peers. On average, 
participants reported to have been worrying about 1.53 of their health complaints (SD = 1.70) with 




36.2% reporting no complaint specific worry. The mean on the general illness worry scale was 0.61 
(SD = .83) with 56% reporting no general illness worry. Thirteen percent of the sample had visited 
their general practitioner during the past month with a maximum of two visits. These participants 
also reported more worry about their complaints (Mann Whitney’s U = 35.50, p<. 05).  
 
Subjective health and health worry 
Spearman correlations between subjective health indices and the health worry indices are shown in 
Table 1. Number and severity of SHCs were positively correlated with complaint specific worry (rs = 
.48 and .49, respectively; Ps < .05). There were no significant correlations between the health worry 
measures and SRH. Finally, number and severity of SHC were significantly associated with self-rated 
health (rs = -.35 and -.37, Ps < .05), with high levels of SHC associated with poor self-rated health. 
 
Table 1. Correlations between somatic health complaints, self-rated health, complaint specific and 
general illness worry  
  
SHC SRH  Worry 
Severity Number  
Complaint 
specific  
General illness  
SHC
1
      
 Severity -     
 Number .92
*







 -   
Worry      




 -.19 -  
 General illness  .00 .05 .00 .09 - 
*
  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
 1
 SHC = Subjective health complaints; 
2 
SRH = Self-rated health 
 
Subjective health, health worry and cognitive sensitization 
Modified Stroop task 
Figure 1 presents the response latencies on the modified Stroop task. There were no significant 
associations between subjective health indices and health worry indices on the one hand and any of 









Figure 1. Mean response latencies per word category on the modified Stroop task 
 
 
Incidental free recall 
Results of the correlation analyses are shown in Table 2. Severity of SHCs (r = .29, P < .05), self- rated 
health (r = -.31, P < .05) and complaint specific worry (r = .34, P < .05) were all significantly associated 
with a recall for health related words, in the expected directions. No such associations were apparent 
for number of SHC and general illness worry.  
The number of recalled negative words was positively related to Stroop interference on trials 
with negative words (r = .34, p < .05). No further significant correlations were found between Stroop 
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Table 2. Correlations between somatic health complaints, self-rated health, health worry and free 
recall performance 




    
 Number .20 .17 .07 -.02 
 Severity .29
*





 -.04 .06 -.00 
Worry     
 Complaint specific .34
*
 .24 .00 -.20 
 General illness .14 -.19 -.08 -.17 
* 
p < .05; 
1
 SHC = Subjective health complaints; 
2 
SRH = Self-rated health 
 
Mediating effects of health worry  
Table 3 shows the results of the mediation analysis. In line with the suggestions by Baron and Kenny 
(1986), severity of SHCs was first regressed on complaint specific worry and, subsequently, complaint 
specific worry was regressed on recall bias. These two basic requirements for establishing a 
mediation effect were met. In the final step, the mediator (complaint specific worry) was entered 
first in the regression analysis, followed by recall bias.  The relationship between recall bias for health 
related words and severity of SHCs was mediated by complaint specific worry.   
 
Table 3. Mediating effect of complaint specific worry  
Step and variables B SE B p 
Regression 1    
Criterion: SHC
1
 (severity)    
 1. Recall for health words .55 .33 .05 
Regression 2    
Criterion: Complaint specific worry    
 1. Recall for health words .28 .12 .02 
Regression 3    
Criterion: SHC (severity)    
 1. Complaint specific worry  1.26 .37 .00 
 2. Recall for health words .20 .32 .53 
1








Subjective health, health worry and somatic sensitization  
There were no significant associations between subjective health indices and health worry on the 
one hand and pain threshold on the other hand. Pain thresholds were significantly, but moderately, 
(r = .40, P < .05) associated with pain tolerance, our second measure of somatic sensitization. 
Inspection of pain tolerance scores yielded a clear distinction into two groups of subjects: those who 
removed their hands from the water after less than 77 seconds (“low tolerance”; N = 33) and those 
who kept their hands in the water until 131 seconds or for the total four minutes (“high tolerance”; N 
= 14) (see Figure 1). The low pain tolerance group had significantly more health complaints (M = 8.55 
versus M = 6.42; Mann-Whitney U = 153.50, P < .05) and more severe health complaints (M = 11.30 
versus M = 7.86; Mann-Whitney U = 133.00, P < .05) than participants with high pain tolerance. There 






Figure 2. Panel A shows the difference in number of SHC between the pain tolerance groups. Panel B shows the difference 
in severity of SHC between the pain tolerance and the severity of SHC (the bold lines represent the means on the SHC for 
the pain tolerance groups).  
 
 
A B GROUPS 
 
○ = Low pain 
tolerance  
 
● = High pain 
tolerance 




Somatic sensitization and cognitive sensitization 
To test the hypothesis that the different levels of sensitization are related, we tested whether 
subjects who had low pain thresholds and low tolerance for pain showed cognitive bias towards CPT 
related and health related words during the Stroop task and the recall test. People with low pain 
thresholds exhibited more Stroop interference when presented with health-related words (r = -.27, P 
< .05), but showed no better recall for these words. There were no associations between pain 
tolerance and both kinds of cognitive sensitization, or between the two kinds of somatic sensitization 
and bias for CPT-related words.  
 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to test whether subjective health is associated with cognitive and somatic 
sensitization, and whether health worry mediated the link between cognitive sensitization and 
somatic health complaints (SHCs). It was also expected that the two types of sensitization would be 
related and interact, thereby yielding evidence of the multilevel nature of sensitization. The results 
partly support the hypotheses: Subjective health is related to both types of sensitization and to 
health worry, and the association between subjective health and cognitive sensitization is mediated 
by health worry. Furthermore, we found that somatic sensitization and cognitive sensitization for 
health related information were related. However, based on the paradigm used by Williams et al. 
(2003), several different indices were used for each of these factors, and these associations were not 
always found for each of the two indices per factor. Subjective health was measured by SHCs in the 
last month and by general self-reported health. Cognitive sensitisation was measured by attentional 
bias and free recall for health related words, and somatic sensitisation was measured by pain 
threshold and tolerance. Finally, two indices for health worry were employed: worrying about recent 
complaints and general illness worry. The results showed that the associations between the two 
indices per factor were moderate, suggesting that the indices were tapping into the same construct, 
but were not measuring exactly the same. We will discuss the results for each hypothesis in more 
detail below. 
With respect to cognitive sensitization, there was an association between SHCs and self-rated 
health on the one hand and cognitive sensitization on the other hand, but the latter was found for 
health related recall and not for attentional bias (Stroop interference). This suggests that even non-
clinical individuals with common SHCs possess highly accessible cognitive networks related to health. 
When retrieving information from memory, health related information is given priority over neutral 
and negative information. The fact that this recall bias was found for severity rather than the number 
of SHCs, suggests that it may depend on the cognitive appraisal of complaints, that is, the meaning, 





biases in conditions that are characterized by extreme emotional appraisals such as excessive worry 
(catastrophizing), chronic pain (Pincus & Morley, 2001b) and in emotional disorders such as 
depression and anxiety (Russo et al., 2006). In other words, the link between recall bias and SHCs 
may be related to emotional appraisals such as worry. In line with this, we found that the association 
between SHCs severity and recall bias was mediated by complaint specific worry. These results seem 
to indicate that a highly accessible health-related cognitive network, as indexed by a recall bias, may 
increase the likelihood of reporting SHCs by causing worries about these complaints. This might also 
explain why there were no effects of general illness worry. The effect of a trait-like measure of health 
worry on actual SHCs might be much less substantial than worries linked to these very complaints. In 
a recent study we have found that general measures of worry correspond only to a small extent with 
worry in daily life (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 2007). Future studies should consider using 
additional momentary assessments of worry and recall bias to be able to uncover the dynamic 
process by which worry and recall bias interact and possibly enhance SHCs (Brosschot & Van Der 
Doef, 2006).  
The lack of a relationship between subjective health and attentional bias is in partial 
discordance with Williams et al. (2003), who found an association of SHCs and Stroop interference 
for health related words. This disparity is not likely to be caused by differences in the Stroop tasks, 
because the blocked design we used usually results in larger Stroop effects (Waters, Sayette, 
Franken, & Schwartz, 2005) than the random design Williams et al. used. In line with models of pain 
which propose that pain demands attention (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999), it is more likely that the 
pain task, the CPT, led to an attentional bias that could have overruled the more subtle association 
between SHCs and attentional bias. Indeed, we found that people with low pain thresholds showed 
an attentional bias for health related words. 
For somatic sensitization we also found a relationship with subjective health: The less 
participants tolerated pain, the more numerous and severe their health complaints were. 
Interestingly, until now, reduced CPT pain tolerance has only been found in somatoform disorders 
(i.e. in studies comparing people experiencing clinical levels of SHC with healthy controls ; Kasch et 
al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2000; Gramling, Clawson, & McDonald, 1996; Bouin et al., 2001). This study 
is the first to show this for common health complaints, and offers some support for our sensitization 
theory of these complaints (Ursin & Eriksen, 2001; Brosschot, 2002; Eriksen & Ursin, 2004; Ursin, 
2005).  
Finally, we found the expected association between the two types of sensitization. This too, 
however, was restricted to specific types of sensitization: pain threshold and attentional bias for 
health related words. This can be understood when the detection of thresholds is viewed as an 
interaction between somatic sensitization and attention. An early detection of pain is more likely to 




be related to attentional bias for health-related information such as in the Stroop task we used, and 
less so to recall of this information.  
There are several methodological limitations. First of all, the study was conducted in a young 
and female sample. As several studies suggest that mechanisms contributing to somatic complaints 
differ between males and females (Lee, Mayer, Schmulson, Chang, & Naliboff, 2001; Staud, 
Robinson, Vierck, & Price, 2003) it is unclear how the findings might generalize to older and male 
populations. Second, one could argue that compared to the tests we used for cognitive sensitization, 
our test for somatic sensitization, the CPT, allows more conscious cognitive strategies to deal with 
the pain, such as distraction, acceptance or catastrophizing, which could have contaminated the 
measure of sensitization (Masedo & Esteve, 2007;  but see Hodes et al. (Hodes, Rowland, Lightfoot, & 
Cleeland, 1990) who found no effects of distraction on pain tolerance). This possibility can not be 
completely ruled out and future studies could consider instructing participants to use the same 
coping strategy. Another limitation is that our measures of somatic sensitization were restricted to 
cold-induced pain. Other measures of somatic sensitization, for example, thermal or electrical pain 
induction might have yielded different findings. A further limitation is that a general tendency to 
experience negative emotions could have caused high SHC scores and influenced our tests of 
sensitization. However, the lack of effect on the general negative emotional words in our tasks ruled 
out such a general negative emotional bias. This is in line with recent studies which have shown that 
associations of selective attention for pain, SHCs and worry and catastrophizing exist independent of 
negative affect (Vervoort, Goubert, Eccleston, Bijttebier, & Crombez, 2005; Brosschot & Van Der 
Doef, 2006; Crombez, Eccleston, van den Broeck, Van Houdenhove, & Goubert, 2002). Finally, an 
obvious limitation of a study such as the present one is its correlational nature, which allows no clear 
conclusion as to causal directions of the relationships found. Although useful as a first investigation 
of these relationships, it is clear that future studies should use prospective designs or interventions 
directed at worry or cognitive sensitization. 
In summary, this study has focused on SHCs in a non-clinical female sample and has provided 
preliminary support for the sensitization theory of SHC (Ursin & Eriksen, 2001; Brosschot, 2002; 
Eriksen & Ursin, 2004; Ursin, 2005). It suggests that a large variety of common health complaints are 
associated with specific types of cognitive and somatic sensitization, that is, enhanced recall of health 
related information and lowered tolerance for pain. The results also seemed to imply that this 
relationship, at least for cognitive sensitization, is mediated by worries about these complaints. One 
possible implication of this is that it might be more fruitful to focus interventions at cognitive 







Words used as stimuli 
English Translated Word Sets 
Health Complaint Words Negative Words Neutral Words Cold Pressor Words 
Tired Scary Brake Wet 
Back Pain Concerned Cylinder Numbed 
Flu Cruel Mirror Stinging 
Migraine Hateful Passenger Cold 
Cough Jealous Seat Prick 
Pain Worthless Turbo Insensitive 





Interacting effects of worry and anxiety on attentional disengagement from threat 
 



































Recent work suggests that the ability to disengage attention from threatening information is 
impaired in people who suffer from anxiety and dysphoria. It has been suggested that this impaired 
ability to disengage from threat might specifically be associated with the tendency to perseverate 
about threat (i.e. worry), which is a main characteristic of anxiety disorders and a wide range of other 
psychopathologies. However, no studies have yet addressed this issue. The present study examined 
whether trait worry as well as worry intensity after experimental worry induction are associated with 
impaired ability to disengage attention from threatening cues (angry faces), independently from or in 
conjunction with anxiety. Sixty-one participants performed a visual cueing experiment that required 
detection of a target stimulus at one of two possible locations. Prior to the target neutral, happy or 
angry facial cues appeared at one of these two locations; An overall faster responding to invalidly 
cued trials relative to validly cued trials is believed to indicate inhibition of return (IOR) to a recently 
attended location, or, in other words, attentional disengagement. Lower disengagement from angry 
faces was only found when both trait worry and anxiety were high. When anxiety was kept constant, 
both trait worry and state worry was associated with reduced attention allocation to neutral faces 
instead. The results seem to suggest that specific threat-related deficiencies in disengagement may 
be a function of the co-occurrence of worry and anxiety. 
 





Perseverative thinking such as worry is a central feature of a wide range of psychopathologies and 
has been proposed to be an important transdiagnostic process (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 
2004). Worry predicts anxiety and depressive affect (Hong, 2007), and it is the main characteristic of 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In addition, it is found in 
social phobia (Mellings & Alden, 2000), panic disorder (Casey, Oei, & Newcombe, 2004), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Comer, Kendall, Franklin, Hudson, & Pimentel, 2004), eating disorders (Sassaroli 
et al., 2005) and in depression (Diefenbach et al., 2001). More recently, it has been suggested that 
worry prolongs physiological stress responses beyond the actual presence of stressors, thereby 
contributing to the total wear and tear of stressors on the human body (Brosschot et al., 2006; Pieper 
et al., 2007; Brosschot et al., 2007). Given this seemingly broad importance of worry in the 
development and maintenance of mental and somatic health problems, studies that investigate its 
cognitive underpinnings are warranted.  
A large number of studies conducted with extreme worriers, that is, people suffering from 
GAD, have shown that they show biased processing of threat-related information that is associated 
with the excessiveness of their worrying. For example, they interpret ambivalent information in a 
more negative way (Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004), have biased explicit memory (Friedman, 
Thayer, & Borkovec, 2000) and selectively attend to concern-related threatening information 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg, Mathews, & 
Weinman, 1989; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995). These biases in the processing of threat are 
thought to contribute to the prolongation of worry episodes in GAD.  
Still, although biased attention seems to be associated with worry, it is not known what 
aspects of attention are specifically associated with worry. Attention can be divided into three 
processes (Posner & Petersen, 1990): orienting towards a stimulus, engaging attention and 
eventually disengaging from it. Especially the delayed disengagement from threatening information, 
or prolonged dwell time, is believed to lead to worry and rumination (Georgiou et al., 2005; Fox et 
al., 2001). This makes sense from a phenomenological point of view: A main characteristic of 
pathological worry is that high worriers find it extremely difficult to disengage from their worry 
topics, and the same threatening thoughts occur over and over again. They find it extremely difficult 
to stop worrying and to mentally disengage (or ‘decenter’) from their sorrows.  
The inability to disengage attention from neutral or threatening information has mainly been 
studied with regard to enduring negative affect such as in dysphoria (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, 
Franck, & Crombez, 2005) and in trait anxiety (Yiend & Mathews, 2001; Fox et al., 2002; Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Waters, Nitz, Craske, & Johnson, 2007; Derryberry & 





to disengage attention from threatening information. Although these studies did not directly address 
whether delayed disengagement from threat was particularly associated with worry, they all focused 
on emotions that are likely to be caused by perseverative cognition such as worry (Hong, 2007) or 
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Tentatively, it might be that delayed disengagement from 
threat seen across several psychopathologies is due to an association between attention processes 
and the transdiagnostic process of worrying. We therefore conducted the present study to 
investigate whether worry is associated with delayed attentional disengagement from threatening 
information.  
To investigate the association between worry and attentional disengagement, we used an 
emotional modification of Posner’s exogenous cueing task (Posner, 1980), which is often used in 
studies concerned with attentional disengagement. In this task, participants have to respond to a 
target presented at one of two locations, which is preceded by a cue that has either been presented 
at the same location as the target (a valid trial) or at the opposite location (an invalid trial). When 
there is a short period of time between the cue and the target (stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) < 
300 ms), responses appear to be faster to the valid trials. At longer SOAs (> 300 ms) responses to the 
valid trials are instead slower, which is thought to be due to inhibition of attention to the location on 
the screen that has previously been attended to (because a cue was presented), a phenomenon 
called inhibition of return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 1984). Recent clinical studies of the emotional 
modulation of this phenomenon however prefer to use the term 'disengagement' instead of 
‘inhibition of return’, since the debate is still ongoing whether these findings can best be explained 
by an attentional inhibitory mechanism, or by a biased attentional shifting mechanism (for a detailed 
account of the attentional mechanisms explaining the IOR effect see: MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, 
Wilson, & Bibi, 2003; Spalek & Hammad, 2005). This spatial cueing task is made an emotional one by 
presenting as cues either schematic or realistic pictures of threatening (angry), neutral or happy faces 
(e.g., Fox et al., 2002; Fox et al., 2001), IAPS pictures (e.g., Yiend & Mathews, 2001) or arrows 
indicating wins and losses in a game (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). In the present study, we tested 
whether people with a strong tendency to worry (high trait worry) show a diminished 
disengagement, that is, a lower IOR effect, to angry faces, as compared with happy or neutral faces.  
Trait worry is only one way to measure the tendency to worry, and tests for trait worry 
actually only predict behavior partially (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 2007). Therefore, we also used 
a worry induction procedure, to test whether induced worry intensity is also associated with a 
reduced ability to disengage attention from angry faces.  
Additionally, we wanted to examine whether the role of anxiety is important in these 
hypothesized relationships of worry with disengagement. Although worry and anxiety are closely 
related, several studies have made clear that worry and anxiety have independent associations with 




health outcomes (e.g., Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006) and stress management strategies (Davey, 
Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). We therefore also examined whether the hypothesized 
association between worry and attentional disengagement from threat was independent of the 
previously found association for anxiety (Yiend & Mathews, 2001; Koster et al., 2004; Fox et al., 2002; 
Waters et al., 2007; Derryberry & Reed, 2002), or whether it was the interaction between worry and 
anxiety that reduces attentional disengagement from threat.  
In short, the present study was conducted to examine the following hypotheses: (1) trait 
worry is associated with decreased attentional disengagement from angry faces, relative to neutral 
and happy faces, independent of or in interaction with trait anxiety; (2) This association is also found 




Data were gathered from sixty-one student participants (mean age = 24.61, range 17 – 50). Sixty-
seven percent of the sample was female. This study formed part of a larger study of the cognitive and 
physiological associates of worry and parts of this larger study have been reported elsewhere 
(Verkuil, Brosschot, Borkovec, & Thayer, in press). Participants were asked to perform several tasks 
for this experiment among which were the exogenous cueing task (see paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3) and 
the experimental worry induction (see paragraph 2.5). The order of these tasks was counterbalanced.  
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
To measure attentional disengagement, we used a task that was highly similar to the one used by Fox 
et al. (2002; experiment 2). Three schematic face types: ‘angry’, ‘happy’, and ‘neutral’ faces were 
used as cues. Each of the faces was 2 cm in diameter on the computer screen. The target that the 
participants had to localise was a black dot with a diameter of 0.5 cm. The cue and target stimuli 
were presented inside two light grey boxes that were continuously present on the computer screen. 
These boxes were 5 cm high by 3.0 cm wide and were displayed 2.25 cm to the left and the right of a 
central fixation point (shape: +). All stimuli were presented on a Dell computer with a 17" Dell LCD 
monitor (resolution: 1280 * 1024).  
  
Procedure 
Each trial started with a fixation point which was presented at the centre of the screen for 800 ms. A 
schematic face cue was then presented for 300 ms in either the left or the right box. This cue was 
then blanked out and 200 ms later the central cross was presented in bold type for 300 ms. The initial 





half of either the left or the right box for 33 ms (Lupianez et al, 1997). Subsequently, the initial 
fixation display was presented until the participant responded (or until 2000 ms elapsed). This 
resulted in a cue-target onset asynchrony (SOA) of 960 ms. We used an intertrial interval of 1000 ms. 
Similar to the procedure used by Fox et al. (2002), each participant completed 16 practice trials, 
followed by 360 experimental trials, divided into five blocks of 72 trials. Fifty percent (180) of the 
experimental trials were valid (i.e., the target appeared in the same box as the cue), and 50% (180) 
were invalid (i.e., the target appeared in the opposite box to the cue). Angry, happy and neutral face 
cues appeared 60 times each on valid trials and 60 times each on invalid trials. The probability of any 
particular cue appearing in the left- and right-hand side boxes was equal, as was that of the types of 
faces.  
All participants were seated 50 cm from the computer screen. They were told that the position of the 
cue did not predict the location of the target and therefore they should ignore the cue and keep their 
eyes focused on the centre of the screen and respond as quickly and as accurately as possible (Fox et 
al., 2002). The participant’s task was to respond to the target which appeared either on the left or 
the right hand location by pressing the “Z” on the keyboard when the target was located on the left 
hand side of the screen and the “M” when the target was located on the right hand side of the 
screen. A standard QWERTY keyboard was used.  
 
Trait questionnaires 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Dutch version; 
van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999). This trait worry questionnaire consists of 16 self-report 
items that are directed at the excessiveness, duration and uncontrollability of worry. The PSWQ has 
demonstrated high reliability as well as high temporal stability and substantial validity in the 
assessment of trait-worry (Meyer et al., 1990; van Rijsoort et al., 1999; Verkuil et al., 2007). 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Form (STAI-T; Dutch version: van der Ploeg, Defares, & 
Spielberger, 1980). For measuring trait-anxiety we administered the trait version of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory. The STAI-T is a questionnaire that measures the participants’ predispositions to 
anxiety. It consists of 20 self-report items and earlier use has shown good internal consistency and 
validity (van der Ploeg et al., 1980).  
 
State measures 
Experimental worry induction. Following the work of Borkovec and others (Lyonfields, 
Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995; Thayer, Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 
2007), participants were asked to write down three personal worry topics, before receiving further 
instructions. To minimize participant’s social evaluative concerns about writing down a personal 




worry topic, they were notified that they could take home or destroy the paper on which they wrote 
their worry topic. Thereafter, participants were asked ‘to worry as you usually do’ (Lyonfields et al., 
1995; Thayer et al., 1996; McLaughlin et al., 2007).  After the worry induction, participants were 
asked to indicate on a ten point scale (1) the intensity with which they were able to worry, (2) the 
extent to which one negative thought led to another negative thought and (3) the extent to which 
the same thoughts occurred over and over again. The scores on these items were combined into a 
short state worry scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .71). 
 State anxiety. The amount of state anxiety after the worry induction was assessed using 
visual analog scales (Brosschot et al., 1992; Johansson, 1976). Participants rated their level of anxiety 
at the start of the experiment (baseline) and after the worry induction. For this rating the 
participants was first asked to rate their 'mood as usual' with a vertical line, and then to indicate with 
a cross their 'mood during the preceding period'. The change between ‘mood as usual’ and ‘mood 
during the preceding period’ was used to address the second hypothesis.  
 
Statistical analyses 
To investigate whether trait worry, trait anxiety or their interaction were associated with reduced 
disengagement from angry faces, but not from neutral and happy faces, we conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA with Valence and Validity as within subjects factors, and trait worry, trait anxiety, 
and their interaction as continuous between subjects variables. To be able to examine significant 
interactions, we calculated cue validity effects for each of the three valences (Waters et al., 2007). 
Cue validity effects were obtained by subtracting the response latencies to valid trials from the 
response latencies to invalid trials (CV = RT invalid – RT valid). Negative values therefore indicated 
faster responses to invalid trials (suggesting IOR, i.e. attention away from the cue), whereas positive 
values indicated faster responses to valid trials (i.e. no IOR, but attention towards the cue). Relative 
cue validity effects were calculated by subtracting the CV effect for neutral faces from the CV effect 
for angry or happy faces. To test whether trait worry, trait anxiety and the worry induction measures 
were associated with the (relative) cue validity effects we calculated partial correlations and 
conducted simple slopes analysis in order to examine significant interactions. The predictor variables 
were centered in order to reduce multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991; (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 




Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for scores on the trait questionnaires and on the 





conducted with student participants (Startup & Erickson, 2006). There were no gender differences in 
trait anxiety, intensity of induced worry, state anxiety and the response latencies on the spatial 
cueing task (ps > .05). Women (M = 47.67, SD = 12.50) had a slightly higher score on the PSWQ than 
men (M = 41.58, SD = 12.71; t(34) = 1.74, p = .091). Reaction times on the different trials are 
presented in figure 1. 
 
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of and Pearson correlations between the trait 
questionnaires, induced worry intensity and state anxiety 
 
  M SD PSWQ STAI-T Induced worry intensity 
PSWQ 
1
 46.11 12.96    
STAI-T 
2
 39.69 10.07 .73**   
Worry intensity 15.79 5.09 .49** .30*  
State anxiety 0.55 1.79 .06 .18 .21 
Note: 
1
 PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
2
 STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait Version; ** Correlation 
significant at the .001 level (1-tailed); * correlation significant at the .05 level (1-tailed). 
 
Spatial cueing task 
Errors 
The percentage of errors was 3.44%. No significant difference between the percentage rates of 
errors was found between the conditions. Trials in which the responses were incorrect were 
excluded from the analyses. In addition, trials on which the RTs were faster than 150 ms (anticipatory 




Mean reaction times were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with Valence and Validity as 
within subjects factors. This analysis showed a significant main effect of Validity (F(1,62) = 57.39, p < 
.0001, η² = .48), indicating a general IOR effect (invalid trials M = 297.81; valid trials M = 313.62). 
There was no significant effect of Valence, and no interaction between Validity and Valence. 
 





Figure 1. Mean reaction times on the spatial cueing task. 
 
 
Association between traits and attentional disengagement  
The results showed a significant interaction between Trait Worry and Valence x Validity (F(2,116) = 
2.63, p < .05, η² = .04), and a marginally significant effect of Trait Anxiety x Valence x Validity F(2,116) 
= 2.37, p < .06, η² = .04). In addition, the four-way interaction of Trait Worry x Trait Anxiety x Valence 
x Validity was significant (F(2,112) = 2.81, p < .05, η² = .05). This four way interaction was further 
examined by inspecting the partial correlations between the cue validity effects and the interaction 
between trait worry and trait anxiety.  
Partial correlation analyses on the CV effect for angry faces relative to neutral faces yielded a 
significant association with the interaction between trait worry x trait anxiety (r(58) = .23, p < .05). 
This association was due to the association between trait worry x trait anxiety and the cue validity 
effect for angry faces (r(58) = .24, p < .05), while no association was present for the CV effect for 
neutral faces. A simple slopes regression analysis on the cue attentional bias index for angry faces 
confirmed that attentional allocation to angry faces was associated with the interaction between 





trait anxiety. Figure 2 indicates that only when both trait worry and trait anxiety were high, 
disengagement from angry faces was reduced. Significance tests on the separate regression slopes 
showed that the slope of the high trait anxiety line was significant (β = .36, p < .05). 
Partial correlations analyses on the CV effect for happy faces relative to neutral faces yielded 
a significant association with trait worry (r(58) = .31, p < .05), and, in the opposite direction, with trait 
anxiety (r(58) = -.29, p < .05). Yet, there were no significant associations between the cue validity 
effect for happy faces with trait worry or trait anxiety. Analyses on the CV effect for neutral faces 
however showed an association with trait worry (r(58) = -.21, p < .06), and an association with trait 
anxiety, again in the opposite direction (r(58) = .24, p < .06). This suggests that trait worry, 
independent of trait anxiety, is associated with reduced attention to neutral faces, whereas trait 
anxiety, independent of trait worry, is associated with prolonged attention to neutral faces.  
 
 









Association between induced worry intensity, state anxiety and disengagement  
A repeated measures ANOVA with Valence and Validity as within subjects factors and induced worry 
intensity and state anxiety as continuous between subjects variables yielded a significant Induced 
Worry Intensity x Valence x Validity interaction (F(2,114) = 4.61, p < .05, η² = .07). 
To examine this interaction, we calculated partial correlations between induced worry 
intensity and the attentional indices, while controlling for state anxiety and the induced worry 
intensity x state anxiety interaction. The results showed that induced worry intensity was 
significantly associated with the cue validity effect of angry faces, relative to neutral faces (r(57) = 
.25, p < .05) and with those of happy faces (r(57) = .39, p < .05). Yet, further inspection of this 
association showed that induced worry intensity was negatively associated with the CV effect for 
neutral faces (r(57) = -.31, p < .05), but not with the CV effects for angry or happy faces.  
 
Trait and state predictors of attentional disengagement from threat 
As trait and state variables are often found to have independent associations with performance on 
attentional tasks (e.g. Fox et al, 2001) and with health outcomes (Cohen et al), we assessed which of 
the trait and state variables was most directly associated with the attentional bias indices (Table 2). A 
forced entry regression analysis showed that the cue validity effect of angry faces was best predicted 
by the interaction between trait worry and trait anxiety (β = .28, p < .05), and by state anxiety (β = 
.26, p < .05). No significant predictors were found for the CV effect for happy faces. The CV effect for 
neutral faces was negatively predicted by induced worry intensity (β = -.33, p < .05). 
 
Table 2. Hierarchical regression analyses on the CV effects for angry, happy and neutral faces 
Note: PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
2
 STAI-T = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait Version; Ind. worry. int. = 
Induced worry intensity. 
  CV angry faces  CV happy faces  CV neutral faces 
 β t p R
2
  β t p R
2
  β t p R
2
 
 Predictors    .18     .11     .14 
 (Constant)  -6.77 .00    -5.21 .00    -3.31 .00  
  PSWQ -.11 -0.52 .30   .06 0.29 .38   -.12 -0.54 .29  
  STAI-T .03 0.15 .44   -.15 -0.73 .23   .27 1.34 .09  
  Ind. worry int. -.02 -0.17 .43   .09 0.59 .28   -.33 -2.19 .02  
  State anxiety .26 1.97 .03   .16 1.12 .13   .07 0.51 .31  
  PSWQ x STAI-T .28 2.02 .02   -.09 -0.59 .28   -.10 -0.68 .25  
  
Ind. worry int. 
x State anxiety .15 1.12 .13 
  







The main aim of this study was to investigate whether trait worry and induced worry intensity were 
associated with lower attentional disengagement from threatening stimuli, i.e. angry faces and 
whether this was independent of anxiety or interacted with it. The results showed that trait worry 
was associated with lower disengagement from angry faces, but only when trait anxiety was also 
high. In addition, we found that both trait worry and worry during a worry induction were associated 
with reduced attention to neutral faces, an effect that was not dependent on anxiety. In contrast, 
trait anxiety was associated with prolonged attention to neutral faces.  
 The finding that at high anxiety levels worry is associated with reduced disengagement from 
angry faces provides further evidence for the proposal that pathological worry (worry that is 
associated with anxiety) is associated with enhanced elaboration of threatening information, as 
found in previous  studies  (Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004; Friedman et al., 2000; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985; Mathews et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1989; Mogg et al., 1995).  However, this study 
adds to this previous work evidence that enhanced elaboration of threatening information may be 
particularly due to a reduced ability to disengage from it. A weak or deficient ability to disengage 
from threatening information will easily lead to the prolongation of worry episodes, which, in the 
long term, might exacerbate worry as a core psychological problem, and instigate meta-worry, the 
core problem of GAD. According to the perseverative cognition hypothesis (Brosschot, Gerin & 
Thayer, 2006), this prolonged worrying can also lead to somatic pathology because it adds to the 
total time that mental representations of threatening information provoke stress related 
physiological activation, which could eventually affect somatic health (Brosschot, Gerin & Thayer, 
2006).  
In addition, the correlation analyses suggested that trait worry and trait anxiety had 
independent opposing relations with the cue validity effect of neutral faces. Whereas trait worry was 
associated with reduced attentional disengagement from neutral faces, trait anxiety was associated 
with prolonged attention to neutral faces. Since it is unclear how participants interpreted these 
neutral schematic faces the main effects of worry and anxiety have to be interpreted cautiously. Still, 
the finding that worry was associated with reduced attention to neutral faces was also found when 
perseverative worry was measured after a proxy for a real-life worry bout (which usually also lasts 8 
minutes on average; Brosschot, van Dijk & Thayer, 2007). Moreover, in the regression analysis 
induced worry intensity was the only significant predictor of attention to neutral faces. This might 
suggest that worry in essence is associated with an enhanced inhibition of return when neutral 
information is present, thereby biasing the attentional system away from neutral information, 
towards more salient information. Yet, this suggestion is tentative and should be addressed in future 




studies. How worriers attend to and interpret neutral information certainly deserves more attention 
given the findings that GAD patients show smaller cardiac orienting responses and impaired 
habituation of cardiac orienting to neutral information (Thayer, Friedman, Borkovec, Johnsen, & 
Molina, 2000) and show equally enhanced BOLD responses when presented with neutral information 
as well as worry related information (Hoehn-Saric, Schlund, & Wong, 2004). 
 There are several limitations that have to be addressed. Foremost, we used a relatively 
young and non-clinical group. Although worry might even have adverse effects on health at non 
clinical levels and student samples are suitable to measure worry on the full severity range (Ruscio, 
2002), it remains unclear to what extent our findings extend to pathological worry as observed in 
GAD. In addition, one could argue that the use of the STAI-T as a measure of trait anxiety has its 
limitations, as several items of the STAI-T seem to tap into depression (Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 
1998). However, worry has been found to be not only associated with anxiety, but also with sad 
mood and it could be that reduced attentional disengagement from threat found in anxiety and 
depression is mainly associated with the transdiagnostic process of worrying. Therefore the 
confounding between anxiety and depression in the STAI-T actually might add to the generalizability 
of the present results. Finally, we only examined reduced attentional disengagement at one stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA of 960 milliseconds between cue and target onset) and future studies should 
use more SOAs to be able to more specifically address the temporal aspects of this reduced 
attentional disengagement (Samuel & Kat, 2003). 
A possible implication of the present findings might be that interventions might do well to 
focus more on the engagement-disengagement dimension in the worry process. The success of some 
novel therapies, such as mindfulness-based cognitive behavioral therapy, may be fruitful because 
they treat this dimension as an important first target (Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007). For example, 
mindfulness based cognitive therapy is aimed less on changing the content, or threat value of 
worrisome cognitions, as in traditional CBT, but instead aims at disengaging or decentering from 
these thoughts through the use of meditation or breathing exercises. From a research standpoint a 
next step might be to conduct studies that investigate how these findings obtained in a laboratory 
setting transfer to the experience of worry episodes in daily life, for example by linking reduced 
attentional disengagement from threat to the frequency and duration of worry episodes as captured 
by momentary assessments. It might be that people that are high in trait worry, but who do not 
report anxiety, experience other kinds of worry episodes in their daily lives, relative to people high in 
both trait worry and trait anxiety. It might be that the former experience frequent but short lasting 
worry episodes, possibly indicating successful problem solving, whereas the latter experience 





All in all, the results of this study suggest that specific threat-related deficiencies in 




Acute autonomic effects of experimental worry and cognitive problem solving: Why worry about 
worry? 
 



































Worry has been associated with adverse mental and somatic health outcomes, which have been 
attributed to the pathogenic physiological activity caused by worry. However, experimental evidence 
is scarce, and existing studies did not address whether the physiological effects of worry do actually 
exceed those of mere mental load during cognitive problem solving. In the present experiment, heart 
rate (HR) and heart rate variability (HRV) of fifty-three participants were continuously measured 
during induced worrying, problem solving concerning issues that were not personally relevant, and 
relaxation. The results showed that HR was higher and HRV lower during both worrying and problem 
solving than during relaxation. Differences in emotional responses did not account for these results. 
This suggests that mere mental load is responsible for - at least a part of - the physiological effects of 
worry. Consequently, long term health effects of worry might be due to prolonged mental load of 










A large body of research has made clear that stressful events can have profound effects on mental 
health, such as depression (McEwen, 2003), and somatic health, such as cardiovascular diseases 
(CVD; Rozanski, Blumenthal & Kaplan, 1999). However, the exact psychophysiological mechanisms by 
which stressors have these adverse effects are not well understood (Pieper & Brosschot, 2005). 
Recently, Brosschot, Gerin, and Thayer (2006) proposed that perseverative thoughts, such as worry, 
rumination and trauma recall, are important mediators of the health effects of stressors. The 
recurrent or persistent cognitive representation of stressors, especially their uncontrollability, might 
prolong physiological activation of several bodily systems, including the endocrine, immune and 
cardiovascular systems. Prolonged physiological activity, or prolonged arousal, is unequivocally 
present in the early stress theory of Selye (1950). Also in more recent years, physiological activation 
that is prolonged beyond the presence of actual stressors has been put forward as a crucial stage in 
the causal chain from stressors to disease (Pieper & Brosschot, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2003). 
Prolonged activation of the autonomic nervous system, especially high levels of heart rate (HR) and 
low levels of heart rate variability (HRV), is a risk factor for CVD and is argued to play an important 
etiological role in a wide range of other somatic and psychological pathological conditions, including 
immune dysfunction, diabetes, mood and anxiety disorders and, more generally, self regulatory 
difficulties (Masi, Hawkley, Rickett & Cacioppo, 2007; Thayer & Lane, 2000; Thayer & Lane, 2007; 
Thayer & Sternberg, 2006). 
Several studies support crucial aspects of this “perseverative cognition hypothesis”. Worry has been 
shown to predict anxiety (Hong, 2007) and cardiovascular disease (Kubzansky et al., 1997), and it was 
associated with enhanced activation in endocrine, immune and cardiovascular systems (Brosschot, 
van Dijk, & Thayer, 2007; Gerin, Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal & Schwartz, 2006; McCullough, 
Orsulak, Brandon & Akers, 2007; Pieper, Brosschot, van der Leeden & Thayer, 2007; for a review of 
earlier studies see: Brosschot et al., 2006). Recent diary studies showed that worry in daily life is 
associated with enhanced HR and lowered HRV, independent of and stronger than actual stressful 
environmental events (Brosschot et al., 2007; Pieper et al., 2007). However, such momentary 
assessments yield correlational data, which are not unequivocal with respect to causality. Moreover, 
they do not allow for more rigorous testing of the mechanisms that are responsible for these 
physiological effects. More direct evidence of the physiological effects of worry comes from the few 
studies that have directly manipulated worry and measured its acute cardiac effects (Borkovec and 
Hu, 1990; Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser & Deihl, 1993; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky & DePree, 1983; 
Davis, Montgomery & Wilson, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2005; Lyonfields, Borkovec & Thayer, 1995; 
Thayer, Friedman & Borkovec, 1996). Although some of these studies only measured HR and failed to 






(Borkovec et al., 1983; Borkovec et al., 1993; Borkovec and Hu, 1990), other studies measured both 
HR and HRV and found that worry is associated with enhanced HR and with low HRV compared to 
relaxation (Davis, et al., 2002; Hofmann, et al., 2005; Lyonfields et al., 1995; Thayer et al., 1996). Still, 
simple relaxation is not sufficient as a control condition to understand the mechanisms underlying 
the potentially adverse physiological effects of worry. It is implicitly assumed that its adverse effects 
are due to the defining characteristics of worry (namely perseveration of negative thoughts) or to 
anxiety and other negative emotions that are associated with worry (Borkovec et al., 1983). Yet, it is 
not unlikely that the cardiac effects of worry are at least partly caused by the high cognitive activity 
or mental effort involved in worrying. Effortful cognitive problem solving has been known for a long 
time to increase HR and decrease HRV (e.g., Brod, Fencl, Heijl & Jirka, 1959). 
Worry and cognitive problem solving are closely related (Davey, 1994). Both worry and cognitive 
problem solving involve abstract reasoning about problems, and both can occur without the actual 
presence of these problems. In fact, worry has been defined as consisting of ‘attempts to engage in 
mental problem solving’, albeit thwarted attempts (Borkovec et al., 1983). Thus, it is possible that the 
effects of worry on HR and HRV that have been found earlier are, at least in part, due to the mental 
effort associated with the cognitive problem solving component of worry. The crucial difference 
between worrying and mere cognitive problem solving is the perseveration of negative thoughts and 
emotions. Worrying involves thinking about topics involving personally relevant threats (Mcintosh, 
Harlow & Martin, 1995), thereby increasing and prolonging negative affect and negative thoughts. 
Mere cognitive problem solving, on the other hand, involves personal topics not associated with 
threat. Recent neuroimaging studies by Greene et al. (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley & Cohen, 
2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001) demonstrated that pure cognitive 
problem solving was associated with activation in the brain areas associated with working memory 
(the right middle frontal gyrus and bilateral parietal lobes), while only the personal relevance of a 
problem being solved was associated with additional heightened activation of emotional areas of the 
brain (the medial frontal gyri, posterior cingulate gyri and the angular gyri). Thus, to test whether 
physiological effects of worry are truly due to the perseveration of negative emotions, the latter 
should be compared with solving problems that are not personally relevant.  
Worry is increasingly recognized as a pathogenic cognitive process in the link between stressors and 
disease. However, to date no study has examined whether the physiological effects of worry actually 
exceed those of mere problem solving. In the present experimental within subjects study (Montero & 
Leon, 2007; Ramos-Álvarez, Moreno-Fernádez, Valdés-Conroy & Catena, 2008), the cardiac effects of 
experimentally induced worrying were compared with those of a cognitive problem solving task 
concerning problems that were not personally relevant and with those of a relaxation condition. For 
this purpose, we employed the operationalization of non-personally relevant problem solving used in 





the neuroimaging study by Greene and coworkers (Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004) and 
shown not to activate emotional brain areas. The main objective of this study was to rule out one of 
two rival hypotheses: (a) the cardiac effects of worry will exceed those of cognitive problem solving, 
thus ruling out mere mental load as the explanation for the cardiac effects of worry, or (b) the two 
conditions are equal in their cardiac effects, thereby ruling out the hypothesis that negative emotion 




The sample consisted of 18 male and 35 female students, aged 17-50 (mean = 24.4). Seventy-six 
percent of the sample had Caucasian ethnicity, 4% African, 11% Asian and 9% had mixed ethnicity. 
Participants were recruited by advertisement at Leiden University.  
 
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, all participants took part in three experimental conditions: a worry 
induction, a cognitive problem solving task, and a relaxation induction. The experimental conditions 
were presented in counterbalanced order. Each condition lasted 10 minutes. After the experimental 
conditions, the participants completed questionnaires and were paid 6 euros or received course 
credits. During the experiment, cardiac activity was recorded.  
 
Worry induction 
Following the work of Borkovec and others (Lyonfields et al., 1995; Thayer et al., 1996), participants 
were asked to write down three personal worry topics before receiving further instructions. To 
minimize participant’s social evaluative concerns about writing down a personal worry topic, they 
were notified that they could take home or destroy the paper on which they wrote their worry topic. 
Thereafter, participants were asked ‘to worry as you usually do’ for ten minutes.  
 
Relaxation induction 
In the relaxation condition, participants were asked to relax and to let their minds wander. Some 
non-arousing magazines were available to read.  
 
Cognitive problem-solving induction  
For the cognitive problem solving condition, we selected 10 moral dilemmas from the moral dilemma 
paradigm that were not personally relevant (for example: ‘is it appropriate for your friend to 






To be comparable with the cognitive activity during worrying (often jumping from one problem to 
another), participants were presented with 10 dilemmas on a computer screen. Each dilemma was 
presented on the screen for 1 minute. Participants were asked to judge for themselves the 
correctness of the actions that were described in the dilemma scenes. To rule out the possibility that 
participants would feel judged themselves, they were not asked to respond to the dilemmas in any 
other way.  
 
Assessment of mood 
Mood changes due to the experimental manipulations were assessed using visual analog scales, with 
scales ranging from 0 to 10. After each of the three induction periods, participants rated their level of 
‘anxiety’, ‘sadness’, ‘irritation’, ‘tension’ and ‘impatience’. For each rating, the participants were first 
asked to rate their mood as usual with a vertical line and then to indicate with a cross their mood 
during the preceding period. To assess the effects of the experimental tasks on mood, we used the 
change score between mood as usual and mood during the preceding period (Brosschot et al., 1992).  
 
Assessment of cognition 
After each induction, participants were asked to rate the intensity with which they worried, felt 
relaxed, or thought about the moral dilemmas. Additionally, after the worry induction and the 
cognitive problem solving task, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they had found 
solutions or had made a decision about the problem(s) they were thinking about.  
 
Physiological recording 
HR and HRV were continuously measured, in a non-invasive manner, with the Polar s810i wristwatch 
and the Polar Wearlink 31 belt band, which has a sampling rate of 1000 Hertz (Polar Electro 
Nederland BV; Gamelin, Berthoin & Bosquet, 2006). Before analyzing HR and HRV, the raw interbeat 
intervals (IBIs) were preprocessed for artifacts using the Polar Precision Software. The corrected IBI 
series were subsequently processed with the HRV Analysis program, using the smoothness priors 
based approach which removes the low frequency trend component of the IBIs (Niskanen, Tarvainen, 
Ranta-Aho & Karjalainen, 2004). For every 10-minute condition mean HR (in beats per minute, BPM) 
and mean HRV (root mean squared successive differences, RMSSD, in milliseconds) were calculated.  
 
Assessment of individual differences 
 Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990). This trait 
worry questionnaire consists of 16 self-report items that are directed at the excessiveness, duration, 
and uncontrollability of worry. The PSWQ has demonstrated high reliability, high temporal stability 





and substantial validity in the assessment of trait-worry (Meyer et al., 1990; Verkuil, Brosschot & 
Thayer, 2007). 
 State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Form (STAI-T; van der Ploeg, Defares & Spielberger, 1980). 
For measuring trait-anxiety we administered the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. It 
consists of 20 self-report items and earlier use has shown good internal consistency and validity (van 
der Ploeg et al., 1980).  
 
Biobehavioral variables 
Participants’ were asked to report the number of cigarettes, the number of cups of coffee, and the 
number of alcoholic beverages they had consumed before participating in this study, because this 
could influence their cardiac activity. For the same reason, participants were also asked to report the 
use of medication and chronic disease of themselves or their family, and their body mass-index (BMI) 
was measured.  
 
Statistical analyses 
The distributions of the heart rate variability variables were significantly skewed according to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, but could successfully be normalized using log transformations. For 
variables that could not successfully be normalized (the biobehavioral variables and indices of mood 
change between the conditions), we used the appropriate non-parametric tests (Spearman’s rho). To 
investigate differences in the physiological, cognitive, and mood variables between the conditions, 
repeated measures MANOVAs with condition (worry, cognitive problem solving, relaxation) as within 
subjects factor were used. To examine differences between individual means, we conducted pre-
planned t-tests. P values and effect sizes for repeated measures designs are reported (Dunlap, 




Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the cardiac variables and the trait 
questionnaires for males and females. The mean levels of trait worry and trait anxiety were in line 
with previous studies conducted with student participants. With respect to gender differences, t-
tests yielded no significant differences between women and men (all ps > .05), although inspection of 
the means suggested that women scored higher on the trait questionnaires and had higher HR and 
RMSSD than men. Spearman correlations between the biobehavioral variables (number of cups of 
coffee, cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, BMI, medication and medical history) and HR and RMSSD 







Table 1. Means and standard deviations of cardiac variables and trait questionnaires. 
 
 Males Females 
 M SD M SD 
 Heart Rate (bpm)     
Worry 75.28 9.38 78.01 11.77 
Relaxation 72.70 11.11 75.69 11.61 
Cognitive problem solving 75.22 11.21 78.01 11.86 
     
RMSSD (ms)     
Worry 37.07 15.22 46.21 31.92 
Relaxation 42.40 19.04 47.06 30.40 
Cognitive problem solving 36.01 13.54 43.74 28.98 
     
Trait worry  43.94 13.96 49.03 13.56 
Trait anxiety 39.61 13.95 41.21 9.00 
 
Manipulation check 
A repeated measures ANOVA with condition (worry, cognitive problem solving, and relaxation) as a 
within subjects factor on rated intensity of worry revealed a main effect of condition (F(2,104)  = 97.35, 
p < .0001, η² = .65). Pre-planned t-tests showed that the intensity of worry was significantly higher in 
the worry induction condition (M = 5.43, SD = 2.14) than in the relaxation (M = 0.43, SD = 1.15; t(52)  = 
15.97, p <.0001, r = .82) and cognitive problem solving conditions (M = 1.87, SD = 2.39; t(52)  = 8.52, p 
< .0001, r = .62). In addition, the intensity with which participants were worrying was equal to the 
intensity with which participants were thinking about the dilemmas (M = 5.32, SD = 2.13; t(52) = .30, p 
= .768, r = .02). A paired t-test also showed that participants rated the extent to which they found 
solutions to their worries to be lower (M = 4.51, SD = 2.33) than to the impersonal moral dilemmas 
(M = 6.81, SD = 1.81; t(52) = 5.90, p = .000, r = .48).  
 
Mood effects 
Figure 1 illustrates the mood ratings after the three conditions, compared to a baseline of how 
participants usually feel. Examination of the mood change scores showed that the worry induction 
led to higher levels of anxiety (t(52) =2.68, p = .010, r = .12) and tension (t(51) =2.57, p = .013, r = .11), 
whereas the cognitive problem solving task did not lead to any significant changes in mood (ps > .09) 
and the relaxation condition overall led to lower levels of negative mood than mood as usual (ps 





<.01). Subsequently, a repeated measures MANOVA with condition (worry, cognitive problem 
solving, and relaxation) as a within subjects factor was performed on the mood variables (anxiety, 
sadness, impatience, tension, irritation). The omnibus test yielded a significant effect of condition 
(F(10,194) = 5.17, p < .0001, η² = .21). Pre-planned t-tests showed that overall the worry induction led to 
more negative mood than relaxation (all ps <.01). In addition, the worry induction led to more 
anxiety (t(51) = 2.86, p = .003, r = .24), sadness (t(51) = 2.41, p = .021, r = .21), and tension than the 
cognitive problem solving task (t(51) = 2.67, p = .010, r = .24). No significant difference between the 
conditions emerged in the amount of irritation and impatience (ps >.35).   
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of worry, relaxation and cognitive problem solving on mood. Bars marked with asterices (*) are 
significantly different from baseline (mood as usual). Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
 
Cardiac effects  
Mean HR and RMSSD are shown in table 1 and figure 2. A repeated measures MANOVA with 
condition as a within subjects factor was performed on HR and RMSSD. A significant main effect for 
condition emerged (F(4,208) = 6.67, p < .0001, η² = .11). Pre-planned t-tests showed that HR was 






= 3.68, p = .001, r = .10) than during relaxation. HR did not differ between the worrying and cognitive 
problem solving conditions (t(52) = 0.02, p = .978). A complimentary pattern was found for RMSSD. 
RMSSD was significantly higher during relaxation than during worrying (t(52) = 3.07, p = .003, r = .06) 
and cognitive problem solving (t(52) = 3.63, p = .001, r = .09). RMSSD did not differ between the 
worrying and cognitive problem solving conditions (t(52) = 1.49, p = .143).   
To test whether the cardiac difference between worry and cognitive problem solving on the one 
hand and relaxation on the other could be due to changes in mood, change scores were calculated 
for mood, HR, and RMSSD by subtracting mean scores during relaxation from either worry or 
cognitive problem solving. Spearman correlations showed that changes in mood were not related to 
changes in HR and RMSSD (ps > .05). In addition, visual inspection of the graphs did not suggest 









Individual differences in cardiac activity  
As previous studies have suggested that gender, trait worry, and trait anxiety can account for 
differences between the cardiac effects of the conditions, we conducted two subsequent analyses to 
examine whether these individual differences moderated the cardiac effects of the conditions.  
Therefore, the means of HR and RMSSD of the combination of worry and problem solving cognitions 
were calculated, because as shown above there was no difference in their cardiac effects. A repeated 





measures MANCOVA with HR and RMSSD as within subjects dependent variables, gender as a 
between subjects factor, and trait anxiety as covariate did not yield significant results. The same 
analysis for trait worry showed that the Condition x Gender interaction approached significance 
(F(2,48) = 3.14, p =  .052, η² =  .12) and that the interaction effect Condition x Gender x Trait worry was 
significant (F(2,48) = 4.56, p = .015, η² = .16). To examine this three-way interaction effect, we 
performed a median split on the trait worry questionnaire (PSWQ scores: low trait worriers M = 
36.03 (SD = 6.41); high trait worriers M = 59.00 (SD = 8.54)). Pre-planned t-tests showed that trait 
worry and gender influenced the mean difference in RMSSD during the relaxation condition and the 
cognitive tasks, but not the observed difference in HR. Figure 3 shows the mean RMSSD separately 
for males and females, and for low and high trait worriers. Paired t-tests show what is clearly visible 
in figure 3, that is, that RMSSD was higher during relaxation than during worry and cognitive problem 
solving (ps < .05), except for female high trait worriers (t(19) = 0.58, p = .57) who showed equally high 




Figure 3. Individual differences moderating the effects of the cognitive tasks (worry and cognitive problem solving) and 
relaxation on RMSSD. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether the cardiac effects of experimentally induced worry 






and lower HRV during worry and cognitive problem solving compared to relaxation. Crucially for the 
goals of this investigation, the cardiac effects of induced worry were not different from cognitive 
problem solving per se.  
The cardiac effects of experimental worry compared to relaxation that we found in this study are in 
line with previous experimental studies (Davis et al., 2002; Hofmann et al., 2005; Lyonfields et al., 
1995; Thayer et al., 1996). Together, these results add important experimental evidence to the 
findings from real life studies that worry is associated with changes in cardiovascular, immunological, 
and endocrinological activation (Brosschot et al., 2006; Brosschot et al., 2007; McCullough et al., 
2007; Pieper et al., 2007). These studies offer support for the theory that worry or more generally 
'perseverative negative cognition' may represent an important risk factor for somatic disease, either 
on its own or by mediating the effects of other stress factors (Brosschot et al., 2006).  
However, the results of this study also suggest that the cardiac effects of induced worry are not 
different from cognitive problem solving per se. This might imply that mere mental load is 
responsible for at least a part of the physiological effects of worry, irrespective of the personal 
relevance of worrisome problem solving. Because it is unlikely that common daily cognitive problems 
can have substantial adverse health effects, it seems logical to infer that the adverse health effects of 
worry might be at least partly due to the prolonged mental load of worry, prolonged because worries 
tend to last longer than common cognitive problems and perhaps occur more often as well. Worry 
problems are by definition less easy to solve, if not unsolvable, compared to common problems. 
Indeed, participants came up with fewer solutions to their worry topics than to the moral dilemmas. 
Thoughts concerned with issues that have not been dealt with successfully are more accessible in 
memory (Zeigarnik, 1927). Furthermore, although we found that negative mood could not directly 
account for altered cardiac functioning, several studies have shown that negative mood experienced 
during worrying adds to the total time spent thinking about problems because it informs us that a 
problem has not been dealt with effectively (e.g., Startup & Davey, 2001). In addition, as worry often 
involves highly valued personal goals (Mcintosh et al., 1995), it is possible that people require more 
evidence before implementing solutions to personally relevant problems, which again adds to the 
time spent worrying (Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 1991). Consequently, worries intrude more often 
into awareness and are cognitively processed for much longer periods of time than non personal 
problems. Importantly, we have repeatedly shown that worry duration more so than worry 
frequency is associated with health complaints and prolonged cardiac effects (Brosschot & Van Der 
Doef, 2006; Brosschot et al., 2007; Pieper et al., 2007). As the duration of worry episodes may be 
longer lasting than the duration of cognitive problem solving episodes, the cardiac effects of worry 
may produce more sustained wear and tear on the system compared to cognitive problem solving 
[cf., the Neurovisceral Integration Model (Thayer & Lane, 2000) and the Allostatic Load Model of 





McEwen (McEwen, 2003)] It is interesting to note in this context that we have found that the cardiac 
effects of positive and negative emotions initially do not differ (Jacob et al., 1999) but that negative 
emotions are associated with more sustained cardiac effects than positive emotions (Brosschot & 
Thayer, 2003). Future studies should further investigate the naturally occurring time course of the 
cardiac effects associated with worrying and with cognitive problem solving. It is possible that, in 
parallel with the different time course of the cardiac effects of positive versus negative emotions, 
worry mainly differs from cognitive problem solving in having sustained cardiac effects. These 
different temporal effects may account for differential health consequences of worry versus problem 
solving. These speculations should be addressed in future momentary assessment studies that 
examine the cardiac effects of worry and cognitive problem solving in daily life.  
The results also showed that the HRV of women that were high in trait worry was equally high during 
the cognitive tasks as during relaxation. This result extends earlier findings showing that women high 
in depressive symptoms, including rumination, had higher baseline HRV compared to depressed men 
(Chambers & Allen, 2007; Thayer, Smith, Rossy, Sollers & Friedman, 1998). These findings have been 
taken as evidence that the increased HRV in women reflects a compensatory response which 
counteracts the perseveration of negative thoughts and mood: a higher HRV is positively associated 
with emotion regulation and frontal cortical activity which are thought to modulate the subcortical 
activity involved in sustained emotional reactivity (Thayer & Lane, 2000). This compensatory 
response may explain why women with subclinical depression have decreased mortality (Hybels, 
Pieper & Blazer, 2002).  
Several limitations of this study need to be addressed. First, we only examined indices of the 
cardiovascular system at the cardiac level, e.g., HR and HRV, but not at the peripheral vascular level. 
It remains unclear to what extent worry and cognitive problem solving have different effects on 
hemodynamic functioning, such as blood pressure, cardiac output, and total peripheral resistance. As 
several studies suggest that different mental and emotional tasks are associated with differential 
cardiovascular reactivity patterns (e.g., Lawler et al., 2001), it is warranted to conduct more studies 
that manipulate worry and compare its cardiovascular effects with relevant control conditions, such 
as cognitive problem solving. Second, although changes in self reported mood could not account for 
cardiac differences between conditions, it is possible that these differences could be accounted for 
by differences in emotionality that participants were not aware of. Several studies suggest that 
processing of emotional information that is presented subliminally can have autonomic effects 
independent of the conscious experience of negative affect (e.g., Levy, Hausdorff, Hencke & Wei, 
2000). A final limitation is that a relatively small, young and healthy sample was used. Although the 
sample of this study seemed to represent worriers on the full severity range, it would be useful to 






from GAD. Null findings always raise questions about statistical power. The current sample size was 
sufficient to detect small, medium, and strong effect sizes, according to Cohen (1988). It is possible 
that a larger sample size will yield small but significant differences between the conditions. It is quite 
possible that other participants than the healthy students in this study would worry about other, 
perhaps more severe, topics that would show stronger cardiac effects than during neutral problem 
solving. In addition, it is known that cardiovascular diseases, such as hypertension, develop over 
time, and it is possible that the immediate cardiac effects of different cognitive tasks are dissimilar 
when tested in an older sample.  
In sum, the results suggest that although worry enhances HR and reduces HRV, these effects are not 
different from engaging in mental problem solving. In addition, female high trait worriers showed a 









For decades the question that has been the focus of stress research is how stressful events can 
ultimately lead to disease. The main aim of this thesis was to add knowledge to this quest by 
examining the effects of worry about stressful events on somatic health, operationalized as somatic 
health complaints and slowed cardiac recovery after stress, both of which are associated with 
morbidity and mortality (Cole, 2000; Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Sha et al., 2005). Furthermore, the 
mechanisms by which worry was hypothesized to affect somatic health were examined. The studies 
reported in this thesis add to the accumulating number of studies testing the perseverative cognition 
hypothesis (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006), which is described in chapter 2. This hypothesis states 
that only prolonged cognitive representations of stressful events (perseverative cognition) lead to 
sustained or prolonged stress-related physiological activity which, in turn, can lead to somatic 
disease.  
 Taken together, the studies reported in this thesis provide evidence for the perseverative 
cognition hypothesis, that is, worry predicted adverse somatic health outcomes. In addition, the 
results of the studies presented in the second part of this thesis yielded several new and more 
specific hypotheses concerning the mechanisms behind the health effects of worry. These results 
warrant future studies that systematically test these hypotheses, or examine the robustness of the 
results already found. Below, the main findings from the studies reported in this thesis will be 
discussed, along with their limitations and their potential implications. 
  
Measurement of worry 
The majority of the studies testing the perseverative cognition hypothesis have relied solely on trait 
questionnaires measuring the tendency to worry or ruminate (Brosschot, Gerin & Thayer, 2006). It is 
commonly believed that these trait worry questionnaires are a good reflection of what people 
experience in their daily lives, but this had never been tested. Therefore, before testing the effects of 
perseverative cognition on somatic health, we examined the extent to which trait worry 
questionnaires correspond to worry in daily life. This study (see chapter 3) showed that trait worry 
questionnaires, like the well validated and reliable Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ), and 
momentary assessed real-life worry only have 24% shared variance. We therefore decided to include 
measures of state worry in our studies, either by using ecological momentary assessments (chapters 
4 and 5), by measuring the occurrence of worrisome thoughts using retrospective state 
questionnaires (chapters 6 and 7), or by experimentally inducing a worry episode (chapters 8 and 9). 
The fact that we not only found additional but also differential effects of trait and state measures of 
worry has important implications for future studies on worry. The decision about which measure to 





Worry and somatic health 
We examined the relation between worry and somatic health complaints, such as fatigue, headache 
and neck pain . Momentary assessed (state) worry in a sample of teachers was found to predict the 
occurrence of daily somatic complaints (Chapter 4). Furthermore, in line with the perseverative 
cognition hypothesis, this study was the first to show that worry mediated the effects that stressful 
events had on the occurrence of daily somatic complaints. This provides evidence for the idea that 
only prolonged effects of stressful events, in other words, worry, is the pathogenic ingredient in the 
link between stressful events and somatic health problems.  
In addition to these prospective effects, we  performed a randomized clinical trial in which 
we aimed to reduce the effects of worry on somatic and mental health in clinical outpatients 
suffering from severe work stress. The results (see chapter 5) showed that a simple worry 
intervention was effective in reducing the frequency and duration of nighttime worries, which in turn 
were associated with decreases in somatic complaints. Moreover, the intervention added to the 
effectiveness of a subsequent stress management therapy. In another recent study (not included in 
this dissertation) we tested the effectiveness of the worry postponement intervention in children 
and found that it was helpful in reducing worry and somatic complaints in seventh grade children 
(Jellesma, Verkuil, & Brosschot, 2009). In sum, three studies now provide evidence that reductions in 
worry are associated with reductions in somatic complaints (i.e. chapter 5; Brosschot & Van der Doef, 
2006; Jellesma, Verkuil, & Brosschot, 2009). Yet, the selectivity of the samples used (people suffering 
from severe work stress, children from primary and high schools) still leaves unexplored how the 
effects of reductions in worry generalize to the larger populations or other patient groups. 
Finally, as a third type of evidence supporting the PC hypothesis, we found that induced state 
worry increased cardiac activity  (chapter 9) and that trait as well as state worry were associated with  
slowed cardiac recovery after stress (chapter 6). In the latter study, state worry was operationalized 
as explicit worry (the amount of self-reported negative intrusive thoughts) as well as implicit worry 
(automatic vigilance measured with a lexical decision task). However, the results concerning implicit 
state worry were less straightforward than those from explicit state worry. Slowed recovery of the 
heart rate associated with slowed responses to control words depicting positive personality traits, 
and not with speeded responses to target words depicting task relevant / intelligence related 
information. Still, the results from the study provide further evidence for the perseverative cognition 
hypothesis and suggest that future studies should examine how implicit worry can be measured in 
more adequate ways. 
All in all, evidence, in real life as well as in the laboratory, now makes clear that worry might 




intervention focused on retraining the ability of worriers to disengage from worrisome thoughts can 
be helpful in reducing worries and somatic complaints.  
 
Worry and health: mechanisms 
In the second part of this thesis, three mechanisms behind worry and its health effects were 
examined. The effect of worry on the occurrence of somatic health complaints that was shown in 
chapters 4 and 5 posed the important question how these effects are brought about. As mentioned 
above, one mechanism might be the one proposed by the perseverative cognition hypothesis, that is, 
that worry induces prolonged activity that may lead to somatic problems. Another mechanism was 
tested in chapter 7, namely whether somatic complaints are caused by worry about specific health 
complaints. The theoretical rationale for this study was based on the work of Ursin and Eriksen 
(2001) and Brosschot (2002), who proposed that somatic health complaints are produced by 
sensitization (‘amplified processing’) of neural networks that are involved in the processing of pain 
signals, both at somatic as well as cognitive levels. Sensitization would be reflected in lowered 
tolerance of pain (somatic sensitization) and enhanced elaboration of health information (cognitive 
sensitization). The results of the study indeed showed that the severity of somatic health complaints 
was associated with lowered tolerance of cold-pressor pain and with enhanced recall of health 
related information. Importantly for the context of this thesis, worry about specific health complaints 
mediated the association between recall of health related information and somatic complaints. This 
suggests that at least part of the somatic complaints can be explained by the fact that people keep 
on worrying about them. This also increases the chances that people decide to consult their general 
practitioners (Looper & Kirmayer, 2001), which adds to the economical costs that are associated with 
these somatic complaints. The other route, the prolonged physiological activation one, was not 
extensively tested (see the next section for some reasons). However, we tested and found support 
for one important part of that hypothesis, namely that worry is associated with increased 
physiological activity. In doing this, we corroborated existing empirical evidence but also extended 
this by testing whether the physiological (i.e. cardiac) effects of worry (chapter 6) were due to its 
emotional components, rather than to pure mental load (chapter 9). The amount of worry after a 
stressful task can not be easily controlled experimentally and leaves much room for individual 
differences. Therefore, instead of focusing on worry measured after stressful events, as done in 
chapter 6, we decided to use an often used worry induction procedure. Furthermore, we used a 
within-subjects design in which the cardiac effects of induced worry were compared to the cardiac 
effects of relaxation and cognitive problem solving. As expected worry clearly increased cardiac 
activity compared to relaxation, a finding that corroborated a still limited set of previous studies' 




Montgomery, & Wilson, 2002; Hofmann et al., 2005). However, worry did this to nearly the same 
extent as non-worry problem solving, which pointed towards the interesting possibility that the 
cardiac effects of worry are mainly due to mental load, in contrast with the largely held position that 
worry enhances heart rate due to its emotional components.  
The success of the interventions (chapter 5) in reducing worry and health complaints suggest 
that it is possible to reverse some of the processes that cause worry. Since the interventions explicitly 
focused on disengaging from the worrisome thoughts, by observing them from a distanced 
perspective (chapter 5), it is tempting to believe that this was the process that was indeed changed. 
However, there was no proof of reduced disengagement in worriers in the literature, and it was 
difficult to test in these real life studies. Therefore we did this in a laboratory setting (chapter 8) and 
found evidence that worriers indeed have trouble disengaging from threatening information. More 
specifically, we showed that people who reported high worry as well as high anxious mood showed 
prolonged attention (sometimes referred to as ‘dwell time’ (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002)) to 
threatening stimuli in an exogenous cueing task. This was taken as evidence that these people have 
difficulties in disengaging attention from threat. Therefore, training anxious worriers to disengage 
from such information might be beneficial. Interestingly, it might explain the finding in chapter 5 that 
worry registering on itself was already beneficial in terms of reducing daytime worry. It is possible 
that registering facilitates disengaging. 
Below we will provide a theoretical integration of the main findings and will discuss these 
findings more in depth.  
 
Theoretical integration of the main findings 
The results of this thesis provide evidence for the extended perseverative cognition model that was 
presented in the introduction (see figure 1). The combined studies of the thesis suggest that 
perseverative cognition influences somatic health (chapter 4 and 5), either via prolonged 
physiological activity (chapters 6 and 9), or via a 'purely' cognitive route (chapter 7). In this thesis we 
found evidence for both these pathways, and it is interesting to speculate how they may be related.  
It is likely that worry about health, just like worry about other stressful events, affects 
somatic health by prolonging physiological responses. Prolonged physiological activity may not only 
be detrimental for health in itself, but may also produce bodily sensations that can be interpreted by 
individuals who worry about their health as additional signs that one is suffering from a serious 
disease. In an extreme form this vicious cycle is observed in people suffering from hypochondriasis. It 
is a similar vicious cycle as the one observed in panic disorder in which catastrophic interpretations 
of harmless bodily sensations trigger physiological responses that evoke panic attacks (cf. Olatunji, 




A special comment should be made about the role of negative affect that is included as a 
factor in the perseverative cognition model. As stressful events evoke worry as well as negative 
affect, it was examined if the effects of worry depended on negative affect or exceeded its effects. In 
line with previous studies (Watkins, 2008), we found that momentary assessed state worry predicted 
state negative affect (chapter 4). In turn, state negative affect predicted somatic health complaints 
independently from worry (chapter 4). State negative affect (anxiety) was also positively associated 
with prolonged attention towards threat, independently of the interaction between trait worry and 
trait anxiety (chapter 8). Yet, in chapter 9, heightened negative affect did not explain the cardiac 
effects of worry. As negative affect was associated with subjective health and prolonged attention to 
threat, but not with objective indicators of health, these studies together suggest that negative affect 
might affect health mainly via the cognitive pathway, that is, by prolonging the attention that is paid 
to (the detection of) bodily signals and towards their catastrophic misinterpretation. In addition, 
negative affect enhances the prolongation of worry episodes by signaling that a problem hasn’t been 
dealt with effectively, called mood-as-input (Startup & Davey, 2001; Davey, 2006). This prolonged 
worrying is likely to be accompanied by prolonged increases in physiological activity that, via the 















Enhanced processing of threat:










Figure 1. The extend perseverative cognition model 
 




In this thesis somatic health was operationalized as somatic health complaints and slowed cardiac 
recovery. The latter is actually an intermediate step between the experience of stressful events and 
ill health. Our main interest was in examining the role of worry in explaining these two adverse 
health outcomes, and therefore we did not address whether slow cardiac recovery mediated the 
effect of stressful events on somatic health complaints, nor did we test the cognitive pathway leading 
from daily worries about ones health to daily somatic complaints. A practical reason not to test these 
mediating pathways was that this would have required an elaborated real life study that would have 
covered a whole thesis (e.g., Pieper, 2008). Thus, future research should certainly consider 
investigating the link between somatic complaints and prolonged physiological activity. In fact, the 
cardiac effects of worry in real life as found by Brosschot et al., (2007) and Pieper et al. (2007) makes 
it tempting to speculate that at least a part of the health complaint effects of worry found in the 
current studies is due to prolonged physiological activity in real life. According to the perseverative 
cognition model, prolonged physiological activity should lead to increased somatic, organic problems. 
These organic problems should eventually be accompanied by bodily signals that can eventually be 
reported as somatic complaints. Yet, to date, relatively little is known about how prolonged activity 
of several bodily (e.g., cardiovascular, immune, endocrine) systems leads to somatic complaints, 
although several promising theories exist that are being currently investigated. In the context of 
chronic fatigue, Wyller et al. (2009) recently proposed that severe fatigue is due to prolonged 
physiological activity. Correlational evidence supported this idea by showing that people suffering 
from the chronic fatigue syndrome had elevated blood pressure and heightened body temperature 
when compared to controls (cf. Wyller, Eriksen, & Malterud, 2009). Yet, other studies found no 
differences in stress-related physiological activity between people suffering from multiple somatic 
complaints and healthy controls (Houtveen & van Doornen, 2007). In addition, another model for the 
link between prolonged physiological activity and somatic complaints was provided by Dantzer 
(2004; 2005) who proposed that pro-inflammatory cytokines, which can be induced by immune as 
well as non-immune (e.g., psychological) stressors, trigger sickness behavior, including somatic 
complaints, without necessarily inducing substantial activity in other physiological systems, such as 
the autonomic systems.   
Future studies are clearly warranted to test both the physiological and the cognitive pathway 
in real life and also to gain more insight into how worry affects other physiological systems and how 
they are related to somatic complaints.  
  
Specific components of worry, cardiac activity, and the moderating role of gender  
The results from chapter 9 indicated that the cardiac effects of worry are mainly due to mental load. 




when they are non-emotional, are at heightened risk of developing health problems (although it is 
likely that it is easier to disengage from non-emotional topics than from emotional ones). However, 
the results from this study are in contrast with another recent study. In this study, the physiological 
difference between worry and mental load, that is, mental arithmetic (Oathes, Bruce, & Nitschke, 
2008) was tested in a sample of men. Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the primary motor cortex 
yielded larger corticospinal motor responses during worry than during mental load. This was taken as 
evidence that in contrast with pure mental load, worry, due to its emotional component, is more 
closely associated with action preparation to escape from a threatening situation (the so called ‘fight-
flight’ response). Yet, one could cast some doubt on the successfulness of the worry induction used 
in this study as differences in motor responses between the worry induction and a resting baseline 
were only marginally significant and only so for just one of the used indices of motor preparation. 
Inspection of the exact instructions provided to participants showed that during the worry induction, 
participants were instructed to relax their bodies, in order to allow an uncontaminated measurement 
of the motor responses. This instruction to ‘relax while worrying’ questions the validity of the 
procedure to induce worry. Nevertheless, it seems imperative to use a combination of physiological 
indices to further elucidate which components of worry are responsible for its physiological effects.  
 Another interesting finding from the studies described in chapters 6 and 9 pertains to gender 
differences. In line with animal studies showing gender differences in physiological responses to 
stress (Taylor et al., 2000), the studies reported in chapters 6 and 9 suggest that differences exist 
between men and women in cardiac vagal control during or after task performance. These 
differences were moderated by the tendency to ruminate (chapter 6) or worry (chapter 9). This 
gender difference was most clearly shown in chapter 9, in which we found that only female high trait 
worriers responded with increased heart rate variability during both cognitive problem solving and 
worrying compared to relaxation. Males and female low trait worriers showed reduced HRV during 
these mental tasks when compared to relaxation. In chapter 6 we found that in a largely female 
sample (80%), the tendency to brood about ones negative mood predicted increases in HRV during 
recovery after a stressful task. However, this effect was not found for the tendency to worry, which 
predicted decreases in HRV during recovery. It remains unclear why we did not consistently find that 
trait worry was associated with increased HRV during or after mental stress in women. Furthermore, 
a firm empirical basis for gender differences in physiological stress reactions is still lacking. Yet, as 
proposed in chapter 6, it is likely that trait worry and trait rumination exert their influence on cardiac 
activity via prolonged explicit and implicit cognitive representations of stressful events that arise in 
the anticipation or aftermath of these events. Recent work on the content of these representations 
showed that thinking about recent experiences of anger from a ‘self-distanced’ rather than a ‘self-




some cognitive representations of stressful events more easily trigger physiological responses than 
others, and men and women differ in the amount of these thoughts, this could possibly explain the 
inconsistency in the current findings. Furthermore, it could suggest that the function of perseverative 
cognitions differs by gender. For example, men might be more prone to show a prolonged fight-flight 
response in reaction to prolonged worry, while worry might encourage women to engage in tend-
and-befriend behavior (Taylor et al., 2000), like communicating about their sorrows and fears with 
others. This latter form of perseveration is termed co-rumination (Rose, Carlson, & Waller, 2007) and 
might facilitate a self-distanced perspective on stressful events. It might explain several rather 
puzzling findings, not only the enhanced HRV in high trait female worriers in this study, but also 
enhanced HRV in depressed women (Thayer, Smith, Rossy, Sollers, & Friedman, 1998; Chambers & 
Allen, 2007) and even the lower cardiovascular risk of depressed women as opposed to depressed 
men (Hybels, Pieper, & Blazer, 2002).  
The above makes clear that asking how frequent or long participants were thinking about a 
stressful event is not enough, and that more information is needed on in what way they where 
thinking about this event (that is, self-distanced versus self-immersed; concrete versus abstract; 
verbal thoughts versus images). Future studies that manipulate the exact content of the cognitive 
representations of stressful events among males and females are clearly needed to clarify gender 
differences in stress-related physiological responses. 
 
Worry and the processing of concern-relevant information 
Although investigating the cognitive correlates of worry was not the main aim of this thesis was per 
se, the cognitive elaboration of concern-relevant information was measured in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
One perspective on how worry might be associated with information processing was offered in 
chapter 2. In general, information pertaining to a discrepancy between ones current state and ones 
goals (goal discrepancy) tends to stay activated until this discrepancy has been resolved, making it 
likely that people will start worrying about the discrepancy. We also proposed that in extreme 
worriers this discrepancy is persistently activated because they interpret even neutral or safety 
information as a threat to their current concerns (cf. Nitschke et al., 2009). Although methodological 
differences between the studies presented in this thesis limit firm conclusions, it might be interesting 
to summarize and discuss what this thesis adds to the current knowledge on worry and information 
processing.  
First, in contrast with Koole et al. (1999) and Forster et al. (2005), we did not find that 
inducing a goal discrepancy (failure versus mixed failure and success) in chapter 6 led to 
perseveration of concern relevant information, that is, either explicit worry or implicit worry 




performing an unsolvable task predicted speeded reactions to concern-relevant information (i.e. 
words related to intelligence) in the lexical decision task. The data of the lexical decision task made 
clear that the interpretation of this task is difficult as one can both expect speeded as well as slowed 
reactions to concern-relevant words (see also: Siegle, Ingram, & Matt, 2002; Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 
2004). Yet, the slowing down of responses to concern-relevant words would be in line with the idea 
that worry and its associated emotional states (anxiety and sadness) are associated with prolonged 
attention towards concern-related information (chapter 8). As these effects have not yet been 
systematically examined, we do not recommend using the lexical decision task to measure implicit 
perseverative cognition.  
In a second study (chapter 7) we found that after having exposed participants to a cold-
pressor task, health worry was associated with enhanced recall of concern-relevant information 
(measured with an incidental free recall task). This finding is in line with studies showing that people 
suffering from generalized anxiety disorder and other anxiety disorders have biases in explicit 
memory (Friedman, Thayer, & Borkovec, 2000; Russo et al., 2006; Mitte, 2008). However, we did not 
find that health worry was associated with enhanced attention towards health information 
(measured with a modified Stroop task), which is in contrast with studies finding Stroop interference 
in patients suffering from generalized anxiety disorder (Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995; 
Taghavi, Dalgleish, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 2003) We already proposed that this might have 
been due to the cold-pressor task that preceded the modified Stroop task which might have 
overruled the association between health worry and biased attention. Another explanation for not 
finding an association between health worry and biased attention might be that it is just not present 
in a healthy sample, or too subtle to be captured with a modified Stroop task. Health worry involves 
enhanced processing of current internal bodily sensations, and information about one’s own health 
that is stored in memory (‘I am a person who gets a cold easily, having a cold is terrible’). This 
attentional focus inwards might not be captured by a Stroop task that presents information 
externally on a computer screen. Attention towards external health information might only be 
observed when people have more severe complaints such as asthma or psoriasis (e.g., Fortune et al., 
2003; Jessop, Rutter, Sharma, & Albery, 2004), or when they have read about and communicated 
with others about these complaints.  
Still, worry in general, not limited to health, was associated with attentional processes in 
chapter 8. In this study we were the first to show that worry and anxiety interact and together 
predict prolonged dwell time on threat (angry schematic faces). In contrast with the modified Stroop 
task used in chapter 7, the task used in chapter 8 (exogenous cueing task) assessed spatial attention, 
that is, attention towards objects that are not presented at the location where one is currently 




makes it possible to distinguish between the components of attention (orienting, engaging and 
disengaging), whereas the results from a modified Stroop task do not permit this distinction. Given 
that the interpretation of modified Stroop tasks are also under debate (Algom et al., 2004) and 
exogenous cueing tasks have yielded consistent results (e.g., Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 
2006; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006), we advise future studies into 
the attentional correlates of worry to use exogenous cueing tasks. 
In sum, worry was most strongly related to biases in explicit memory and to prolonged 
attention for threat in this thesis. This knowledge is of particular importance since cognitive biases 
now can be modified which might reduce emotional distress (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, 
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). Furthermore, as we proposed in chapter 2, these cognitive biases might 
have adverse physiological consequences that have to be examined in future studies. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
One of the major strengths of the studies presented in this thesis is that worry was not only 
measured using trait questionnaires. Besides being a more sensitive and better reflection of current 
real-life experiences of people, the advantage of using these state measures is that they can provide 
more information about the temporal dynamics (daytime versus nighttime worry) and the 
pathogenic ingredients of worrying (frequency, duration or intensity). For example, in chapter 5 we 
showed that especially nighttime worry was associated with health outcomes. Furthermore, daily 
worry predicted somatic complaints in chapter 4, while a trait measure of worry that provided a 
more global estimate of daily worries, the PSWQ, did not. However, a complication of the use of 
more than one index of daily worry is that they did not yield a consistent pattern of results 
concerning what aspects of worry were most detrimental for one’s health. In chapter 4 we found 
that somatic complaints were predicted by worry duration and to a lesser extent by worry frequency, 
although these effects diminished when worry intensity was entered into the model. In chapter 5 we 
found that somatic complaints were best predicted instead by the frequency of worry episodes in the 
nighttime, and not by worry duration. These contrasting findings could likely be explained by 
differences in the methodology used (time based sampling in chapter 4 versus event based sampling 
of worry frequency and daily retrospective assessments of worry duration in chapter 5), but limit firm 
conclusions and warrant studies that test this explanation.  
 A second strength of this thesis is that the findings are not limited to one specific population, 
but can be easily generalized to a broader Western population. We studied the health effects of 
worry in relatively young and healthy student (chapters 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9) who are well suited to study 
worry on the full severity range (Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001). However, we also studied the 




stress (that is, teachers, chapter 4) and in people suffering from severe work stress, diagnosed with 
adjustment disorders (chapter 5). This latter population has only received little attention from clinical 
psychologists who are merely focused on more severe clinical populations. Non- or sub-clinical worry 
and somatic health complaints are very common and are responsible for huge personal suffering and 
high economical costs. More work on how to reduce the detrimental effects of worry is clearly 
required. 
 A third strength is that we did not solely rely on self-report questionnaires in the 
operationalization of our outcome measure, somatic health. Although subjective evaluations of one’s 
health are the main determinant of whether one will visit a doctor or will call sick from work, the 
combination of subjective and objective measurements of ones health status results in more 
convincing evidence in support of the perseverative cognition hypothesis.  
One could argue that the correlational / prospective nature of some of the findings is a 
limitation of this thesis. Yet, the cross-sectional and prospective findings that worry is associated with 
somatic complaints and cardiac activity (chapters 4 and 6) were followed up by studies using 
experimental designs that were aimed to directly manipulate worry (chapter 5: between subjects 
design; and chapter 9; within subjects design), thereby aiming to provide information of the causal 
relation between worry and health. Furthermore, in the introduction we already mentioned that the 
studies concerning the mechanisms behind worry (chapter 8) and its health effects (chapter 7) were 
set up to provide initial evidence for the proposed hypotheses, and to stimulate further research. We 
therefore believe that in order to test these hypotheses, it was justified to start off with cross-
sectional designs. Yet, since the hypotheses tested were confirmed, experimental studies should 
further examine their tenability.      
Another limitation to the results is that we can not provide a definite answer to the question 
at what level worry becomes detrimental to one’s health. As described in chapter 2, worry can be 
regarded as a primarily adaptive response to threat. Only when people have repeated or continuous 
difficulties inhibiting worrisome thoughts, it is usually regarded as a clinical mental problem. 
Normative data exist for scores on trait worry questionnaires that facilitate decisions made by 
general practitioners and other clinicians on whether someone worries too much (and likely suffers 
from generalized anxiety disorder) and needs psychological treatment, such criteria have to be 
regarded with caution and cannot replace clinical interviews. With respect to somatic health, studies 
have shown that even non-clinical worry can be detrimental to one’s somatic health (e.g. chapter 4). 
Yet, it is highly questionable whether a precise dose-response relationship between worry and 
somatic complaints will ever be established. Other factors that were not the main focus of the 
present studies also co-determine whether people will be more or less vulnerable for the 




differences exist that predispose people for the development of somatic complaints (Gillespie, Zhu, 
Heath, Hickie & Martin, 2000), making it likely that individual differences exist in the total 
physiological load that people can handle before their health is affected. 
 
Practical implications 
This thesis resulted in the formulation of innovative hypotheses concerning the effectiveness of 
costly and time consuming stress management therapies (SMTs). The results of the study reported in 
chapter 5 suggest that SMTs can be enhanced if specific attention is being paid to the reduction of 
worry. Part of this intervention already forms part of the manual of occupational physicians on how 
to deal with work related stress (van der Klink & van Dijk, 2003) and the results of chapter 5 evidently 
advocate its use.  
Besides the worry postponement and disengagement intervention, several other worry 
interventions exist, such as Competitive Memory Training (Korrelboom, Van der Gaag, Hendriks, 
Huijbrechts, & Beretty, 2008); Mindfulness Meditation (Jain et al., 2007), Attentional Bias Retraining 
(Hazen, Vasey, & Schmidt, 2009) and Concreteness Training (Watkins & Moberly, 2009). These 
interventions are aimed at different aspects of the worry process. As such, it is recommendable to 
compare the effectiveness of several of these interventions and to examine for who a specific 
intervention works best, which likely depends on factors like the severity of one’s complaints, 
personality characteristics and co-morbid problems.  
 
Conclusions and future directions  
We can conclude from the studies presented in this thesis that when people keep on worrying about 
stressful events they report more somatic complaints and that they physiologically recover more 
slowly from such events compared to people who do not worry. Several ventures for future research 
have already been mentioned in the foregoing, here we will summarize the most important 
suggestions.  
  One important next step would be the replication of the studies presented in the second 
part of this thesis that examined the mechanisms behind worry and its health effects (chapters 7 – 
9). Studies using ecological momentary assessments should be conducted to test whether worry 
about specific health complaints indeed predict somatic health complaints (‘the cognitive pathway’). 
Furthermore, the cardiac effects of worry in daily life should be compared to that of non-emotional 
problem solving. In these studies gender differences should also be a main aim of investigation, given 
that the results of these studies suggest that men and women respond differently to stress.  
 A second venture would be to study the effects of implicit perseverative cognition. As 




without conscious awareness and these might have physiological consequences. A first aim of studies 
should be to investigate how to capture implicit perseverative cognition. Thereafter, the 
physiological effects of implicit perseverative cognition during the daytime as well as during the 
nighttime, during sleep, should be examined.  
 Third, the effectiveness of relatively easy to administer worry interventions should be 
examined in larger populations. Dissemination of effective worry interventions can help preventing 
severe forms of work stress, anxiety, depression and somatic health problems. Besides being 
beneficial for individuals suffering from sub-clinical forms of these complaints, such interventions 
might also help to reduce the negative effects that these complaints have on job performance or 
absenteeism. Furthermore, they might as well help reducing the burden that clinical forms of these 
complaints currently place on health care systems (Jorm & Griffiths, 2006).  
In sum, since its publication in 2006 (Brosschot et al., 2006), the perseverative cognition 
hypothesis has received gaining interest from researchers and has received support from several new 
studies (Pieper, Brosschot, van der Leeden, & Thayer, 2007; Zoccola, Dickerson, & Zaldivar, 2008; 
Holman et al., 2008; Brosschot, van Dijk, & Thayer, 2007). The studies presented in this thesis yielded 
additional support that worry is associated with somatic health complaints and prolonged cardiac 
activity, and extended the perseverative cognition model by pointing toward several new cognitive 
mechanisms underlying these relationships. Notably, two commonly held beliefs were challenged: (1) 
trait questionnaires are not sufficient to measure worry as they only predict a small extent of worry 
experiences in daily life and (2) the cardiac effects of worry are not due to its negative emotional 
experiences as we found that non-emotional problem solving yielded similar cardiac effects. All in all, 
this thesis further strengthens and extends the evidence for the view that prolonged cognitive 
representations of stress (worry) are crucial in the link between stressful events and somatic health 
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Perseveratieve cognitie: de invloed van piekeren op gezondheid 
 
Iedereen maakt zich wel eens zorgen. Piekergedachten over werk, gezondheid of financiële 
problemen kunnen op zichzelf al als storend en vervelend worden ervaren en gaan vaak gepaard met 
gevoelens van angst. In dit proefschrift is er gekeken of piekeren een negatieve invloed heeft op onze 
lichamelijke gezondheid. Hoewel veel onderzoek al heeft laten zien dat stressvolle gebeurtenissen 
een negatieve invloed hebben op onze lichamelijke gezondheid, doordat ze bijvoorbeeld de kans op 
hart- en vaatziekten vergroten, is er nog weinig bekend over de invloed van het piekeren over 
stressvolle gebeurtenissen op de lichamelijke gezondheid.  
 Centraal in het proefschrift staat de ‘perseveratieve cognitie hypothese’, welke in de 
hoofdstukken 1 en 2 wordt geïntroduceerd. Perseveratieve cognitie is een term die sinds 2006 
gebruikt wordt voor verschillende vormen van persisterende of herhaalde mentale, cognitieve 
representaties van stressvolle gebeurtenissen. Dit kunnen bijvoorbeeld angstige piekergedachten zijn 
over gebeurtenissen die nog moeten of zouden kunnen plaatsvinden, maar ook sombere gedachten 
over dingen die in het verleden zijn gebeurd. Volgens de perseveratieve cognitie hypothese hebben 
stressvolle gebeurtenissen een negatieve invloed op onze lichamelijke gezondheid omdat mensen 
over deze gebeurtenissen blijven piekeren. De fysiologische activiteit die optreedt tijdens een 
stressvolle gebeurtenis zou verlengd worden doordat mensen in gedachten met de stressvolle 
situatie bezig blijven. Wanneer deze fysiologische activiteit te lang doorgaat zou dit ten koste kunnen 
gaan van de lichamelijke gezondheid. Mensen zouden hierdoor meer lichamelijke klachten 
rapporteren en uiteindelijk ook hart- en vaatziekten kunnen ontwikkelen.  
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een overzicht gegeven van de studies waarin de perseveratieve cognitie 
hypothese is onderzocht. Dit overzicht maakt duidelijk dat onderzoeken in laboratoriumsettings laten 
zien dat piekeren na een stressvolle gebeurtenis zorgt voor een vertraagd herstel van de bloeddruk 
en het niveau van stresshormoon cortisol. Studies in het dagelijks leven laten zien dat de hartslag 
tijdens piekerperiodes is verhoogd, vergeleken met periodes van rust. Prospectieve studies laten 
bovendien zien dat piekeren is geassocieerd met het ontwikkelen van cardiovasculaire 
gezondheidsproblemen. Daarnaast wordt in dit hoofdstuk een model gepresenteerd waarin piekeren 
wordt gezien als een logische eerste reactie op bedreiging, nieuwigheid en onzekerheid. Drie 
psychologische factoren worden besproken die ervoor zorgen dat  deze reactie bij chronische 
piekeraars blijft voortduren: het extreem veel waarde hechten aan het behalen van bepaalde doelen, 






verminderd vermogen om in te zien dat er geen onmiddellijk gevaar dreigt, oftewel tekenen van 
veiligheid te herkennen.  
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht of veelgebruikte vragenlijsten over piekeren als individuele 
eigenschap (‘dispositioneel piekeren’) kunnen voorspellen hoe vaak en hoe lang iemand in het 
dagelijkse leven piekert. Dit is van belang omdat een groot deel van het onderzoek naar piekeren 
gebruikt maakt van deze vragenlijsten, terwijl het niet bekend is of ze wel bruikbaar zijn om 
daadwerkelijk piekergedrag te voorspellen, laat staan dat ze bij kunnen dragen aan het onderzoek 
naar de lichamelijke effecten van piekeren in het dagelijkse leven. De resultaten van de studie uit dit 
hoofdstuk wijzen uit dat slechts 24% van het piekeren in het dagelijkse leven wordt voorspeld door 
deze veelgebruikte piekervragenlijsten. Het is dus aan te raden om naast vragenlijsten over 
dispositioneel piekeren ook gebruik te maken van zogeheten ambulante meetmethoden, waar de 
hoeveelheid piekeren in het dagelijkse leven mee in kaart kan worden gebracht.  
Om de perseveratieve cognitie hypothese te toetsen worden in de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 de 
effecten van piekeren op lichamelijke gezondheid onderzocht. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt bekeken of 
piekeren het aantal lichamelijke klachten (bijvoorbeeld nekpijn, buikpijn, en verkoudheid) dat 
mensen dagelijks rapporteren kan voorspellen. Bovendien wordt bekeken of piekeren het effect van 
stressvolle gebeurtenissen op het aantal lichamelijke klachten kan verklaren. Voor deze studie 
hielden 69 docenten gedurende een week, met behulp van palmtops, dagelijkse registraties bij van 
stressvolle gebeurtenissen, piekeren en lichamelijke klachten bij. De resultaten lieten zien dat de 
vooral de intensiteit van het piekeren het aantal lichamelijke klachten voorspelde en bovendien het 
effect van stressvolle gebeurtenissen verklaarde. Deze studie ondersteunt hiermee de perseveratieve 
cognitie hypothese: stressvolle gebeurtenissen hebben een negatieve invloed op onze lichamelijke 
gezondheid omdat mensen over deze gebeurtenissen blijven piekeren.  
Om te bekijken of een vermindering van piekeren ook zou leiden tot een vermindering van 
lichamelijke klachten is een interventieonderzoek gedaan, welke in hoofdstuk 5 is beschreven. Eerder 
onderzoek liet namelijk al zien dat een korte piekerinterventie, het opschorten van piekeren naar 
een dagelijks piekerhalfuur, effectief was in het verminderen van piekeren en lichamelijke klachten 
bij adolescenten. Het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 5 richtte zich op mensen die kampten met werkstress 
en die op de wachtlijst stonden voor een stress-management-therapie bij PsyQ. Omdat piekeren ook 
een centrale rol speelt bij het in stand houden van stressgerelateerde psychische klachten zoals angst 
en depressie, is in dit onderzoek ook bekeken of een vermindering van piekeren tevens een effect 
heeft op deze psychische klachten. Het tweede doel van dit onderzoek is te bekijken of een korte 
piekerinterventie (opschorten en leren loslaten van piekergedachten) aangeboden voorafgaand aan 
de stress-management-therapie effectief is in het versterken van deze therapie. Het idee hierachter 





en dat het aanpakken van een dergelijk proces noodzakelijk is voor een effectieve behandeling. De 
resultaten van deze studie waren dat de piekerinterventie, vergeleken met het registreren van 
piekeren, leidde tot minder, en minder lange, piekerepisoden gedurende de nacht, maar niet 
overdag. Een vermindering van het aantal piekergedachten in de nacht was ook gerelateerd aan een 
vermindering aan het aantal lichamelijke klachten dat de deelnemers rapporteerden. Bovendien 
hadden – conform de verwachtingen – de deelnemers die voorafgaand aan de stress-management-
therapie iets hadden gedaan aan het piekeren meer profijt van deze therapie; ze rapporteerden drie 
maanden na afloop van de therapie minder lichamelijke en depressieve klachten dan de mensen die 
de piekerinterventie niet hadden gekregen. Aangezien vorige studies geen duidelijke effecten vonden 
van stress management therapieën op lichamelijke klachten, is dit een relevante bevinding die zeker 
gerepliceerd dient te worden.  
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt het effect van piekeren op het herstel van de hartslag en de 
hartslagvariabiliteit na een inspannende cognitieve taak (het moeten oplossen van onoplosbare 
analogieën) onderzocht. Vertraagd herstel van de hartslag is een voorspeller van cardiovasculaire 
problemen. Voorgaand onderzoek suggereerde al dat piekeren het herstel van de hartslag na 
emotionele gebeurtenissen kon vertragen, maar de resultaten waren echter niet eenduidig. In dit 
onderzoek is zowel naar de rol van piekeren als persoonlijkheidskenmerk gekeken als naar de 
hoeveelheid gerapporteerde negatieve gedachten na afloop van de cognitieve taak. Geheel nieuw 
was het meten van ‘onbewust piekeren’ na afloop van de cognitieve taak door middel van een 
lexicale-decisie-taak. Het is goed mogelijk dat mensen zich niet bewust zijn van een groot gedeelte 
van hun stressgerelateerde piekergedachten. Een heel groot gedeelte van onze dagelijkse 
informatieverwerking vindt plaats zonder dat we ons daar bewust van zijn, en het is mogelijk dat dit 
ook voor het verwerken van stressvolle gebeurtenissen geldt. De resultaten van dit onderzoek lieten 
zien dat zowel de neiging om te piekeren als het daadwerkelijke aantal negatieve piekergedachten 
geassocieerd zijn met een vertraagd herstel van de hartslag na de cognitieve taak. De resultaten van 
de meting van het ‘onbewuste piekeren’ waren echter lastig te interpreteren en vervolgonderzoek 
zou zich moeten richten op het onderzoeken van welke testen er geschikt zijn om ‘onbewust 
piekeren’ mee te kunnen meten.  
In het kort gezegd ondersteunen de resultaten van de studies uit hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 in 
grote lijnen de perseveratieve cognitie hypothese. In de hoofdstukken 7, 8 en 9 zijn enkele 
mechanismen onderzocht die mogelijk verklaren waarom piekeren een effect heeft op lichamelijke 
gezondheid.  
Hoewel de perseveratieve cognitie veronderstelt dat piekeren tot lichamelijke klachten leidt 
doordat piekeren stressgerelateerde fysiologische activiteit verlengd, is er nog een alternatieve route 






piekergedachten over gezondheid. Volgens het zogenaamde sensitizatie-model ontstaan en 
verergeren lichamelijke klachten doordat pijn- en andere negatieve signalen uit het lichaam op alle 
niveaus (o.a. perifeer, ruggenmerg, hersenstam, limbische structuren, cortex) versterkt worden 
weergegeven. Mensen met extreem veel lichamelijke klachten zonder medische verklaring zouden 
lichamelijk gevoeliger zijn voor pijn, meer aandacht schenken aan gezondheidsinformatie in het 
dagelijkse leven, deze beter onthouden en bovendien ook vaker piekeren over hun gezondheid. In 
deze studie is onderzocht of dit ook opgaat voor meer alledaagse lichamelijke klachten, zoals 
hoofdpijn en rugpijn in verder gezonde vrouwelijke deelnemers. De resultaten van de studie in 
hoofdstuk 7 laten zien dat de ernst van verschillende lichamelijke klachten inderdaad geassocieerd 
zijn met een verlaagde tolerantie voor pijn en een beter geheugen voor gezondheidsgerelateerde 
informatie. Bovendien was de ernst van de klachten geassocieerd met de mate waarin de 
deelnemers piekerden over de lichamelijke klachten. Dit piekeren verklaarde ook de relatie tussen 
het versterkte geheugen voor gezondheidsinformatie en de ernst van de lichamelijke klachten. 
Hoewel dit correlaties zijn, en de richting van de oorzakelijkheid hiermee niet aangetoond, is, lijkt dit 
te suggereren dat piekeren ook via andere wegen dan de fysiologische een belangrijke invloed kan 
hebben op onze gezondheid.  
Het gebruik van een piekerinterventie gericht op het leren opschorten en loslaten van 
piekergedachten (hoofdstuk 5) werd ondersteund door de resultaten van de studie beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 8. In deze studie werd aangetoond dat mensen die zich angstig voelen èn bovendien veel 
piekeren, moeite hebben om hun aandacht los te maken van bedreigende informatie.  
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt een studie beschreven waarin werd bekeken of de effecten van 
piekeren op de hartslag en hartslagvariabiliteit toe te schrijven zijn aan de emotionele componenten 
van piekeren (zoals vaak wordt aangenomen), of aan het feit dat mensen tijdens het piekeren ook 
cognitief heel actief bezig zijn. Vergeleken met een periode waarin de deelnemers werd gevraagd om 
zich te ontspannen, bleken zowel piekeren als hard nadenken over niet persoonlijk relevante 
problemen dezelfde effecten te hebben op de hartslag en op de hartslagvariabiliteit. De effecten van 
piekeren op hartactiviteit lijken dus niet veel hoger te zijn dan die van neutrale problemen oplossen. 
Ligt dat effect van piekeren dan vooral aan de mentale inspanning ervan? Vervolgonderzoek zal meer 
duidelijkheid moeten geven over de consequenties van deze bevinding.  
In het laatste hoofdstuk worden alle bevindingen nog eens op een rijtje gezet en besproken 
in het kader van de houdbaarheid van de perseveratieve cognitie hypothese. Een belangrijke 
conclusie is dat deze hypothese wordt ondersteund door de bevindingen in dit proefschrift. Piekeren 
heeft een negatieve invloed op lichamelijke klachten en op het herstel van de hartslag na een 
inspannende taak. Bovendien wordt het perseveratieve cognitie model uitgebreid doordat de 





levert het proefschrift bewijs op dat een korte interventie gericht op piekeren een daarop volgende 
stress management therapie versterkt. Van de vele vragen die nog resten zijn misschien wel de 
belangrijkste of piekeren ook onbewust of automatisch kan plaatsvinden, hoe dit het beste gemeten 






Ik kan volmondig toe geven dat ik ontzettend heb genoten van de afgelopen jaren waarin ik heb 
kunnen werken aan mijn proefschrift. De door velen gevreesde AIO-dip is mij ontgaan en dat heeft in 
hoge mate te maken met de vele mensen die ik gedurende mijn promotietraject heb mogen 
ontmoeten. Het zijn er vele, en enkelen wil ik hier hierbij in het bijzonder bedanken.  
 
In de eerste plaats Jos Brosschot. Ik heb jouw persoonlijke stijl van begeleiden altijd zeer 
gewaardeerd. Onze ideeënstroom is nog lang niet uitgeput en ik kijk uit naar de komende jaren van 
samenwerking. This PhD project also wouldn’t have been possible without the support from Julian 
Thayer. Julian, from our first meeting on you’ve always been very enthusiastic and encouraging. It 
was really an honor and a pleasure to collaborate with you.   
 
Daarnaast wil ik alle mensen die hebben deelgenomen aan de onderzoeken beschreven in dit 
proefschrift bedanken. Alle studenten, docenten en cliënten van PsyQ Business: bedankt voor de 
inzet en het doorzettingsvermogen waarmee jullie de dagelijkse logboeken hebben ingevuld en de 
experimentele procedures hebben ondergaan. Zonder jullie deelname was dit een mager boekje 
geworden! 
 
Het onderzoek naar de effecten van een korte piekerinterventie in een klinische setting vond plaats 
op een afdeling die thans helaas niet meer bestaat: PsyQ Business (voorheen Arbeid en Psyche 
Nederland, voorheen Centrum Arbeid en Psyche; voorheen Ockenburgh Prevent). Ik waardeer de 
onvoorwaardelijke steun die ik vanaf het eerste moment kreeg van Ria Reul-Verlaan om het 
onderzoek op haar afdeling uit te voeren. Ondanks alle veranderingen waar de afdeling aan 
onderhevig was bleef jij je hard maken voor het onderzoek. Onmisbaar bij het ontwerpen van dit 
onderzoek was de input van Kees Korrelboom. Dank voor jouw kritische en heldere manier van 
denken waardoor dit onderzoek nog beter kon worden opgezet. Ook zonder de A(lgemene) G(roep) 
A(rbeid)-therapeuten van het eerste uur was dit onderzoek niet mogelijk geweest: Helma, Huub en 
Ton, bedankt voor jullie inzet! Karlijn, dank voor je hulp met het verzamelen en invoeren van de data 
van dit project. Mila, dank voor de motiverende gesprekken die we over onderzoek hebben gehad. 
Veel dank ben ik ook verschuldigd aan Fred Sterk die mij motiveerde om de overstap te maken naar 
arbeidsrelevante hulpverlening en me vele kansen bood. En uiteraard een ‘big thank you’ naar alle 
andere collega’s van de afdeling; ik heb de afgelopen jaren als collega behandelaar altijd met veel 
plezier met jullie samengewerkt. Eindelijk kan ik jullie vraag “is je piekeronderzoek eigenlijk al klaar?” 






Alle collega’s van de afdeling Klinische, Gezondheids en Neuropsychologie: ontzettend bedankt voor 
de afgelopen gezellige jaren. Dankzij jullie ging ik elke dag met veel plezier naar mijn werk. De 
‘stressmeetings’ boden me een plek om mijn warrige hoofd, vol met data die ik niet kon 
interpreteren of met nog te vage onderzoeksideeën, te structureren. In het bijzonder wil ik Emma en 
Maarten noemen: ik heb warme herinneringen aan onze ‘drie-uurtjes’, de steun die we aan elkaar 
konden vragen en vooral de lol die we met elkaar hebben gehad. Esther, voor jou geldt hetzelfde, ik 
vind het een tof vooruitzicht dat we de komende jaren nog zullen blijven samenwerken! Ik ben er 
heel blij mee dat jij en Maarten mijn paranimfen zijn! Ook Marieke en Jacobien (in dezelfde periode 
aan een promotietraject begonnen en nu klaar!), Peter, Suzanne (mede-piekeraar), Nicole en Ilya 
dank voor jullie gezelligheid en adviezen. Arnold, het schrijven van een stressboekje samen met jou 
was zo ontzettend niet stressvol, hier moeten we in de toekomst toch echt een vervolg aan geven! 
 
Om van dag tot dag goed te kunnen functioneren is het van belang werkgerelateerde zaken af en toe 
los te laten en goed te herstellen. Vrienden en muziek en de combinatie daarvan zijn daarvoor 
onontbeerlijk. Vandaar een speciaal woord van dank aan al mijn bandgenoten van de afgelopen 
jaren. Lieve Anna, tegelijkertijd aan de studie psychologie begonnen en sindsdien de beste maatjes. 
Ik ben blij met zo’n goede vriendin als jij. Gerben en Michiel, inmiddels maak ik al meer dan de helft 
van m’n leven dikke plezier met jullie. Dat geeft me veel energie.  
Ten slotte wil ik mijn lieve familie bedanken, jullie zijn altijd belangstellend geweest en waren 
bij voorbaat al trots op de weg die ik aan het bewandelen was. Lieve pap en mam, Petra en Dianne, ik 
voel me onvoorwaardelijk door jullie gesteund. Zonder die basis was ik nergens. Lieve Kitty, jij geeft 
me de liefde en rust die ik nodig heb gehad om dit project tot een goed einde te brengen; je bent het 
mooiste wat mij is overkomen. 
 
I don't quite know  
How to say  
How I feel  
Those three words  
Are said too much  
They're not enough  
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